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Abstract 
Searle’s theory of Biological Naturalism has been largely ignored in the philosophical literature 
and Searle’s commentators are confused by his seemingly contradictory views.  In this 
dissertation I attempt to make sense of Biological Naturalism.  In chapter 2 I will ascertain 
which concerns prevent Searle’s readers from understanding his position.  The remaining 
chapters aim to dissolve the tensions and dispel any confusion.   
Chapter 3 considers Searle’s notion of first-person ontology, finding that it expresses a belief 
that experiences are essentially subjective and qualitative.  In chapter 4 I consider the notions 
of levels of description, causal reduction and what Searle means by causation and realisation.  
Chapter 5 turns to the question of how to categorise Searle’s position.  Many of his critics 
charge him with being a property dualist.  By highlighting the difference between the meaning 
of irreducibility intended by the property dualist and Searle I show that there is sufficient 
difference in their use of the term so as to reject an interpretation of Biological Naturalism as 
a form of property dualism.  Chapter 6 is where I turn to the other end of the 
physicalism/dualism spectrum and assess whether Searle should be seen as holding a form of 
identity theory.  I first argue for a neutral form of identity that I call real identity, which does 
not include the inherent reductive privileging of standard identity.  I then argue that Searle 
should be seen as advocating a form of real identity theory; a form of token identity theory 
which does not privilege the physical over the mental. 
In chapter 7 I return to the main barriers to making sense of Biological Naturalism which I 
identified in chapter 2 and lay out my response to each.  I conclude with a coherent 
interpretation of Searle’s position. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1. A unique position within philosophy of mind? 
Experiences seem to be subjective and first-personal, physical items seem to be objective and 
third-personal, and yet we know that experiences are correlated with states of the brain.  The 
puzzle of how first-personal subjective experiences are related to third-personal objective 
brain processes has been under debate for centuries.  The current landscape of positions 
which are available is broad and varied.  At one end are extreme physicalist positions such as 
eliminativism, which tries to eliminate subjective experiences altogether, resulting in a view of 
the world which contains only strictly physical items.  At the other end is substance dualism, 
which takes the reality of subjective experiences so seriously as to posit a fundamental divide 
in the ontology of reality between the mental and the physical.  In between are a whole host 
of other options, such as reductive physicalist positions which accept subjective experiences 
but claim that they are nevertheless “nothing but” some kind of physical state.  Towards the 
other end, property dualism accepts the ontological divide between mental and physical, but 
only in relation to properties, that is to say that certain physical items will have both mental 
and physical properties.   
Realistically, the majority of philosophers of mind position themselves not at one of the 
physicalist or dualist extremes but somewhere in the middle, where they try to find a balance 
between respecting the advances made in understanding both the universe, and the 
knowledge gained from neuroscience, whilst avoiding denying the obvious facts that we really 
do experience qualitative subjective states of conscious experience.  John Searle’s theory of 
Biological Naturalism tries to walk this fine line between reductive physicalism and dualism.  
Searle states, 
‘I see the human brain as an organ like any other, as a biological 
system.  Its special feature, as far as the mind in concerned, the 
feature in which it differs remarkably from other biological organs, is 
its capacity to produce and sustain all of the enormous variety of our 
consciousness’1  
He sees himself as providing a theory which contrasts with both reductive physicalism and 
property dualism, believing that he has taken the best of both of these theories and discarded 
                                                          
1
 Searle J. The Rediscovery of the Mind p.227 
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their mistakes to forge a unique position.  Searle believes that Biological Naturalism has 
embraced physicalism’s claim that ‘the universe is entirely made up of physical particles that 
exist in fields of force and are often organized into systems’ but rejected physicalism’s 
insistence ‘that there are no ontologically irreducible mental phenomena’.2  At the other end 
of the scale, Searle considers Biological Naturalism to accept the property dualist’s belief that 
‘there are irreducible mental phenomena’ whilst denying that such irreducibility means that 
experiences ‘are something apart from the ordinary physical world we all live in, that they are 
something over and above their physical substrate’.3  The point here is that property dualism 
and reductive physicalism are usually seen as mutually exclusive positions, at opposite ends of 
the spectrum of possible positions.  Reductive physicalism for example, reduces experiences 
to physical brain states, yet property dualism views experiences as irreducible.  Searle is, in 
effect, trying to have his cake and eat it – he is trying to create a theory which is both partly 
dualistic and partly physicalist, whilst denying he is either.  It is therefore unsurprising that 
Searle has been interpreted by some as being a property dualist and by others as being an 
identity theorist.  In other words, it seems that his critics think Searle fails to successfully walk 
the very fine line between the two positions that Searle considers himself to have achieved.  
In this dissertation I will be defending my belief that it is possible to make sense of Searle’s 
theory of Biological Naturalism as a coherent theory, and indeed view it as a position which 
does provide an unusual combination of claims from both sides of the physicalist and dualist 
traditions. 
2. Searle’s Biological Naturalism – key features 
As well as not abiding by categories of positions in philosophy of mind, seeming to choose 
aspects of positions at will to create a pick’n’mix theory, Searle does not accept many of the 
standard uses of terminology in philosophy of mind.  With this in mind before I embark on the 
task of making sense of Biological Naturalism I will briefly summarise its main features.  As it 
contains many interdependent concepts which Searle has his own terminology for, I’ll briefly 
outline them here so that the reader always has the bigger picture in mind and can place 
discussions of the specifics of Searle’s theory in a broader picture of Biological Naturalism as a 
whole. 
                                                          
2
 Searle J. Mind: A Brief Introduction p.88 
3
 Searle J. Mind: A Brief Introduction p.88 
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a) Conceptual dualism 
Underpinning Searle’s Biological Naturalism is a denial of what he terms conceptual dualism.  
He describes it like this; 
‘It is customary to think of dualism as coming in two flavours, 
substance dualism and property dualism; but to these I want to add 
a third, which I will call “conceptual dualism.”  This view consists in 
taking the dualistic concepts very seriously, that is, it consists in the 
view that in some important sense “physical” implies “nonmental” 
and “mental” implies “nonphysical.”’  Both traditional dualism and 
materialism presuppose conceptual dualism, so defined.  I introduce 
this definition to make it clear why it seems to me best to think of 
materialism as really a form of dualism.  It is that form of dualism 
that begins by accepting the Cartesian categories.  I believe that if 
you take those categories seriously – the categories of mental and 
physical, mind and body – as a consistent dualist, you will eventually 
be forced to materialism.  Materialism is thus in a sense the finest 
flower of dualism.4 
Searle therefore believes that both materialism and dualism are founded upon an acceptance 
of conceptual dualism; they both assume that mental features and physical features of the 
world are mutually exclusive and are therefore in need of being reconciled, or their 
interactions explained.  In other words, Searle believes that within philosophy of mind, 
‘It is assumed that “mental” and “physical” name mutually exclusive 
ontological categories.  If it is mental then it cannot be in that very 
respect physical.  And if it is physical, then it cannot be in that very 
respect mental.  Mental qua mental excludes physical qua physical’5 
Searle finds this “conceptual dualism” too restrictive, for he wants to claim that experiences 
are both mental and physical, using the standard vocabulary, which seems contradictory.  He 
puts it like this; 
‘The property dualist wants to say that consciousness is a mental and 
therefore not physical feature of the brain. I want to say 
consciousness is a mental and therefore biological and therefore 
physical feature of the brain. But because the traditional vocabulary 
was designed to contrast the mental and the physical, I cannot say 
what I want to say in the traditional vocabulary without sounding 
like I am saying something inconsistent.’6 
                                                          
4
 Searle J. The Rediscovery of the Mind p.26 
5
 Searle J. Mind: A Brief Introduction p.76 
6
 Searle J. “Why I Am Not A Property Dualist” p.61 
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So Searle believes that conceptual dualism prevents him from saying that experiences are 
ordinary biological features of the brain, yet they also have a first-person ontology, which is 
another of his own terms, which I will now present. 
b) First-person ontology 
The dualistic aspect of Searle’s Biological Naturalism can be seen in his doctrine of first-person 
ontology.  First-person ontology is central to Searle’s criticism of reductive theories in 
philosophy of mind; 
‘Much of the bankruptcy of most work in the philosophy of mind and 
a great deal of the sterility of academic psychology over the past fifty 
years, over the whole of my intellectual lifetime, have come from a  
persistent failure to recognize and come to terms with the fact that 
the ontology of the mental is an irreducibly first-person ontology’7 
With his doctrine of first-person ontology Searle is referring to many of the features of 
experience which are highlighted in dualistic theories of mind such as an essentially qualitative 
nature and being linked to a particular point of view.  Searle describes it thus; 
‘Because of the qualitative character of consciousness, conscious 
states exist only when they are experienced by a human or animal 
subject.  They have a type of subjectivity that I call ontological 
subjectivity.  Another way to make this same point is to say that 
consciousness has a first-person ontology.’8 
This notion of first-person ontology is, according to Searle, the reason why experiences are 
ontologically irreducible, to which I will now turn. 
c) Ontological irreducibility 
Although, unlike the previous three concepts, ontological irreducibility is a well-recognised 
locution in philosophy of mind, however, Searle’s meaning of it is not standard.  Whilst the 
ontological irreducibility of experiences lies at the heart of dualistic theories of mind, Searle 
clearly states his belief that the notion of ontological irreducibility is ‘the crucial distinction 
between my view and property dualism’.9  Searle describes this distinction thus;  
                                                          
7
 Searle J. The Rediscovery of the Mind p.95 
8
 Searle J. Mind: A Brief Introduction, p.94 
9
 Searle J. “Why I Am Not A Property Dualist” p.60 
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‘The dualist supposes that the irreducibility of consciousness already 
implies that consciousness is something over and above its 
neurobiological base.  I deny that implication.’10 
Searle asserts that experiences are ontologically irreducible, in that ‘a complete description of 
the third-person objective features of the brain would not be a description of its first-person 
subjective features.’11 Although he adds that this is merely a ‘trivial consequence of our 
definitional practices’.12  Searle’s claim of ontological irreducibility is made hand-in-hand with 
the claim that experiences are what he calls causally reducible to underlying brain states. 
d) Causal reduction 
Causation and reduction are widely used and discussed notions in philosophy, but Searle 
creates the notion of a specifically causal type of reduction, claiming that it is in this restricted 
sense that experiences can be seen as reducible.  He describes causal reduction thus; 
‘We can say that phenomena of type A are causally reducible to 
phenomena of type B, if and only if the behaviour of A’s is entirely 
causally explained by the behaviour of B’s, and A’s have no causal 
powers in addition to the powers of B’s’13 
When applied to experiences, Searle talks of experiences having no causal powers in addition 
to those had by the neuronal states in our brains; 
‘Causally speaking, there is nothing there, except the neurobiology, 
which has a higher level feature of consciousness. In a similar way 
there is nothing in the car engine except molecules, which have such 
higher level features as the solidity of the cylinder block, the shape 
of the piston, the firing of the spark plug, etc.’14 
For Searle, Biological Naturalism is a position where a denial of conceptual dualism frees him 
to claim that experiences are biological features alongside other processes in our bodies like 
digestion.  However, they also have a first-person ontology, in that they are ‘essentially 
subjective’15 but this poses no problem, Searle believes, because the denial of conceptual 
dualism breaks down the barrier for a subjective item to also be physical.  The first-person 
ontology of experiences is the basis for his notion of the ontological irreducibility of 
experiences, which is held in conjunction with the belief that experiences are causally 
                                                          
10
 Searle J. Mind: A Brief Introduction pp.88-89 
11
 Searle J. “Why I Am Not A Property Dualist” pp.60-61 
12
 Searle J. Mind: A Brief Introduction p.84 
13
 Searle J. Mind: A Brief Introduction p.83 
14
 Searle J. “Why I Am Not A Property Dualist” p.60 
15
 Searle J. The Rediscovery of the Mind p.20 
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reducible.  All of these concepts are closely intertwined and involve some non-standard 
pairings of claims, and the unusual features of Searle’s position have led to most philosophers 
being unable to make sense of Biological Naturalism.  The different chapters of my 
dissertation will address the various obstacles to making sense of Searle’s position, and aim to 
make sense of Searle’s claims within Biological Naturalism.  I will now summarise the chapters 
to come so that the reader will be aware of the direction of argument as they read.  
3. Chapter summaries 
Chapter 2 - Motivating the thesis 
There are many apparent contradictions within Biological Naturalism such as experiences 
being both reducible and irreducible, being caused by the brain but also realised in the brain, 
and ontological irreducibility being a mere trivial consequence of how we define reduction, 
yet based on the substantive ontological claims of first-person ontology.   
In chapter 2 I will survey the literature and categorise the criticisms put forth by Searle’s 
commentators.  These will cover both specific criticism, like Searle’s use of seemingly 
inadequate examples to explain his ideas, and more general critique such as Searle not 
achieving the unique position within the options of philosophy of mind and actually being a 
version of a different position, such as property dualism or identity theory. 
I will then draw out the main barriers that prevent Searle’s critics from making sense of 
Biological Naturalism and use them as the basis of each of the subsequent chapters.  This way 
I will deal with all the concerns that his critics have, and remove the barriers to making sense 
of Biological Naturalism. 
Chapter 3 - Making sense of first-person ontology 
In chapter 3 I will tackle the problems surrounding first-person ontology.  It is not always 
entirely clear from what Searle says what he intends the label of first-person ontology to 
indicate, so I will look at the features that he associates with first-person ontology and the role 
it plays within Biological Naturalism.  To analyse the notion of first-person ontology I then 
attempt to break down the possible features that Searle intends to convey with first-person 
ontology, such as a perspectival nature, an essential qualitative feel, and whether, or in what 
sense, experiences are private or have any form of special access.   
12 
 
I will conclude that when he refers to the first-person ontology of experiences, he is making 
the dual claim that experiences are essentially qualitative and subjective in nature, in that it 
feels a certain way to undergo an experience, and that experience is essentially restricted to a 
subject’s first-person view of the world.   
I will then explore whether first-person ontology is as unconventional a notion as Searle’s 
terminology might suggest and find that Searle is expressing views that have been long held 
by anti-reductionist philosophers.  Given Searle’s other physicalist-style claims I point out how 
his concept of first-person ontology highlights a problematic tension within Biological 
Naturalism; first-person ontology is suggestive of dualism, but Searle’s claims of causal 
reduction is suggestive of physicalism.   
Chapter 4 - Making sense of levels of description and causal 
reduction 
In chapter 4 I move onto Searle’s concept of causal reduction and the claim that experiences 
are both caused by and realised in the brain.  By exploring Searle’s use of levels of description 
and highlighting how Searle seems to be an extensionalist  about properties, individuating 
them via differing causal powers, I will look at the problem of mental causation as a way of 
uncovering in more detail what Searle means by his claim of causal reduction.   
I will conclude that Searle uses the notion of realisation in a fairly standard way, but has such 
an unusual view of causation in relation to experiences that it is tantamount to standard 
realisation.  This resolves the worry about Searle claiming that experiences are both caused by 
and realised in the brain.  I find that by causal reduction, Searle is referring to the way in which 
a particular token brain state which is correlated to an experience undergone by a subject 
comes under two types; “experience” and “neuronal activity”.  The claim of causal reduction 
itself is that the brain state in question has particular causal powers and that the experiential 
way of picking out the token brain state is equally descriptive of those causal powers as the 
neuronal way of picking it out. 
Chapter 5 - Is Searle a property dualist?  
In chapter 5 I confront the criticism that Searle is a property dualist.  By looking in depth at 
property dualism and the claim of irreducibility which is at its core, I show how this 
irreducibility amounts to the belief that experiences are something over and above the 
physical brain, thus ontologically separating physical properties from mental ones.  I then 
analyse Searle’s notion of irreducibility and his claim that it is merely a trivial consequence of 
13 
 
the way that we define and use the process of reduction.  Given this belief, irreducibility for 
Searle becomes the mere inapplicability of reduction to experiences.   
However, I go on to draw out the tension between Searle’s trivial sense of irreducibility and 
his belief that experiences have a first-person ontology, which seems to coincide more with 
the substantive sense of irreducibility that the property dualist uses.  I explore whether Searle 
can succeed in his seeming quest to render experiences irreducible, but not too irreducible.  I 
finish with a discussion of whether Searle has sufficiently tackled the substantive problem at 
the heart of the mind-body problem; how first-personal subjective experiences can arise from 
essentially objective brains.  I use the work of Howell and his insistence that certain states 
have to be instantiated to be fully grasped to explain Searle’s approach to the mind-body 
problem.  I highlight how Searle seems to opt for a brute assertion that some brain states just 
are subjective when instantiated by a subject. 
Chapter 6 - Is Searle an identity theorist? 
In chapter 6 I look at what I find to be the most compelling criticism of Searle, that his 
Biological Naturalism is tantamount to a form of identity theory.  I spend some time looking 
in-depth at identity theory and argue that the standard format includes an inherently 
reductive aspect; a privileging of the physical over the mental.  I develop the terminology of 
real-identity to mean a neutral identity claim without any accompanying reductive privileging, 
and show how this might lead to a real identity theory, which makes the claim of identity 
between token brain states and token experiences, but does not include any privileging of the 
physical over the mental.   
Having established this new way of approaching identity theory, I assess whether Searle can 
be seen as an identity theorist.  Concluding that he cannot be justly interpreted as a 
traditional reductive identity theorist, I make the argument that Biological Naturalism both 
can, and should, be seen as a form of real identity theory.  I again draw on the work of Howell, 
and Searle’s use of levels of description to explain my interpretation of Searle as a real identity 
theorist.   
I will now move on to establishing the motivation for this thesis – showing how philosophers 
are very confused about exactly what Searle is claiming, and setting out the barriers within 
Searle’s theory which make it difficult to a make sense of Biological Naturalism.
14 
 
Chapter 2 – Motivating the thesis 
1. Introduction 
In his book The Rediscovery of the Mind, Searle is characteristically confident in his views and 
equally dismissive of his opponents leading Thomas Nagel to describe Searle as ‘a 
dragonslayer by temperament’1 whose book is ‘trenchant, aggressive, and beautifully clear, in 
Searle’s best “What is all this nonsense?” style’.2  The response to this book is hugely varied, 
and ranges from tentative agreement, to charging Searle with either closet token identity 
theory3 or property dualism4, to simply dismissing Biological Naturalism as incoherent5 or 
‘infuriating’.6 Many criticise ‘his bull-in-the-china-shop routine’7 and find his assertive nature 
of presenting his ideas concerning; 
‘Someone less self-confident might reason: "I must be missing 
something; these colleagues of mine are coming out too stupid for 
words!" but if this occurs to Searle, it does not prompt any serious 
consideration by him’8 
What is clear is that most philosophers cannot make their way through Searle’s rhetoric and 
assuredly confident style to make sense of his seemingly self-contradictory claims, for 
example, that experiences are both reducible and irreducible. As Collins puts it, ‘he wants to 
have his cake and eat it too’.9 
The cornerstone of Searle’s book is the ‘radical thesis, that consciousness is a physical 
property of the brain in spite of its subjectivity, and that it is irreducible to any other physical 
properties’.10  The claim is that materialism has left out the most important feature of 
consciousness – the subjective, qualitative nature of experiences – and that Searle wishes to 
‘put back in what has been left out, but he wants to put it back into the brain itself’.11  This 
                                                          
1
 Nagel T. “Searle: Why We Are Not Computers” p.96 
2
 Nagel T. “Searle: Why We Are Not Computers” p.110 
3
 For example, see Kenyon T. “Searle Rediscovers What Was Not Lost” 
4
 For example, see Olafson F. “Brain Dualism”,  Nagel T. “Searle: Why We Are Not Computers” or Palmer 
D. “Searle on consciousness: or how not to be a physicalist” 
5
 For example, see Dennett D. “Review of Searle” 
6
 Stoutland F. “Searle’s Consciousness” p.245 
7
 Dennett D. “Review of Searle” p.204 
8
 Dennett D. “Review of Searle” p.204 
9
 Collins C. “Searle on Consciousness and Dualism” p.27 
10
 Nagel T. “Searle: Why We Are Not Computers” p.103 
11
 Olafson F. “Brain Dualism” p.256 
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results in him trying to offer ‘a hybrid of the two positions he ostensibly rejects’,12 whereby 
Searle takes himself to be melding the best of materialism and dualism, whilst leaving out 
what, in his opinion, they each get wrong.  However, most commentators either disagree 
entirely with Searle, charging him with being at either end of the materialism-dualism 
spectrum that he claims to bypass, or are merely exasperated by the process of trying to 
understand the substance of his theory.  There is, therefore, confusion over ‘what kind of view 
is Searle advocating; a property identity theory or a property dualism?’13 and the critique that 
‘Searle’s attempt to have it both ways is inconsistent’14 because he ‘cannot consistently 
maintain both his physicalist stance toward mental phenomena and his phenomenological 
characterization of those same phenomena’.15  Most philosophers considering Searle’s work 
would agree that ‘Searle has failed to show that consciousness can be both irreducibly 
subjective and a normal physical feature of the brain’.16 
The confusion over Searle is evidenced by the range of interpretations of his work, from all 
over the materialism-dualism spectrum.  How can it be that the same philosopher is 
interpreted by some as a reductive identity theorist and by others as a property dualist?  How 
can his views cause such confusion in those reading them and give rise to all manner of claims 
of incoherence and inconsistency?  In this chapter I will simply set out the main criticisms 
against Searle, categorising them in such a way as to highlight the areas that philosophers feel 
unable to make sense of.  I will start with general theory-wide issues such as Searle’s claim 
that he has moved away from the traditional mental/physical divide in philosophy of mind, 
and the corresponding criticism that he has in fact merely replaced the mental/physical 
categories with those of subjective/objective.  Searle is also criticised for misconstruing his 
opponents, whether that be characterising all materialist positions as eliminativist, and 
missing out any discussion of non-reductive physicalism, misrepresenting the process of 
reduction itself, or creating a straw man out of property dualism.  I will then consider more 
specific critiques of Searle’s Biological Naturalism, such as concern over whether his causal 
reduction is in fact causal, a denial that Searle’s simultaneous causation either exists or should 
be seen as causation, and doubts over whether the causal reduction of experiences that 
Searle sees as non-problematic can actually be achieved.  Finally, I will move to criticisms that 
Searle has not, as he claims, created a new position in philosophy of mind which transcends 
                                                          
12
 Olafson F. “Brain Dualism” p.255 
13
 Garrett B. “Non-Reductionism and John Searle’s The Rediscovery of the Mind” p.211 
14
 Palmer D. E. “Searle on Consciousness: or How not to Be a Physicalist” p.159 
15
 Palmer D. E. “Searle on Consciousness: or How not to Be a Physicalist”  p.168 
16
 Palmer D. E. “Searle on Consciousness: or How not to Be a Physicalist”  p.159 
16 
 
the usual options, but is actually either a property dualist or a materialist/identity theorist in 
disguise. 
Ultimately, this chapter will set the scene for my thesis.  By showing how confused 
commentators are by Searle’s claims, I hope to motivate my project of trying to make sense of 
Biological Naturalism.  I agree with Nagel that ‘if this view could be clarified in a way that 
distinguished it from the alternatives, it would be a major addition to the possible answers to 
the mind-body problem’,17 which I think justifies an investigation into whether it is possible to 
give a plausible and coherent reading of Biological Naturalism which can lay to rest the 
concerns I will present in this chapter. 
2. Theory-wide criticism 
Some criticism of Searle’s work applies in general to his theory as a whole, or to the overall 
underpinnings of his theory.  For example, Searle declares that he has transcended the mental 
vs. physical conceptual divide that he believes to be prevalent in philosophy of mind, yet his 
opponents charge him with replacing the categories of mental vs. physical with those of 
subjective/first-person vs. objective/third-personal.  Another complaint against Searle is that 
he has misconstrued the positions of his opponents, with the result of either creating a straw 
man of his opponents that is overly easy to defeat, or drawing an apparent distinction 
between himself and rival positions when in fact no such distinction exists.  Searle is criticised 
for either construing all materialists as eliminative materialists, and ignoring the contribution 
to the discussion of non-reductive materialism, or misconstruing the beliefs of property 
dualists so as to distance himself from that position, falsely so in the eyes of some of his 
critics.  Finally, many commentators have complained that the examples Searle uses to convey 
his ideas are insufficiently robust, for example, the use of solidity as a parallel example to 
explain consciousness is denigrated on the basis that it is too dissimilar from consciousness to 
do the explanatory job Searle asks of it. I will now explore these critiques further. 
a) Criticism 1: Searle replaces one terminological dichotomy with 
another 
One of the foundations of Searle’s theory of Biological Naturalism is his belief that the 
problems that beset dualism and materialism, as he sees them, stem from a misconception on 
the part of philosophers about what “mental” and “physical” mean.  For Searle, philosophy of 
mind is plagued by a conceptual dualism, as he calls it, whereby our terminology reflects 
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conceptual categories which are ‘designed around a false opposition between the “physical” 
and the “mental”’18 such that, 
‘“Mental” and “physical” name mutually exclusive ontological 
categories.  If it is mental then it cannot be in that very respect 
physical.  And if it is physical, then it cannot be in that very respect 
mental.  Mental qua mental excludes physical qua physical’19 
Searle sees Biological Naturalism as transcending the dichotomy between mental and physical 
that is characteristic of conceptual dualism, thus liberating him to claim that ‘there is no 
problem in recognizing that the mental qua mental is physical qua physical’.20  Some 
philosophers have criticised Searle because in their eyes, ‘biological naturalism is enmeshed in 
the same philosophical tradition from which Searle claims to be departing’.21  In fact, many 
argue that despite seeing it is a big problem that philosophy of mind continues ‘to accept a 
traditional vocabulary that contrasts the mental and the physical, the mind and the body, the 
soul and the flesh, in a way that I think is confused and obsolete’,22 Searle simply replaces the 
mental/physical dichotomy with the subjective/objective one.  I will discuss below why his 
opponents believe this to be the case. 
A key tenet of Biological Naturalism is Searle’s claim that experiences have a first-person 
ontology, and that their essential subjectivity cannot be captured in third-personal objective 
terms.  He contrasts subjective, qualitative experiences with objective third-personal features 
of the world;  
‘The real “physical” world contains both entities with a third-person 
ontology (trees and mushrooms, for example) and entities with a 
first-person ontology (pains and colour experience, for example)’23 
Despite vehemently rejecting the mental/physical terminology of standard philosophy, Searle 
nevertheless maintains a distinction between the first-personal and third-personal, and 
between the subjective and objective.  Such distinctions have been used by philosophers such 
as Nagel to argue the now familiar points about the irreducibility of subjective experiences to 
objective scientific features of the world, and that the first-personal cannot be captured by 
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the third-personal.24  This shows that substantial metaphysical conclusions about experiences 
can be established without the need to refer to the categories of “mental” and “physical”.  
Searle echoes this by trying to avoid the use of “mental” or “physical” when explaining his 
ideas within Biological Naturalism.  He says of the terms “mental” and “physical”,  
‘Since my use of these terms runs dead counter to over three 
hundred years of philosophical tradition, it would probably be better 
to abandon this vocabulary altogether’25 
Searle’s central claims of Biological Naturalism, the dual claims of causal reduction and 
ontological irreducibility for experiences, are based on such a distinction of first-personal and 
third-personal – it is the subjective character of experiences that means that they are, in 
Searle’s eyes irreducible to objective third-personal phenomena: 
‘For any conscious being, there is a what-it-is-like aspect to its 
existence.  And this is left out of any objective account of 
consciousness because an objective account cannot explain the 
subjective character of consciousness’26 
These features of Searle’s theory have led his critics to point out the curiousness of lambasting 
the mental/physical dichotomous vocabulary and ways of thinking on one hand, and 
underpinning his own theory with the subjective/objective divide on the other.  It seems fair 
that his critics ask Searle why retaining an apparent ontological split, but using different words 
to describe it, makes any difference to the overall issue or indeed overcomes the dichotomy 
he so strongly criticises.  Thus Jacquette complains that ‘Searle denounces what he calls 
conceptual dualism while adopting what is essentially the same dichotomy between objective 
and subjective factors of consciousness in explaining his concept of causal reduction’.27  
Palmer feels much the same way;  
‘Searle’s assurance that he has finally overcome the traditional 
paradigms in which the nature of consciousness has been explicated 
begins to strain under closer scrutiny’ because ‘Searle’s view of 
consciousness does not so easily bypass the traditional philosophical 
concerns that found the debate between materialism and dualism as 
he would have us believe’28 
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Olafson complains that Searle’s language is the mainstay of the very tradition he is aiming to 
transcend;  
 ‘the predicates – ‘inner’, ‘subjective’, etc. – that convey the 
character of what materialism is supposed to have left out have long 
been the stock-in-trade of the very dualists to whom Searle declares 
himself to be strongly opposed’29 
He views Searle as reproducing the same old dichotomy of traditional philosophy of mind. 
However, because of Searle’s insistence on biological naturalism and causal reduction of 
experiences, Olafson feels that, 
‘What he thus appears to be doing is reproducing all the 
inside/outside contrasts of traditional dualism quite literally inside 
our heads; and ‘brain dualism’ does seem the right name for such a 
paradoxical undertaking’30 
Corcoran seems to feel similarly, holding the view that Searle’s theory is a reaction against 
reductive theories of mind, and an attempt to reintroduce the subjective nature of 
experiences.  As Corcoran sees it, ‘in the absence of any immaterial mind there is just one 
place to relocate them [experiences], and that place is the brain’.31  Corcoran believes that this 
attempt to reintroduce an irreducibly subjective nature to experiences shows that Searle has 
reintroduced the dualistic dichotomy that he had originally aimed to bypass; 
‘It is important to see that although Searle himself rejects dualisms 
of both the property and substantial sorts his own biological view 
seems nevertheless to reproduce the same divisions of classical 
dualisms – subjective/objective and first-person/third-person’32 
This criticism of replacing one dichotomy of terminology for another, strikes at the heart of 
Searle’s claim to have created a truly unique position in the spectrum of options in philosophy 
of mind.  This is because it accuses him of simply being embedded in the traditionalist 
framework that he is trying to escape.  I will now look at how Searle is accused by some of 
simply redefining “physical” to include subjective, a move which they see as side stepping the 
substantive philosophical questions. 
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b) Criticism 2: Searle simply redefines “physical” to include 
subjective 
Searle repeatedly describes experiences as inherently subjective, yet ordinary biological 
features of the world; ‘mental events and processes are as much part of our biological natural 
history as digestion, mitosis, meiosis, or enzyme secretion’33 and claims that, 
‘One can accept the obvious facts of physics – that the world consists 
entirely of physical particles in fields of force – without denying that 
among the physical features of the world are biological phenomena 
such as inner qualitative states of consciousness’34 
This prompts Hutto to point out that ‘by continuing to use the language of physicalism in this 
way he [Searle] invites confusion’.35  The charge of word play is taken up by Feser, who argues 
that,  
‘If anything it is Searle who seems to be playing word games here, 
re-defining “physical” so that it includes not only the objective 
phenomena usually counted as physical, but also the uniquely and 
irreducibly subjective phenomena that philosophers have had such 
trouble fitting into that objective physical world’36 
The problem is one of Searle not addressing the substantive metaphysical issues at hand, and 
instead just starkly stating that biological physical features of the world can also be subjective.  
Nagel takes up this criticism and points to Searle’s emphasis on the difference between 
subjective and objective that Searle uses as justification for his claim that consciousness is not 
ontologically reducible, unlike most other features of the world.  Nagel seems to find a tension 
in Searle’s position, for given this difference between conscious experiences and non-
experiential features, he believes Searle is slipping in dualistic metaphysics into his theory but 
expressing it in materialistic language; 
‘What is the metaphysical content of Searle’s claim that mental 
properties are physical, and his emphatic rejection of property 
dualism?  He says, after all, that the ontological distinction between 
subjective and objective marks “different categories of empirical 
reality”.  To say further that we are “left with a universe that 
contains an irreducibly subjective physical component as a 
component of physical reality” merely couches an essentially 
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dualistic claim in language that expresses a strong aversion to 
dualism’37 
When trying to completely understand the metaphysical consequences of fitting irreducibly 
experiential and subjective features into an otherwise objective, physical world,  it does not 
seem that using “physical”, to simply include such features of the world that are usually 
considered non-physical, provides the intelligibility that is required.  Nagel again; 
‘Perhaps we could adopt Searle’s use of the word “physical”, but the 
basic issue is more than verbal.  It is the issue of how to construct an 
intelligible and complete scientific worldview once we deny the 
reducibility of the mental to the nonmental’38 
I will now look at Searle’s critics’ complaint that he approaches opposing positions by 
inaccurately portraying their positions and beliefs. 
c) Criticism 3: Searle misconstrues his opposition 
In his attempt to bypass the traditional mental/physical framework I detailed above, Searle 
criticises both physicalism and dualism, usually seen as either end of a spectrum of positions 
available in philosophy of mind.  Considering them both as under the spell of conceptual 
dualism, he disparages them equally, seeing both as fatally flawed because materialism ‘ends 
up saying falsely that there are no ontologically irreducible mental phenomena’39 and dualism 
‘ends up saying falsely that these are something apart from the ordinary physical world we all 
live in, that they are something over and above their physical substrate’.40  Many times in his 
writing Searle refers to what materialism and property dualism each have right, and each have 
wrong, and therefore believes he is positioning himself distinctly apart from either.   
There is the occasional ally for the way Searle sets out the philosophical landscape, such as 
Dennett who states ‘I would say Searle has done a good job of identifying the enemy and its 
foundational assumptions’.41  However, the majority of commentators on Searle disagree with 
his take on the theories of his opponents.  The problem with Searle’s strategy, according to his 
critics, is that he grossly misrepresents or misconstrues his opposition, thereby creating a false 
sense of distinctness from them.  The reason for Searle surveying his opponents’ views is 
nicely expressed by Dennett, along with the problems of not having provided a fair 
assessment of the opposition he faces; 
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‘If he can show that he is an acute and sympathetic interpreter of the 
processes of thought that have led to the impasse, we will at least be 
given grounds for supposing that he may indeed have uncovered an 
overlooked opportunity of major proportions. But the execution of 
this review is unfortunate, and his other discussions of alternative 
positions later in the book are equally unprepossessing. We enter a 
world of breathtaking oversimplification, everything black and white, 
with no shades of gray permitted.’42 
I will first tackle Searle’s supposed misrepresentation of materialism, then his alleged 
misunderstanding of property dualism. 
Misrepresenting physicalism 
Criticism of Searle’s handling of materialism is both general and specific.  General complaints 
include the fact that in reviewing the current state of philosophy of mind, Searle completely 
misses out any discussion of any non-reductive physicalist positions.  In  The Rediscovery of the 
Mind, Chapter 2, “The Recent History of Materialism”, Searle skips straight from reductive 
identity theories to functionalism and then to dualism, without even a hint of non-reductive 
approaches to the mind-body problem.  
With specific reference to his handling of physicalism, Searle is criticised for blanketing all 
physicalist approaches as reductive or eliminative.  For example, he states how he believes 
that, in reference to experiences, ‘it was the elimination or reduction of these mental features 
that materialism sought to achieve’.43  In many places in his writings he refers to the desire of 
physicalist approaches to eliminate or reduce experiences to something else, such as when he 
describes how, in his opinion, a physicalist approach to the mind body problem ‘ends up 
saying, falsely, that irreducible states of consciousness do not exist.’44  Kenyon is disparaging 
about Searle’s approach to physicalism and his tendency to describe it as ‘reductionist, 
eliminativist, and thus anti-realist’,45 which is something he considers to be ‘not just wrong; it 
is a crashing misrepresentation of a familiar position’.46  Northoff and Musholt agree with this 
line of critique, pointing out that Searle only seems to ever mean the eliminative kind 
whenever he refers to materialism; 
‘What Searle means by materialism seems to refer only to the 
eliminative or reductive forms of materialism that do not accept that 
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the first-person perspective has to be distinguished from the third-
person perspective’47 
I will now turn to the ways in which Searle’s understanding of property dualism has been 
attacked. 
Misunderstanding property dualism 
Searle passionately denies that he is a property dualist,48 but his very characterisation of the 
position has caused concern for some philosophers who claim he misunderstands the 
position.  Jacquette points out that  
‘Property dualists…by no means accept the doctrine that Searle 
expresses as entailing that ‘physical’ implies ‘nonmental’ and 
‘mental’ implies ‘nonphysical’’49 
He is protesting against Searle’s characterisation of the property dualist as seeing the mental 
as ‘not part of the physical world’,50 and believes that Searle’s take on property dualist not 
only misrepresents its terminology, but also misunderstands the driving force of the position: 
‘[Property dualists believe that] there are two mutually exclusive 
metaphysical categories that constitute all of empirical reality: they 
are physical phenomena and mental phenomena.  Physical 
phenomena are essentially objective in the sense that they exist 
apart from any subjective experiences of humans or animals. Mental 
phenomena are subjective, in the sense that they exist only as 
experienced by human or animal agents’51 
For Jacquette, the whole point of property dualism is to incorporate the mental into the 
physical realm; 
‘The whole point of property dualism is ‘to put philosophy of mind in 
a position to conclude that physical entities like normally functioning 
brains and nervous systems can also be mental, or, that is to say, can 
also have mental as well as physical properties, and that mental 
entities, mind, capable of sensation, consciousness, and self-
consciousness, can or even must also be physical in the sense of also 
possessing physical properties from which mental properties emerge 
or on which they supervene’52 
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In this way, Jacquette argues that Searle has misunderstood the fundamentals of property 
dualism, and has, in the process, put forward a position that in fact perfectly fits with property 
dualism, rather than being opposed to it.  Given that property dualists would claim that whilst 
all things are physical with corresponding physical properties, some things also have mental 
properties, the criticism against Searle becomes evident.  Searle claims that property dualists 
rely on an outdated adherence to conceptual dualism, which leaves it trying to deal with 
conceptual categories which contrast “mental” and “physical” as opposed to each other, 
indeed, as mutually exclusive, but in fact property dualists aim to show just the opposite, that 
physical things can have mental properties.   
The next criticism I will explore centres around the examples that Searle provides in order to 
explain his theory, and whether they are suitable for the job he intends them to do. 
d) Criticism 5: Searle uses inadequate examples 
Searle has to try to balance the idea that experiences are both reducible and irreducible, and 
he does so by stipulating that they are causally reducible yet ontologically irreducible.  He uses 
many examples to try to explain and justify what exactly he means by this, often citing solidity 
as a parallel example that can shed light on the nature of experiences.  Searle’s critics 
complain that his use of solidity, or indeed other higher-level system features such as liquidity, 
do not, and indeed cannot, properly explain what Searle must mean in relation to the 
ontological irreducibility of experiences because those examples are not ones of ontological 
irreducibility.  For example, Corcoran notes how ‘the emergent system-features of liquidity 
and solidity…with which Searle wants to compare consciousness, are relevantly dissimilar to 
consciousness’,53 in that they are not examples of features which Searle claims are 
ontologically irreducible.  Lamenting that ‘Searle has not provided any convincing examples of 
further irreducible categories’,54 Feser describes the problem like this, 
‘There is thus no mystery about how solidity can be a higher-order 
physical property of a system of water molecules. For, fully to 
describe the condition of water molecules at the temperature at 
which water freezes just is to describe them as solid. There is 
nothing more to solidity than that; it is identical to the configuration 
the molecules are in when the object they constitute is at freezing 
temperature. In any case, there is nothing about the nature of either 
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water molecules or solidity – both of which are “third-person” – that 
excludes such an identification’55 
The criticisms centre around the fact that for the examples like solidity which Searle uses, it is 
intelligible and clear why an ontological reduction seamlessly follows from a causal one, but 
this is not the case for experiences, where Searle’s point is that their supposedly first-personal 
subjective ontology is incompatible with any reduction to a third-personal objective feature of 
the world.  As Olafson puts it, 
‘There is nothing ‘subjective’ about liquidity or solidity – nothing that 
would make them ‘someone’s’ liquidity or solidity or that would 
confine the observation of them to a single observer, as Searle says 
happens in the case of consciousness’56 
This means that in the relevant sense, solidity and liquidity are not useful for explaining the 
way in which experiences differ from other ontologically reducible features of the world.  
Providing an example of a feature other than consciousness which is also ontologically 
irreducible in Searle’s sense is ‘the kind of parallel case that Searle needs if the claims he 
makes about the ‘subjective ontology’ of consciousness are to seem less paradoxical’.57  
So, the examples Searle provides are for system level features which both causally and 
ontologically reduce to lower-level micro-structural features, and as such, it is claimed, they 
cannot be used to adequately spell out what Searle’s claim of ontological irreducibility for 
experiences amounts to.  Searle therefore leaves underdeveloped the claim that 
consciousness is both like solidity in its causal reducibility, yet unlike it in its ontological 
irreducibility.  Palmer puts it like this; 
‘Searle’s claim that consciousness is an ordinary physical feature has 
not been substantially supported.  Searle admits that consciousness 
is quite different from most physical properties, and has provided 
little by way of explanation of what sense this equivalence with 
other physical properties amounts to’58 
This point is made in another way by Feser who looks at how Searle deals with the potential 
charge of epiphenomenalism.  In his article explaining why he does not consider himself to be 
a property dualist, Searle maintains that epiphenomenalism is not a criticism that plagues this 
theory; 
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‘The problems about epiphenomenalism and the causal closure of 
the physical simply do not arise for me. Of course, the universe is 
causally closed, and we can call it ‘physical’ if we like; but that 
cannot mean ‘physical’ as opposed to ‘mental’; because, equally 
obviously, the mental is part of the causal structure of the universe 
in the same way that the solidity of pistons is part of the causal 
structure of the universe; even though the solidity is entirely 
accounted for by molecular behaviour, and consciousness is entirely 
accounted for by neuronal behaviour. The problems about 
epiphenomenalism and the causal closure of the physical can only 
arise if one uses the traditional terminology and take its implications 
seriously. I am trying to get us to abandon that terminology. But if 
consciousness has no causal powers in addition to its neurobiological 
base, then does that not imply epiphenomenalism? No. Compare: 
the solidity of the piston has no causal powers in addition to its 
molecular base, but this does not show that solidity is 
epiphenomenal (try making a piston out of butter or water).’59 
What Feser objects to is the same as other complainants about the examples – Searle uses the 
example of solidity, which is ontologically reducible to an underlying microstructure, to 
explain experiences, which are ontologically irreducible to brain microstructures, according to 
Searle.  This is a relevant, even essential difference between the two examples, so Searle is 
not justified in using one to deal with problems that arise from the other.  In the case of the 
quoted section above, Searle tries to explain away the charge of epiphenomenalism created 
by his concept of ontological irreducibility of experiences by referring to the solidity of a 
piston, but a piston does not have the very property of ontological irreducibility which has 
caused the problem in the first place.  Feser puts it like this; 
‘Consciousness, as Searle himself insists, is not identical to its base, 
nor ontologically reducible to it. The analogy with the piston is 
therefore useless. For it’s precisely this ontological irreducibility that 
threatens epiphenomenalism. The “microstructural base” of 
consciousness – the firing of neurons – would be just as it is, and in 
particular have just the causal powers it has, even in the absence of 
consciousness; so consciousness seems to add nothing to the causal 
story. Searle asks: “[W]hy would anyone suppose that causal 
reducibility implies epiphenomenalism?” (2002, p. 61) but the 
question is directed at a straw man, for no one does suppose this. 
What they do suppose is not that causal reducibility implies 
epiphenomenalism, but rather that ontological irreducibility implies 
it.’60 
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Having looked at a number of problems charged against Searle’s general approach to solving 
the mind-body problem, I will now consider criticisms that are more specific to particular 
aspects of Biological Naturalism. 
3. Specific criticism 
Concerns about the specifics of Searle’s Biological Naturalism are varied.  Some commentators 
criticise Searle’s idea of a simultaneous form of causation, complaining that it is not a 
legitimate form of causation on which to base a notion of a supposedly “causal” reduction.  
Others are concerned that causal reductions are not actually achievable, as Searle makes out.  
Searle’s critics have also voiced apprehension about overdetermination, which some see as an 
inescapable by-product of Biological Naturalism.  Finally, some have wondered about Searle’s 
claim that the ontological irreducibility of experiences is merely a trivial consequence of the 
way we define reduction, given that it is this very irreducibility that is supposed to 
substantively distance him from the materialist positions that he so dislikes.  I will now explore 
each of these in turn. 
a) Criticism 6: Searle’s critics deny simultaneous causation and the 
causal nature of causal reduction 
Searle’s central claims of causal reduction yet without ontological irreducibility of experiences 
rest on an underlying view of causation that is not the Humean causation of distinct events 
ordered in time.  Searle instead looks to what I have called a simultaneous form of causation.  
He puts it thus: 
‘If brain processes cause consciousness, then it seems to many 
people that there must be two different things, brain processes as 
causes and conscious states as effects, and this seems to imply 
dualism.  This…derives in part from a flawed conception of 
causation.  In our official theories of causation we typically suppose 
that all causal relations must be between discrete events ordered 
sequentially in time.  For example, the shooting caused the death of 
the victim.  Certainly, many cause-and-effect relations are like that, 
but by no means all.  Look around you at the objects in your vicinity 
and think of the causal explanation of the fact that the table exerts 
pressure on the rug.  This is explained by the force of gravity, but 
gravity is not an event.  Or think of the solidity of the table.  It is 
explained causally by the behaviour of the molecules of which the 
table is composed.  But the solidity of the table is not an extra event; 
it is just a feature of the table.  Such examples of non-event 
causation give us appropriate models for understanding the relation 
between my present state of consciousness and the underlying 
neurobiological processes that cause it.  Lower-level processes in the 
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brain cause my present state of consciousness, but that state is not a 
separate entity from my brain; rather it is just a feature of my brain 
at the present time.’61 
For Searle’s critics, the problem is not the examples that Searle gives, but the fact that he 
labels the examples “causal”; ‘the most glaring claim is that the relation between the 
molecular structure of a piston and its solidity is one of causation’.62  The entrenched view of 
causation, the default it seems for the critics making this point, is the view of causation where 
one distinct event follows another and there is a definite time-gap in between.  As Kim puts it, 
‘causation suggests “causal mechanism,” and a time gap between a cause and its effect’.63  
This is obviously in contrast to the simultaneous sort of relationship that Searle is spelling out 
in his own way of understanding causation in this case.  This leads to hostility towards Searle 
for labelling as “causal” something which does not involve distinct entities or events ordered 
temporally.  Honderich maintains this criticism towards Searle’s claim that not only is 
consciousness caused by the brain, but it is also a feature of the brain;  
‘Causation, whatever else it is, is a dyadic relation. No account of it 
does or can say otherwise. It doesn't matter, of course, that Searle's 
effect is also said to be 'realized' in the cause, or within the stuff of 
the cause, or in any other secondary sense 'one' with the cause. The 
commonest cases we have of one thing realized in another are such 
that the realized thing (say temperature) is an effect of and 
therefore numerically different from the other thing (say a lighted 
match)’64 
Garrett agrees with the criticism that causation should involve separate entities that each 
have a distinct existence, and expresses the point like this; 
‘The molecular structure does not cause the piston to be solid.  If the 
relation between the particular molecular configuration (at a certain 
time), and the solidity of the piston (at the same time) is one of 
causation, then we are committed to saying that this particular 
molecular configuration is a distinct existent from the solidity of that 
configuration.  But what sense could we make of talk of the piston’s 
solidity, apart from its molecular structure?  After all, the solidity and 
the molecular structure appear to be spatially and temporally co-
extensive.  Such spatial and temporal overlap is the mark of a 
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relation of constitution, not of causation especially if you think that 
causal relations cannot hold synchronically’65 
Kenyon has similar concerns but focuses on whether Searle’s choice of “causal” terminology 
to describe a relation such as solidity or liquidity would be better replaced with the language 
of identity.  Regarding the boiling of water, he says;  
‘Are we inclined to see the internal pressure’s being equal to the 
external pressure – rather than its becoming equal – as a cause of 
the water’s boiling? Not at all.  Rather, we are inclined to see this as 
just another way of saying that the water is boiling’66 
So for Kenyon, ‘for a causal relation to obtain between two events we require at a minimum 
that the two be distinct events.  The relation of identity and the relation of causation are 
mutually exclusive’.67  This criticism then is that Searle’s view of causation as in some way 
simultaneous should not count as causation at all, and Kim wonders why Searle has gone to 
the effort of labelling such a relation “causal”;  
‘His explicit insistence on causal readings of these terms indicates 
that he is serious about the claim that micro-macro property 
relations are really causal, not something else.  It would be 
interesting to know why Searle thinks the causal relation is 
particularly well suited for his purposes’68 
I will now turn to criticism most prominently voiced by Kim over whether Searle’s Biological 
Naturalism can overcome the problems related to mental causation.  
b) Criticism 7: Biological Naturalism cannot deal with the problem of 
mental causation 
The topic of mental causation centres on the problem of trying to maintain the causal efficacy 
of mental states, where our experiences cause things to happen, whether that be other 
experiences to occur (mental-mental causation) or other physical states, typically neuronal 
states (mental-physical, also known as downward causation).  If this can be achieved, it avoids 
rendering our mental states epiphenomenal.  Any reductive approach to the mind-body 
problem solves the need to account for a specifically mental form of causation by reducing a 
purportedly mental and physical cause down to merely the physical cause.   
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Searle believes in the causal efficacy of the mental; he says, ‘I decide consciously to raise my 
arm [raises arm] and the damn thing goes up…it goes up whenever I damn well want it to’69.  
Yet he also makes clear his belief in the causality of brain activity via his concept of causal 
reduction, clearly stating that it is brains and brain activity which cause consciousness; ‘mental 
phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain’.70  This might sound like 
a reductive strategy, but the problem is that some argue that reductionist approaches to the 
mind-body problem do not seriously deal with the way that it very much seems as if our 
experiences have causal powers; 
‘Reductionism, when applied to the mental, appears, at least to 
some, to have the unfortunate consequence of killing the patient in 
the process of curing him: in its attempt to explain mental causation, 
it all but banishes the very mentality it was out to save’71 
 Such an elimination of the mental out of the picture, especially when the point is to explain 
specifically mental causes, is the antithesis of what Searle is trying to achieve in Biological 
Naturalism, where his focus is always to maintain the importance and relevance of 
experiences, as experiential features of the world.   
Kim turns from his many explorations into mental causation and overdetermination to focus 
on Searle and believes that Biological Naturalism suffers from overdetermination because of 
the dual claims that any mental state is caused by brain activity, coupled with Searle’s 
determination to include the causal efficacy of mental states; 
‘Consider a mental event, an instantiation of some mental property, 
M.  This event, on Searle’s account, is caused by an instantiation of a 
certain biological property, B.  Let us assume that M has causal 
powers, powers to cause other properties to be instantiated.  We 
can distinguish two cases: (i) the property it can cause to be 
instantiated is itself a mental property; (ii) the property is a physical 
property.  (ii) is of course mental-to-physical causation (called 
“downward causation” in connection with emergentism); (i) may be 
called “same-level causation”.  Searle, one may presume, wants 
both.  Let us first consider the possibility of (i): an instance of M 
causes another mental property, M*, to be instantiated.  We must 
remember, though, that on Searle’s account, this instance of M*, like 
the M-instance, is also caused by some underlying biological 
phenomenon, an instance of some biological property, B*.  It looks 
as though the instance of M* in question has two distinct sufficient 
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causes, a mental phenomenon (M) and a biological phenomenon 
(B*) – it is causally overdetermined.  This of course quickly 
generalizes: all cases of mental-to-mental causation involve the 
overdetermination of the effect.  This is a peculiar picture, indeed.  
And, given the fact that every mental event has a sufficient cause in 
biological processes, one wonders about the significance, or 
necessity, of appealing to its mental cause.’72 
Kim is unsatisfied with Searle’s response to overdetermination because he takes Searle to be 
making a simple assertion that experiences just are biological features of the brain. This is 
unsatisfying to Kim because such a claim could just as easily rest on a supervenience relation 
as it could an identity relation, both of which might conflict with his notion of ontologically 
irreducible brain states; 
‘Searle cannot get off so easily: we should keep in mind that his 
claim that mental phenomena are biological features of the brain 
only amounts to the claim that mental phenomena are “causally 
supervenient” on brain phenomena.  We should remember as well 
Searle’s claims about “subjective ontology,” irreducible subjectivity 
and intentionality, and all the rest.’73 
So the criticism is that Searle’s combination of causal reduction and ontological irreducibility 
for experiences, coupled with causal efficacy of mental states leads to an inherent 
overdetermination in Biological Naturalism, which Searle does not adequately address.  
Ontological irreducibility is a fundamental claim of Searle’s theory, as the above discussion has 
shown.  I will now look at a criticism concerning Searle’s related belief that such irreducibility 
of experiences is merely a trivial consequence of the way we use the process of reduction. 
c) Criticism 8: Concerns about Searle’s claim that the ontological 
irreducibility of experiences is trivial 
Searle takes what seems to many to be a strange line on the status of the irreducibility of 
experiences.  Believing that this thesis sets him apart from standard identity theorists and 
reductive physicalists, it might seem natural to many that Searle’s irreducibility claim is both 
an important and substantial part of his theory.  Yet Searle describes this irreducibility as a 
mere by-product of the way that reduction is used in philosophy, or as he puts it, a ‘trivial 
consequence of our definitional practices’.74 
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This puzzling aspect of Searle’s Biological Naturalism is ironic for Hodgson, who sees Searle as 
downgrading his central claim of ontological irreducibility by also claiming it is merely a trivial 
matter; 
‘A certain irony in Searle’s assertion of triviality: the main difference 
between his position and that of the orthodox thinkers he attacks 
lies in the assertion of the irreducibility of consciousness; yet he 
makes virtue of contending that this difference is but a trivial 
matter!’75 
Tucked away in an endnote at the back of his book, The Conscious Mind, Chalmers also 
criticises Searle’s handling of the status of his irreducibility claim; 
‘Searle argues that consciousness is irreducible, but that this has no 
deep consequences.  He says that phenomena such as heat are 
reducible only because we redefine them to eliminate the 
phenomenal aspect … but that this sort of redefinition is trivially 
inapplicable to consciousness, which consists entirely in its 
subjective aspect.  This seems correct … phenomena such as heat are 
reductively explainable only modulo conscious experience.  But he 
goes on to say that “this shows that the irreducibility of 
consciousness is a trivial consequence of the pragmatics of our 
definitional practices” (p.122).  This seems to get things backward.  
Rather, the practices are consequences of the irreducibility of 
consciousness: if we did not factor out the experience of heat, we 
could not reduce heat at all! Thus irreducibility is a source, not a 
consequence of our practices.  It is hard to see how any of this 
trivializes the irreducibility of consciousness.”’76 
Chalmers is claiming that it is not the case that consciousness is ontologically irreducible 
because of the way we define reduction, but that reduction does not apply to consciousness 
because it is already known to be ontologically irreducible.  In other words, Chalmers thinks 
Searle has the logic of the triviality claim the wrong way around, and the way Searle has 
construed it diminishes any metaphysical force the claim carried.  This is similar to Collins who 
feels that because of his triviality of irreducibility claim, ‘Searle insists that irreducibility 
doesn’t matter’.77  Corcoran also criticises Searle’s triviality claim for diminishing the 
importance of the irreducibility; 
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‘At the end of the day the irreducibility of consciousness has no 
metaphysical bite, since it is “a trivial consequence of the pragmatics 
of our definitional practices” and not anything special in “the pattern 
of facts in the real world.”78 But why, then make so much of the 
claim that consciousness is “irreducible”? The claim loses all its 
punch as a claim about our lexical practices’79 
Dennett is a staunch critic of irreducibility claims regarding experiences, and yet he is not 
worried by Searle’s notion of first person ontology or his irreducibility claim, precisely because 
of the triviality clause, which means that, for Dennett,  ‘the vaunted "essential" and 
"irreducible" subjectivity of consciousness dissolves under analysis’.80 
The thrust of this criticism about Searle’s triviality claim is that if he is going to make a strong 
ontological claim about the status of experiences as irreducibly subjective features of the 
world, he should not simultaneously try to play down the consequences that such a claim 
entails, by labelling the ontological claim as trivial.  As Chalmers points out, ‘irreducibility has 
its consequences. Consistency requires that one face them directly’.81 
Having assessed some specific criticisms against the particulars of Searle’s Biological 
Naturalism, I will now turn to a wider perspective of comment regarding where to place Searle 
on the spectrum of options available in philosophy of mind.  Searle has been assessed as best 
interpreted as holding various positions from property dualism to full-blown identity theory, 
and it is to these concerns that I now turn. 
4. Concerns about categorisation 
Searle freely admits that his views on philosophy of mind and his theory of Biological 
Naturalism have variously been described as a wild array of other positions; 
‘The view of the relation between mind and body that I have been 
putting forward is sometimes called “reductionist,” sometimes 
“antireductionist.”  It is often called “emergentism,” and is generally 
regarded as a form of “supervenience.”’82 
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‘Oddly enough, my views have been confidently characterized by 
some commentators as “materialist,” by some others, with equal 
confidence, as “dualist.” ’83 
 Corcoran summarises the problems involved in trying to categorise Searle well; 
‘Whereas Searle’s discussion of “first-person ontology” and the 
“subjective ontology of consciousness” seems to be suggestive of 
dualism, his claims about consciousness being physical and therefore 
spatial is suggestive of materialistic monism’84 
Searle sees showing what is wrong with current philosophy of mind and carving out a new and 
unique position on the mind-body problem as one of his fundamental purposes.  Charging him 
with putting forward one of the standard positions on offer therefore threatens the heart of 
Searle’s project.   
I will look at the two most prominent charges, which lie at either end of the reductive 
materialist-dualistic spectrum – that he holds property dualism or identity theory. 
a) Criticism 9: The charge of being a property dualist 
Searle’s Biological Naturalism is often charged with being dualistic, in particular with being a 
version of property dualism, despite Searle’s protestations to the contrary.  This is generally 
because of Searle’s claim that experiences have what he calls a first-person ontology, which 
Searle believes means they are ontologically irreducible to any objective, third-personal, 
physical features of the world.85  Collins is puzzled by the fact that Searle advocates certain 
views which are usually the cornerstones of dualistic theories, but at the same time rejects 
dualism itself; 
‘Traditionally, in contrast to most materialists, many philosophers 
who emphasize the importance of consciousness also embrace 
dualism.  Their reasons usually involve the subjective character of 
consciousness: they argue that anything that is essentially subjective 
cannot also be part of the objective, physical world.  Searle 
vehemently rejects this position’86 
Some critics have detected a generalised dualism within his work, such as Olafson who 
complains that ‘what is proposed in this book is not a ‘rediscovery of the mind’ unless by that 
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is meant an updated version of dualism’,87 or Palmer who believes that ‘by any ordinary 
definition of dualism, Searle’s theory is dualistic’.88 Others have specifically charged Searle 
with property dualism, such as when Nagel declares ‘I don’t think it’s possible to distinguish 
his antireductionist solution from property dualism’,89 and Chalmers concludes that ‘to be 
consistent, he too ought to be a property dualist’.90 
The force of these accusations often comes from drawing parallels between what the property 
dualist believes and features of Biological Naturalism, with many believing that ‘the actual 
substance of Searle’s position and property dualism turn out to be identical’.91  One aspect of 
Biological Naturalism which many take Searle to use as a tool to distinguish himself from the 
property dualist is his idea of causal reducibility of experiences to brain processes, and his 
claim that the brain causes consciousness.  Searle is often interpreted as using this feature of 
his theory to emphasise that consciousness is inextricably entwined with brain activity in a 
way that the dualist does not.  However, some critics see this as a parallel to property dualism 
rather than a point of departure:  
‘By calling consciousness “causally reducible” to brain processes, all 
Searle means is that brain processes cause consciousness. But this is 
exactly what the property dualist believes, as Searle later 
acknowledges (p. 62)! So the property dualist too believes, in 
Searle’s sense, that consciousness is “causally reducible.”’92 
Kim agrees, arguing that in answering whether experiences are reducible to features of the 
brain, ‘Searle’s answer, like the property dualist’s, is a forceful no.  But it is precisely this 
negative answer that defines property dualism’.93 
As well as causal reducibility as an intended point of difference between Biological Naturalism 
and property dualism, Searle sees his claim of the ontological irreducibility of experiences as 
showing a difference between the two theories.  Searle realises that the ontological 
irreducibility claim can, at least on the face of it, seem a point of agreement between him and 
the property dualist, and this prompts him to write the article “Why I Am Not A Property 
Dualist”.  In that article he sets out, as he sees it, the points of agreement and disagreement 
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that he has with the property dualist.  The most important point of diversion for Searle is the 
exact way that “irreducible” is used, and what it is taken to imply.  For him, the property 
dualist takes irreducibility to mean that consciousness is a separate, autonomous feature over 
and above the brain, a consequence that he does not believe is implied by Biological 
Naturalism: 
‘The property dualist means that in addition to all the 
neurobiological features of the brain, there is an extra, distinct, 
nonphysical feature of the brain; whereas I mean that consciousness 
is a state the brain can be in, in the way that liquidity and solidity are 
states that water can be in’94 
The italicisation of “in addition” highlights Searle’s belief that whereas he sees consciousness 
as a particular way the brain can be, as a feature of a functioning brain, the property dualist 
sees consciousness as something over and above the brain, even if strongly connected to it.  
Others are not so convinced by this distinction, claiming that despite using different language 
and ways of expressing his ideas, Searle is in fact in agreement with the property dualist, with 
Jacquette criticising Searle’s Rediscovery of the Mind for defending ‘in different but clearly 
equivalent words…the thesis of property dualism’95 and concluding that ‘Searle’s analysis does 
not amount to a rejection of property dualism’.96 Feser agrees, claiming that between 
Biological Naturalism and property dualism, ‘the words may be different, but the metaphysical 
pictures are identical.’97  Others are confused by Searle’s denial that his irreducibility claim 
does not imply property dualism, because they do not accept that Searle and the property 
dualist are using “ontologically irreducible” in any meaningfully different ways; 
‘I am just not sure how to take Searle’s claim that consciousness is a 
property that is ‘ontologically distinct’ from other physical properties 
and yet maintain that his theory ‘is emphatically not a form of 
dualism’.98  Searle uses the term ‘ontological’, like most of us, to 
refer to different categories of reality…A dualist, whether of the 
substance or property version, maintains that there are two distinct 
and unreducible categories of reality.  It thus seems to follow trivially 
that Searle’s view is dualistic’99 
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Corcoran takes a slightly different view arguing that Searle is a dualist, but not of the property 
dualist sort, because Searle simply does not see any properties as solely mental, leaving Searle 
as a property monist and property dualism in particular out of the picture, 
‘What exonerates Searle from all charges of being a property dualist 
is not the claim that the categories of “mental” and “physical” 
sometimes overlap, for a property dualist might countenance not 
only mixed mental-physical phenomena but also features that do not 
land comfortably under either one or the other of these categories, 
e.g. features of the world such as points scored in football games, 
invitations to parties and denials of tenure.  What exonerates Searle 
is the fact that for him there appear to be no non-physical properties 
i.e., the mental, although genuine and irreducible, is for all of that, a 
natural, physical phenomenon.  So Searle’s biological naturalism is 
not a version of property dualism, on the plausible assumption that, 
at a minimum, a property dualist insists that some properties (i.e., 
mental properties) are distinct from physical properties.  If, as Searle 
claims, mental properties are at some level of description physical, 
then Searle is, despite all his rhetoric to the contrary, a kind of 
property monist!’100 
I think Corcoran’s solution to his rejection of ‘property dualist’ as the appropriate terminology 
to categorise Searle’s Biological Naturalism highlights how philosophers are very confused 
about how to categorise and interpret Searle’s position.  In Corcoran’s case, it is not that he 
does not see Searle as dualistic at all, just that property dualism in particular isn’t appropriate; 
‘What is offered in Rediscovery and elsewhere is a cross pollinated 
view of the two theories Searle so vociferously rejects – monism and 
property dualism, a view for which the term “biological property 
dualism” might be a more fitting description.’101 
Searle tries to walk the line between a monistic, physicalist view of the world, and seeing 
experiences as ontologically irreducible to objective, third-personal neuronal activity in the 
brain.  Despite writing articles trying specifically to distance himself from property dualism, 
many of Searle’s critics are unconvinced, believing that ‘Searle’s biological naturalism is 
insufficiently distinct from property dualism to warrant a different label’102 and that ‘Searle’s 
‘biological naturalism’ appears at every turn to be only a familiar version of property dualism 
in disguise’.103   Nagel recognises Searle’s desire to reject dualism and its non-physical take on 
consciousness, but feels Searle has not escaped the dualistic features he was trying to avoid, 
                                                          
100
 Corcoran K. “The Trouble with Searle’s Biological Naturalism” pp.311-312  
101
 Corcoran K. “The Trouble with Searle’s Biological Naturalism” p.312 
102
 Jacquette D. “Searle’s Antireductionism” p.148 
103
 Jacquette D. “Searle’s Antireductionism” p.144 
38 
 
remarking of Searle that ‘he is absolutely right about the fear of dualism (indeed, I believe he 
himself is not immune to its effects)’.104  So, whether it is because the points of departure that 
Searle gives between his theory and property dualism are unconvincing, or simply because 
Biological Naturalism and property dualism are, in fact, the same view, albeit expressed 
differently, many critics of Searle interpret him as being some kind of property dualist.  I will 
now move to the other end of the reductive spectrum and set out the way that some 
commentators charge Searle with being nothing but an identity theorist. 
b) Criticism 10: The charge of being an identity theorist 
Whilst Searle’s insistence on the ontological irreducibility of experiences was the source of 
many commentators viewing him as a property dualist, his parallel claim of the causal 
reducibility of experiences is the focus of critics who charge him with being an identity 
theorist.  Causal reducibility is the idea that, 
‘Consciousness does not exist in a separate realm and it does not 
have any causal powers in addition to those of its neuronal base any 
more than solidity has any extra causal powers in addition to its 
molecular base.’105 
Some cannot understand why Searle does not simply embrace identity theory, given his other 
commitments.  For example, because conceptual dualism is, according to Searle, supposed to 
be abandoned as unfit for the job of describing how experiences are related to the brain, then 
mental should not imply non-physical, thereby freeing us up to accept a plain and simple 
identity theory.  However, Searle rejects any talk of identity and instead insists on talk of 
causally emergent higher-level features and irreducibility in relation to conscious experiences.  
Garrett seems to be frustrated by Searle’s inability to deal with the inevitable conclusions of 
his own theory; 
‘What Searle owes us here is an answer to the query, Why do we 
need to understand consciousness as an emergent property given 
the falsity of conceptual dualism?  The tradition Searle rejects has 
motivations for such inclinations towards property dualism; the 
problem of multiple realisability and Kripke’s modal objections, 
being the most prominent.  But it is hard to understand why Searle 
speaks in the language of irreducibility, if the tradition is so 
confused.’106 
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Searle has a strong need to distance himself from dualism, which some see as pushing him 
towards a position which insists that regarding causal powers, there are just the causal powers 
of our neurophysiology and that experiences are not something above and beyond brain 
activity.  Although Searle claims ontological irreducibility for experiences, he tempers the 
claim by drawing parallels between experiences and other higher-level features such as 
solidity and liquidity, thus trying to dispel any notion of mystery which might surround the 
irreducibility of experiences.107  When these are combined, some critics find Searle’s views to 
be tantamount to a form of token identity theory, viewing Searle as offering  
‘confused and unsupported claims about supervenience and 
causality, and, when interpreted most charitably, [his view] is 
fundamentally indistinguishable from a prevalent account of token 
identity augmented by supervenience’108 
Collins’ criticism of Searle derives from his belief that the force and intelligibility of causal 
reduction comes from it actually being a claim of token identity.   Referring to Searle’s 
favoured example of solidity, Collins is clear that a causal reduction means that ‘solidity just is 
the molecular structure.  Solidity is identical with the molecules in lattice structures’.109  
Collins is also clear in his acceptance of a causal reduction for experiences; 
‘There is absolutely nothing mysterious about how we might apply 
the bottom-up model to give an exhaustive neurophysiological 
account of the causal powers of consciousness.’110 
Given that he accepts the idea of causal reduction for experiences, Collins sees this as 
entailing a claim of identity, which is why he views Searle as an identity theorist.  He feels 
Searle alters and trivializes what philosophers ordinarily mean by ‘reduction’’111 in an attempt 
to appear non-reductivist but concludes that Searle fails in this endeavour; ‘Searle’s position is 
reductionist in the ordinary, non-trivial sense’.112 
Corcoran agrees with Collins’ interpretation that Searle’s causal reduction implies identity 
though seems to see Searle more as a type identity theorist.  He characterises Searle’s notion 
of causal reduction as claiming that ‘the mental causally supervenes on and so is wholly 
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explainable in terms of lower level neurophysiological goings-on in the brain’.113  He thus 
describes Searle as wrongly denying ‘that higher-level features of the brain (i.e., mental 
properties) are reducible to or identical with the lower-level properties on which they 
supervene’.114  Corcoran then interprets Searle’s causal reduction as a form of reductive type 
identity claim with consciousness being nothing but neuronal activity in the brain.   Given that 
this is what the mind-brain identity theory claims, it explains why he interprets Searle as 
nothing but an identity theorist. 
Searle has been interpreted by his critics from both ends of the spectrum of options in 
philosophy of mind, as an identity theorist and as a property dualist.  This amounts to a 
criticism of his claim to have transcended the usual positional pigeon holes and created a view 
which is different from the usual options available.  This concludes my overview of criticisms 
of Searle, and I will now try to distil out of these different points the common areas of concern 
regarding Biological Naturalism, which are the source of confusion and even bewilderment for 
other philosophers approaching Searle’s work.  These problems will then set the scene for the 
rest of my dissertation, wherein I will aim to tackle each in turn in an effort to make sense of 
Biological Naturalism. 
5. The main barriers to making sense of Searle’s Biological 
Naturalism 
Out of the many wide-ranging criticisms of Searle’s work I will now extract the main overall 
concerns about his theory of Biological Naturalism.  Corcoran is not alone in his belief that 
‘there are, at the very least, prima facie difficulties with Searle’s biological naturalism’.115  
Underpinning the main barriers to understanding Searle’s theory is the fact that some of his 
key tenets seem to belong to both the physicalist and the dualist approaches to the mind-
body problem.  Hodgson brings out the tension within Searle’s theory when he highlights how 
Searle shows physicalistic tendencies by claiming things like ‘consciousness cannot cause 
things that cannot be explained by the causal behaviour of neurons’,116 yet Searle also sounds 
decidedly dualistic in his discussion of irreducibility; ‘consciousness is irreducible in that it is 
‘not eliminable in favour of anything else.’117’118   
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I will assess the barriers to understanding Searle’s Biological Naturalism by extracting the main 
stumbling blocks out of the various criticisms charged against him which prevent people from 
finding a coherent reading of Searle’s work.  This will become the focus of the remainder of 
this dissertation, which will take the form of drawing the barriers out, clarifying what it is that 
is problematic and seeing if it is possible to diffuse the tensions which seem inherent in 
Searle’s position, thereby constructing a coherent reading of Biological Naturalism. 
In this section I will set out which features of Searle’s theory create either an internal tension, 
or are otherwise a barrier for other people to understand Searle’s position in Biological 
Naturalism. 
a) Ontological irreducibility and first-person ontology, but the 
irreducibility is trivial 
Ontological irreducibility is a cornerstone of dualistic theories of mind.  Experiences are 
deemed as separate from physical properties of the world; they have a different and distinct 
essence which means they are not capturable in purely scientific or objective terms.  To make 
such a claim is to make a bold statement about the reality of the world we live in, to declare 
that there are some features of the world which science, the dominant way in which we 
investigate the world around us, cannot fully probe.  Searle includes a claim of ontological 
irreducibility in Biological Naturalism, but tempers it with his description of the irreducibility 
as a mere trivial consequence of the way we apply the process of reduction.   
The tension here is between making a grand statement about the fundamental nature of 
reality, one that gives utmost importance to the essentially subjective and phenomenal nature 
of experiences, and brushing aside the importance of the very same claim by rendering it a 
mere consequence of how we happen to have come to define and use the term “reduction”.  
As I discussed above, this seems a complete contradiction to some philosophers, having the 
effect of either watering down the claim of irreducibly itself and leaving Searle firmly in the 
materialist camp, or simply leaving this part of Searle’s theory in a state of incoherence.   
I will tackle this barrier to making sense of Biological Naturalism in chapter3, when I deal with 
Searle’s idea of the first-person ontology of experiences. 
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b) Causal reduction, and at the same time, ontological irreducibility 
Searle sees his claim of the causal reducibility of experiences as a way of distancing himself 
from dualistic theories.  He seems to suggest that causal reducibility of experiences bind them 
inextricably to brain activity, as they can be fully accounted for, at least causally, by 
neurophysiological goings on.  As Palmer puts it, Searle believes that experiences are ‘causally 
reducible and this, he thinks, is sufficient for a thoroughgoing physicalist’.119  This seems to 
reflect the impetus for materialist and reductive theories of mind; keeping out any talk of 
mysterious, non-physical properties or substances and giving experiences the status of just 
another physical feature of the world, capturable by scientific investigation.   
Searle sees his claim of ontological irreducibility as a way of distancing himself from reductive 
materialist theories of mind, which he sees as eliminative of the subjectivity of experiences.  
Ontological irreducibility is, for Searle, a way of emphasising the unique nature of experiences, 
the way in which their subjective phenomenal character seems to elude capture in purely 
physical or scientific terms, and is indicative of the idea that something so essentially 
subjective cannot be part of a seemingly entirely objective physical reality.   
These approaches to experiences are usually considered as opposing views, the first held by 
materialists, reductionists and identity theorists, the second held by dualists of either the 
property dualist or substance dualist persuasion.  The problem for Searle arises because he 
wants to hold both claims simultaneously.  He is clear that he believes that ‘in the case of 
consciousness we can make a causal reduction but we cannot make an ontological 
reduction’.120  This instantly renders his views confusing to philosophers who automatically 
see these two strands of his theory as conflicting, even mutually exclusive views.  From the 
traditional assumptions and perspective in philosophy of mind these are opposing claims, one 
reductive, one anti-reductive and one materialist, one dualist.  One challenge in trying to 
make sense of Biological Naturalism is to see whether, and how, these dual claims of 
reduction and irreducibility can be made to rest easy together.  This will be explored in 
chapter 4, when I look in more detail at Searle’s notion of causal reduction, and chapter 5 
where I focus on his particular style of irreducibility. 
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c) Experiences are caused by, and realised in, the brain 
The claim that experiences are caused by the brain usually conveys a picture where the two 
are distinct and separate; the brain causes experiences, and those experiences are 
metaphysically distinct from the brain.  This is underpinned by a view of causation where two 
distinct events are connected and ordered through time.  So, if one phenomenon causes 
another, there might seem to be a necessary distance between the two, a separation of 
mental and physical in a way that Searle seems so at pains to deny.   
Realisation is a metaphysical relation that is distinct from causation or identity and is usually 
taken to mean the claim that a particular is fulfilling a certain type.  In other words, a specific 
token is an instantiation of a type, at a specific time, and types of entities are multiply 
realisable by different tokens.  Such a situation does not involve two separate phenomena in 
the way that causal claims might be seen to, nor the idea that one is nothing but the other as 
identity would.  In relation to philosophy of mind, realisation is often used by physicalist 
philosophers to justify their status as physicalist, in other words, particular configurations of 
brain activity are taken to be instances of the type “experience”, and thus not separated from 
the brain.  Instead, as Searle says, ‘thoughts are not weightless and ethereal.  When you have 
a thought, brain activity is actually going on’121 and that ‘the consciousness of the brain is not 
something over and above the neuronal phenomena, but rather a state that the neuronal 
system is in'.122  Searle uses his realisation claim to try to avoid the threat of property dualism, 
which would still be open if he simply claimed that experiences were caused by the brain.  The 
realisation claim therefore moulds his theory into a physicalist shape by closing off the door 
for experiences to be somehow separate or different from the brain itself.  Searle says:  
‘Nothing is more common in nature than for surface features of a 
phenomenon to be both caused by and realised in a micro-structure, 
and those are exactly the relationships that are exhibited by the 
relation of mind to brain.’123  
These simultaneous claims of experiences as apparently separate from the brain, or merely a 
feature of the brain are the source of another tension and barrier to making sense of 
Biological Naturalism.  I will tackle this issue in chapter 4, when I consider Searle’s notions of 
causal reducibility and levels of description. 
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d) Mental causation, but experiences have no causal powers over 
and above those of the neuronal activity in the brain 
Mental causation involves the question of whether experiences can cause things to happen or, 
as Kim puts it, whether mental properties are causal properties, adding that ever since 
Descartes’ work, ‘mental causation has been the acid test that any would-be account of the 
mind-body relation has been required to pass’124.  In other words, any satisfactory solution to 
the mind-body problem should be able to account for mental causation.  Searle leaves little 
doubt that he wants to create a theory that includes mental causation; he sees experiences as 
causally efficacious, 
‘Because conscious states are real features of the real world, they 
function causally.  My conscious thirst causes me to drink water for 
example.’125 
Searle clearly sees some events as having experiences as their causes.  The possible problem is 
how this can be accounted for given Searle’s other belief that causally speaking, there is 
nothing going on above and beyond the neuronal activity in our brains;  
‘[Experiences have] absolutely no life of their own, independent of 
the neurobiology.  Causally speaking, they are not something “over 
and above” neurobiological processes.’126 
Searle wants to make such a claim to distance himself from dualism, and the mystery that he 
sees property dualism as implying, with experiences having powers of their own above and 
beyond the brain.  However, by tethering experiences so closely to brain activity, Searle risks 
seeming as if he is claiming that the brain is doing all the causal work on its own with no need 
for any input from experiences.  This means, as Honderich points out, that ‘epiphenomenalism 
threatens’.127  Searle’s reply is linked to his view of the world as relating to different levels of 
description for any particular system, what has been described by some as “levelism”; which 
means, for Searle at least, that the same event can be causally described either at one level of 
description, for example the higher-level of experiences, or at a different level, for example 
the lower-level description of neuronal activity.  In this way he simply does not see concerns 
about epiphenomenalism, or for that matter overdetermination or concerns about the causal 
closure of the physical world, as applying to Biological Naturalism.  However, for many the 
tension remains between arguing that experiences causally reduce to brain activity, and that 
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they have ‘no causal powers in addition to [their] neurobiological base’128 whilst also holding 
onto mental causation and seeing experiences as able to cause things to happen not because 
of any link to neurobiological features of the brain, but because they are causally efficacious in 
their own right.  This tension will be explored in chapter 4 where I look at Searle’s view of 
levels of descriptions and his response to the problems of mental causation. 
6. Conclusion 
At the very start of The Rediscovery of the Mind, Searle is characteristically forthright in 
declaring his solution to the mind-body problem, 
‘This solution has been available to any educated person since 
serious work began on the brain nearly a century ago, and, in a 
sense, we all know it to be true.  Here it is: Mental phenomena are 
caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain and are 
themselves features of the brain…Mental events and processes are 
as much part of our biological natural history as digestion, mitosis, 
meiosis, or enzyme secretion’129 
This style of philosophy is unusual and although I find it personally quite refreshing, many 
have found it irritating and seem taken aback by his bold manner of expression.  Many, or 
even most, commentators on Searle find it hard to make sense of his claims in Biological 
Naturalism, finding internal tensions within the theory and finding the seemingly self-
contradictory claims, such as experiences being both reducible and irreducible, as anything 
but transparent.    
There are very few points in the literature where commentators find agreement with Searle, 
and even where they occur it is usually on general issues rather than the specifics of Biological 
Naturalism.  For example, when Nagel generally agrees with Searle’s belief in the importance 
of the subjective nature of experiences; 
‘Subjective points of view are themselves parts of the real world, and 
if they and their properties are to be described adequately, their 
ontologically subjective character – the subjectivity of their nature – 
must be acknowledged’130 
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The criticism of Searle’s theory is wide ranging and attacks both his general approach as well 
as the specifics of his theory.  Chalmers, for example, complains that Searle does not actually 
achieve any progress on the mind-body problem,  
‘Searle's all-purpose critique: "the brain causes consciousness". 
Although this mantra (repeated at least ten times) is apparently 
intended as a source of great wisdom, it settles almost nothing that 
is at issue…Searle's claim is simply a statement of the problem, not a 
solution’131 
Regarding the basis of Searle’s claim of ontological irreducibility, his notion of first-person 
ontology, Dennett refers to ‘the metaphysical extravagance (at best just peculiarity or at 
worse incoherence) of "subjective ontology."’132 
Biological Naturalism has been interpreted in the literature as anything from a version of 
identity theory to property dualism.  One might wonder how a theory of mind could be 
understood in such divergent ways, given that they are normally seen as theories at opposite 
ends of the reductive/non-reductive spectrum.  I think there are a number of key tenets 
within Biological naturalism which give rise to this confusion, based on seeming 
contradictions.  Each of the following chapters of this dissertation will be based on trying to 
appease the tensions I have highlighted above in this section.  Chapter 3 will look at Searle’s 
claim that experiences have a first-person ontology, which is the source of their claimed 
ontological irreducibility.  Chapter 4 will focus on realisation versus cause in relation to 
experiences and brain activity and mental causation in conjunction with causal reduction.  
Chapter 5 will explore the problems of the claimed reducibility and irreducibly of experiences, 
and the triviality (claimed by Searle) or importance (alleged by commentators) of that 
irreducibility.  I will thus be exploring the barriers to making sense of Biological Naturalism as a 
coherent and contradiction-free theory, and set out ways in which we should view what Searle 
is claiming in order to best understand his intentions.  I will conclude that Searle should be 
interpreted as a real identity theorist, a position which I argue for in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 3 – Making sense of first-
person ontology 
1. Introduction 
First-person ontology is a part of Searle’s Biological Naturalism which is the foundation for his 
belief in the ontological irreducibility of experiences to brain states.  Searle makes many 
assertions about first-person ontology and how important it is, but does not expand on the 
idea in great detail, including exactly what the idea is supposed to include and entail.  
Consequently, many have found first-person ontology to be a major barrier to making sense of 
Biological Naturalism as a whole.  Commentators on Searle have also criticised his claim that 
the irreducibility of experiences, which is a consequence of their first-person ontology, is 
merely a trivial consequence of our definitional practices.  Some philosophers interpret this 
triviality as meaning the first-person ontology of experiences is not important, which seems at 
odds with the substantive status of any claim about the essential nature of experiences.  
In order to try and make sense of Searle’s first-person ontology, I will first look at how Searle 
himself defines first-person ontology and what its role is within Biological Naturalism.  I will 
then look at Searle’s categorisation of subjective, objective, epistemological and ontological 
items and explore how ontological subjectivity, or first-person ontology, can be better 
understood through the concepts of subjectivity, qualitative feel, perspectivity and privacy.   
By unpacking the ideas and exploring the features of first-person ontology I hope to gain a 
deeper understanding of what it is and what its consequences are regarding the relationship 
between experiences and the brain.  I will conclude that by claiming experiences have a first-
person ontology, Searle is highlighting the way that experiences have both a perspectival 
nature and a qualitative feel for the subject.  
In the final section I will assess first-person ontology.  I will look at whether it is as unique a 
notion as the terminology might suggest, concluding that Searle is actually expressing some 
common views about experiences, albeit by using new terminology.  I will also conclude that 
first-person ontology is problematic for Searle because it introduces a tension between his 
desire to hold experiences as essentially subjective and qualitative, and his commitments to a 
roughly materialist view of the world.  That is something that I will explore in later chapters. 
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2. How Searle explains first-person ontology and its role in 
Biological Naturalism 
In this section I will introduce Searle’s notion of first-person ontology.  I will list the features 
that Searle attributes to first-person ontology in his writing, namely subjectivity and 
qualitative feel, look at the role that first-person ontology plays within his theory of Biological 
Naturalism, and briefly touch on how his critics have reacted to first-person ontology.  My aim 
in this section is to set the scene for a more detailed look at what first-person ontology 
actually amounts to, which I will turn to in the subsequent sections. 
a) Features that Searle associates with first-person ontology 
First person-ontology is focused on subjectivity: Searle’s notion of first-person ontology has, at 
its core, the concept of subjectivity.  He is definite in his belief that ‘”subjective” refers to an 
ontological category, not to an epistemic mode’,1 though what Searle is trying to convey with 
this claim is less obvious.  By looking more closely at what subjectivity amounts to for Searle, I 
hope to shed light on the specific form of ontological subjectivity which Searle sees as the 
basis of first-person ontology and uncover how this is supposed to contrast with what he 
deems ontologically objective phenomena.  It is not immediately clear from Searle’s writings 
exactly what he means by subjectivity, but I think there are a number of inter-related concepts 
which together build up a picture of what Searle means when he uses the term.  I will outline 
them below, and expand on them in the following sections. 
Subjectivity as more than merely belonging to a subject: By its very name, the subjectivity of 
an experience refers to the subject undergoing the experience.  However, although Searle 
states that  ‘every conscious state is always someone’s conscious state’,2 the idea of merely 
belonging to a subject is not sufficient to characterise what is meant by subjectivity, because 
there are a multitude of things which can belong to a subject which would not be classed as 
subjective.  So I need to look to other features for a fuller explanation of what Searle means by 
subjectivity.   
Subjectivity is tied up with points of view and access: Where a phenomenon does not have a 
first-person ontology, in Searle’s framework, it is equally graspable by any person 
encountering it.  In contrast, with the claim that experiences have a first-person ontology, 
Searle seems to be saying that experiences can only be fully grasped from the first-personal 
perspective, or point of view.  Searle says ‘the world itself has no point of view, but my access 
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to the world through my conscious states is always perspectival, always from my point of 
view’.3  I believe these features are key to understanding what Searle means when he uses the 
term “subjective”.   
First-person ontology also involves the qualitative character of experiences: Searle clearly 
states that ‘the essence of consciousness is that it consists in inner qualitative, subjective 
mental processes’.4  He believes that the qualitative, phenomenal feel of an experience is both 
an essential aspect of experiences and an integral part of first-person ontology.  This echoes 
many other philosophers who argue for the primacy of the qualitative nature of experiences, 
as Nagel does with his discussion of “what it is like” to have an experience for the subject 
having it. 
Having sketched out subjectivity and qualitative feel as the two main features of first-person 
ontology and hinted at some of the related concepts that will help to further explain them, I 
will now turn to the role that first-person ontology plays in Biological Naturalism.  I hope that 
consideration of the job first-person ontology is supposed to do will shed light on what Searle 
means when he uses the term. 
b) The role of first-person ontology in Biological Naturalism 
For Searle, first-person ontology is central to understanding the problems of philosophy of 
mind: The fundamental role of first-person ontology within Biological Naturalism is explained 
by the fact that Searle clearly thinks that much of the trouble with modern philosophy of mind 
can be put down to a denial, purposefully or otherwise, of what he calls the first-person 
ontology of experiences; 
‘Much of the bankruptcy of most work in the philosophy of mind and 
a great deal of the sterility of academic psychology over the past fifty 
years, over the whole of my intellectual lifetime, have come from a  
persistent failure to recognize and come to terms with the fact that 
the ontology of the mental is an irreducibly first-person ontology’5 
First-person ontology is fundamental to Biological Naturalism: First-person ontology is a basic 
building block of the claims of Biological Naturalism.  Searle uses similar phrasings over 
different books and articles he has written to express what first-person ontology is.  These 
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include experiences existing only as experienced by a subject and experiences being 
essentially subjective and qualitative in their nature; 
‘Consciousness has a first-person ontology; that is, it only exists as 
experienced by some human or animal, and therefore, it cannot be 
reduced to something that has a third-person ontology, something 
that exists independently of experiences. It is as simple as that.’6 
 ‘Because mental phenomena are essentially connected with 
consciousness, and because consciousness is essentially subjective, it 
follows that the ontology of the mental is essentially a first-person 
ontology.’7 
‘Because of the qualitative character of consciousness, conscious 
states exist only when they are experienced by a human or animal 
subject.  They have a type of subjectivity that I call ontological 
subjectivity.  Another way to make this same point is to say that 
consciousness has a first-person ontology.’8 
 
Within Biological Naturalism, Searle’s notion of first-person ontology plays the role of 
justifying a denial of any appearance/reality distinction: First-person ontology involves the 
idea of only existing as experienced by a subject, which has the consequence for Searle of 
preventing a distinction between appearance and reality when it comes to experiences.  A 
difference between appearance and reality can be seen in a phenomenon such as a rainbow – 
it appears to be a coloured stripe across the sky but in reality there is just normal sunlight 
variously refracted through water droplets in the atmosphere.  For experiences however, the 
appearance is that I am in pain, and the reality is that if it feels to me that I am in pain, then I 
am in pain.  Searle believes that the appearance is the reality and there is no distinguishing 
between the two. Or as he puts it: ‘if it seems to me that I’m conscious, I am conscious.’9  The 
idea of a distinction between appearance and reality is that there might be a better or fuller 
perspective to take up on a phenomenon that reveals more of its true nature, for example, 
the scientific perspective on a rainbow might be seen to expose its true nature.  However, for 
experiences, their existing in a first-person way, as experienced by a subject, means that for 
Searle, there is no “better perspective” to take up on them; the first-person perspective is 
what reveals their essence.    
                                                          
6
 Searle J. “Why I Am Not A Property Dualist” p.60 
7
 Searle J. The Rediscovery of the Mind p.20 
8
 Searle J. Mind: A Brief Introduction, p.94 
9
 Searle J. Minds, Brains & Science p.99 
51 
 
First-person ontology plays a fundamental role in Searle’s claim that experiences are 
ontologically irreducible:  For Searle, a corollary of the first-person ontology of experiences is 
that their essence and essential nature is, as he puts it, first-personal.  Searle uses this to 
justify his claim of ontological irreducibility, by drawing a distinction between ontologically 
objective and ontologically subjective features of the world, and at the same time insisting 
that one cannot reduce to the other; ‘you cannot reduce the first person ontology to the third 
person facts’.10  This is, he believes, at the heart of the fundamental errors which he diagnoses 
philosophers of mind as making; 
‘The characteristic mistake in the study of consciousness is to ignore 
its essential subjectivity and to try to treat it as if it were an objective 
third person phenomenon.’11 
The role that first person ontology plays in Searle’s claim of ontological irreducibility will be 
discussed further below in section 5.  I will now turn to what Searle’s commentators think of 
his notion of first-person ontology. 
c) Searle’s critics’ view of first-person ontology 
How other philosophers view first-person ontology: Commentators who have considered 
Searle’s first-person ontology mostly feel it pushes his Biological Naturalism into the realm of 
dualism.  For example, Nagel says of Searle ‘I don’t think it’s possible to distinguish his 
antireductionist solution from property dualism’.12  This is because dualists generally propose 
some form of ontological irreducibility of experiences as the linchpin of their thesis, and Searle 
sees his first-person ontology as the basis for his claim of ontological irreducibility of 
experiences; he states that ‘the first person ontology of mental reality makes it impossible to 
carry out the ontological reduction’.13  So, by proposing that experiences are ontologically 
irreducible because of their first-person ontology, Searle appears to his critics to put himself 
firmly in the property dualist’s camp.  In this chapter I hope to develop an interpretation of 
first-person ontology which does not necessarily imply property dualism.  In chapter 5 I will 
argue that, despite his critics’ charges, Searle should not be seen as a property dualist.  
Despite his belief that experiences have a first-person ontology, I will argue that Searle and 
the property dualist mean different things by irreducible, and that Biological Naturalism is not 
a form of property dualism.   
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What Searle’s critics say about first-person ontology: Searle’s critics also see his notion of first-
person ontology echoing the claims made by other anti-reductionist or dualist philosophers.  
For example, in comparing his views to Searle’s, Nagel insists that,  
‘Subjective points of view are themselves parts of the real world, and 
if they and their properties are to be described adequately, their 
ontologically subjective character – the subjectivity of their nature – 
must be acknowledged’14 
This seems to parallel the claims Searle makes about ontological subjectivity, which I will 
discuss further in sections 3 and 4 below.  In chapter 5 I will assess whether the ontological 
irreducibility of Searle and anti-reductionists should really be seen as the same, arguing that 
they are in fact using irreducibility to mean different things. 
Having provided a brief overview of the features and role of Searle’s first-person ontology, I 
will take a closer look at the individual aspects of the notion, which I hope will help to make 
sense of what Searle is trying to claim through his idea of first-person ontology.  In the next 
section I will address Searle’s claim that conscious experience has a subjective ontology, which 
he labels first-person ontology.  In section 4 I will consider each of the features of first-person 
ontology in turn, looking at subjectivity, perspectivalness, privacy and access of experiences 
and qualitative feel.  My aim is to elucidate what first-person ontology actually amounts to by 
pulling apart and exploring the related concepts that Searle uses to describe first-person 
ontology. 
3. Ontological subjectivity as the basis of first-person ontology 
Although he mentions first-person ontology a lot, it is very difficult to find, in any of Searle’s 
writing, a detailed and clear description of exactly what first-person ontology is supposed to 
cover, include or amount to.  In the next four sections I will try to get to grips with Searle’s 
notion of first-person ontology.  First, in this section, I will look at Searle’s fourfold distinction 
between subjective or objective and ontological or epistemological, because he sees the 
specific category of subjective ontology as helping to explain what first-person ontology is.  In 
the next section I will try to make sense of Searle’s first-person ontology by breaking it down 
into its constituent concepts and seeing what Searle means by each feature and what he 
believes it is conveying.  In light of this discussion I will then revisit the fourfold distinction to 
show how first-person ontology contrasts with third person ontology, and in section 5 I will 
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pull all my investigations together to summarise what first-person ontology is, and what 
Searle believes it is conveying.  This will have implications later in my dissertation, specifically 
chapter 5, where I assess whether Searle should be seen as a property dualist, in part because 
of his claims that experiences have a first-person ontology. 
Subjectivity as a cornerstone of first-person ontology: Searle puts great emphasis on 
subjectivity in relation to the essence of experiences and what first-person ontology is; 
Experiences, like ‘pain, for example, are subjective in that their 
existence is dependent on being felt by a subject. They have a first-
person or subjective ontology’15 
‘Subjectivity necessarily involves the what-it-feels-like aspect of 
conscious states’16 
‘Consciousness consists of qualitative, subjective states of feeling or 
sentience or awareness’17 
‘The facts are that biological processes produce conscious mental 
phenomena, and these are irreducibly subjective’18 
‘An objective account [of consciousness] cannot explain the 
subjective character of consciousness’19 
Subjective ontology: Searle does not merely emphasise subjectivity, but specifically a 
subjective ontology, or ontological version of subjectivity.  He says that experiences, 
‘have a type of subjectivity that I call ontological subjectivity.  
Another way to make this same point is to say that consciousness 
has a first-person ontology20 
So if I am to make sense of first-person ontology I need to unpack the idea of a subjective 
ontology.   
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A four-way divide: A divide between subjective and objective ontology is not a standard 
categorisation in the literature of philosophy of mind.  Searle makes a four-way distinction 
between objective and subjective, ontological and epistemological, such that any particular 
phenomenon could be one of the following: 
 Epistemologically objective 
 Epistemologically subjective 
 Ontologically objective 
 Ontologically subjective 
I will tabulate these options to highlight the differences between them:  
 
 
Epistemological 
A distinction between the ways in which 
we can know things 
 
 
Ontological 
A distinction between the ways that things 
exist 
 
 
O
b
je
ct
iv
e
 
 
 
 
 
A statement is epistemologically objective 
if you can know its truth (or falsity) 
without any reference to the thoughts, 
feelings, emotions, attitudes or opinions of 
any particular people (subjects). 
 
e.g. Emily is 172cm tall 
 
 
 
 
Something is ontologically objective when 
it exists independently of any particular 
subject 
 
 
 
e.g. aeroplanes, icebergs, cups of coffee 
 
 
Su
b
je
ct
iv
e 
 
 
 
A statement is epistemologically 
subjective if you can only know its truth 
(or falsity) by referring to the thoughts, 
feelings, emotions, attitudes or opinions of 
particular people (subjects). 
 
e.g. A rainbow lorikeet is prettier than an 
eastern rosella parrot 
 
 
 
 
Something is ontologically subjective 
when it only exists as experienced by a 
subject  
 
 
 
e.g. the smell of coffee, the intense feeling 
of jealousy, the itchiness of an itch 
 
 
This is the quadrant Searle sees as 
containing first-person ontology 
 
 
A B 
C D 
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For the category of subjective ontology, the question that naturally arises is what exactly is 
subjective about the ontology of experiences, or put differently, what is non-objective about 
the phenomena that Searle puts in this quadrant?  A related question is what do you gain 
from stipulating that experiences are ontologically subjective, in other words, what is gained 
from claiming that experiences have a first-person ontology?  I will answer these questions by 
investigating in more detail what concepts are involved in first-person ontology and how they 
work together to achieve this supposed status of subjective ontology.  
4. Exploring first-person ontology 
In the previous section I looked at the basis of first-person ontology and the way that Searle 
categorises epistemology and ontology into either objective or subjective.  In this section I will 
delve deeper into first-person ontology and try to make sense of the notion by braking it down 
into its possible constituent parts, and seeing what features come together to create Searle’s 
idea of subjective ontology, that something has a first-person ontology.  Searle states that 
first-person ontology is the realm of the fourth quadrant in my previous table, that is to say 
phenomena with a first-person ontology are ontologically subjective, I will first look in more 
detail at subjectivity and try to ascertain exactly what Searle means by using this term to 
describe experiences.  Noting that Searle must mean more than simply belonging to a subject, 
I will consider the possible perspectivalness of experiences, whether there is any notion of 
privacy of experiences in play or whether different types of access to experiences can explain 
what Searle means by first-person ontology.  I will conclude that these concepts all work 
together to create a notion of first-person ontology that amounts to the claim that 
experiences are essentially qualitative, meaning they have a phenomenal feel when 
undergone, and subjective, meaning they are only able to be fully characterised by the first-
person point of view. 
a) Subjectivity is integral to first-person ontology 
“Subjectivity” is a slippery term and Searle recognises its referent’s uniqueness, stating that 
subjectivity is ‘unlike anything else in biology, and in a sense it is one of the most amazing 
features of nature’.21  When used in philosophy of mind “subjectivity” often denotes a focus 
on the subject and a claim that experiences involve a subject essentially.  With such a focus on 
the subject having experiences, I therefore need to look at other concepts which might unpack 
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the notion of subjectivity and shed light on what Searle is trying to express when applying this 
notion to experiences.  I will start with the idea that an experience’s subjectivity could mean 
that it belongs to a subject. 
Belonging to – not enough to fully explain first-person ontology’s subjectivity 
Searle states many times that experiences only exist when experienced by a subject, and he 
links this to an explanation of what subjective ontology means; ‘conscious states are 
ontologically subjective, in the sense that they exist only as experienced by a human or animal 
subject’.22  So, experiences always belong to the subject undergoing them, hence Searle’s 
claim that ‘every conscious state is always someone’s conscious state’.23  However, there are 
obviously many other things, apart from experiences which can belong to me, a subject; my 
big toe belongs to me, in that it is on my foot, and part of my body, and no-one else’s – it is 
exclusively mine.  But I could have my toe amputated, or perhaps grow a duplicate of my toe 
in a laboratory and that would mean it was the same toe, just not belonging or attached to me 
anymore, in other words no part of me as a subject.  It does not seem like experiences can be 
cut off from the subject to which they belong in the same way as a toe can be amputated; 
experiences only make sense in relation to the experiencer having them.  This view of 
experiences is more like a bruise than a toe, for you cannot chop off a bruise without chopping 
off the thing that it is bruising, just as you cannot chop out an experience without chopping 
out the thing doing the experiencing i.e. a subject’s brain.  This therefore challenges the view 
that experiences are special in this regard.  So, the subjectivity involved in first-person 
ontology is something more than the fact that experiences belong to the subject having them.  
Perspectivalness 
In Searle’s own words:  I will start exploring what Searle means by referring to the perspectival 
nature of experiences by looking at what he says about it; 
‘Consciousness has a first-person ontology.  It exists only as 
experienced by a human or animal subject and in that sense it exists 
only from a first-person point of view’24 
‘The world itself has no point of view, but my access to the world 
through my conscious states is always perspectival, always from my 
point of view’25 
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Perspectivalness meaning from a particular point of view: These quotes suggest that Searle 
thinks that the perspectivalness of experiences is to do with being from a certain point of 
view, specifically, the point of view of the subject undergoing the experience.  The question 
then becomes what is meant by point of view. Perspectivalness is often used in relation to a 
point of view, for example, a camera on a hill overlooking a city can take a photograph or 
video of the entire city; it has a perspective or point of view on the city, it sees it from a 
particular angle.  Or someone might be looking at a hologram from the left and see a different 
picture to what I see as I view it from the right; one object, experienced from two different 
perspectives by two different subjects.  What does this actually mean when it comes to 
experiences?  It seems to me there might be two options, first, a point of view could be seen 
in a straightforward sense to mean a subject’s perspective on the world, including features 
such as spatiotemporal location and the subject’s makeup, such as the fact they have eyes 
capable of producing visual images.  The second way to interpret point of view might be the 
idea that it makes no sense to think of another perspective on my experience, because it 
exists as given to me.  This would imply that experiences are perspectival and that the only 
relevant perspective is the one of the experiencing subject.   
Contrasting objective and subjective features of the world: One of Searle’s complaints about 
modern philosophy of mind is the assumption that the whole of reality must be objective, 
meaning that features of the world are only deemed to be real if they are equally perceivable, 
and accessible to all subjects simultaneously, and their existence does not depend in any way 
on there being subjects or observers to experience them.  Contrary to this, Searle says,  
‘The real “physical” world contains both entities with a third-person 
ontology (trees and mushrooms, for example) and entities with a 
first-person ontology (pains and colour experience, for example).’26 
The first set of features he sees as having a third-person ontology belong in quadrant B in my 
table above, meaning Searle sees them as ontologically objective features.  The second set of 
features, namely experiences, are in quadrant D of what Searle calls subjective ontology.  
Searle therefore includes in his list of “ordinary” features of the world, subjective features 
with what he calls a first-person ontology, meaning that their existence does depend on the 
subjects or observers experiencing them.  In chapters 5 and 6 I introduce the idea that certain 
brain states are just experiential when undergone by a subject, and that the need to have 
them instantiated in a subject in order to be experientially grasped underlies Searle’s notion of 
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experiences existing only as experienced, or being essentially first-personal.  This explains why 
Searle also maintains that, 
‘The characteristic mistake in the study of consciousness is to ignore 
its essential subjectivity and to try to treat it as if it were an objective 
third person phenomenon’27 
Perspectivalness refers to the way experiences are necessarily experienced from the subject’s 
point of view:  I think this is expressing an interpretation of “point of view” as the second 
option give above; that my experiences only exist as given to me, as I experience them from 
my point of view.  Searle says, ‘the world itself has no point of view, but my access to the 
world through my conscious states is always perspectival, always from my point of view’.28  
Because experiences are, for Searle, always perspectival, in that they are experienced from 
the subject’s point of view, it makes them, in a way, restricted to within that subject.  This 
means that Searle believes that one cannot treat experiences like other non-subjective, non-
perspectival features of reality where we would normally just picture how they fit in to our 
view on the world, hence leaving them seeming separated and fundamentally different.  
Searle’s treatment of the problem is to stop worrying that we cannot fit subjective, 
perspectival experiences into a view on the world which can accommodate all the other 
features and instead simply acknowledge the facts, which he sees as being ‘that biological 
processes produce conscious mental phenomena, and these are irreducibly subjective’.29 
From perspectivity to privacy: The perspectival nature of experiences is, for Searle, indicative 
of an essentially subjective, or subject-involving, aspect of reality that should not be reduced 
out of the picture, as he sees it.  This is closely linked to the idea of whether experiences are 
somehow private and available only to the experiencer in some way, that is to say, whether 
the experiencer has a form of privileged access to their experiences which cannot be achieved 
by objective means.  It is to this question that I now turn. 
Privacy and special access 
In Searle’s own words: Searle says this about access to experiences 
‘In consequence of its subjectivity, the pain is not equally accessible 
to any observer.  Its existence, we might say, is a first-person 
existence.  For it to be a pain, it must be somebody’s pain; and this in 
a much stronger sense than the sense in which a leg must be 
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somebody’s leg, for example.  Leg transplants are possible; in that 
sense, pain transplants are not.  And what is true of pains is true of 
conscious states generally.  Every conscious state is always 
someone’s conscious state.’30 
And 
‘I can feel my pains, and you can’t.  I see the world from my point of 
view; you see it from your point of view.’31 
These two quotes demonstrate the way in which Searle believes experiences are private or 
can only be accessed in particular ways, namely via the first-person viewpoint of having an 
experience.  In other words, I cannot have your perceptual states and I therefore cannot have 
your access to the world, which they provide.  To explore this further I will return to the table 
above to highlight the difference between objective and subjective. 
Getting clear about what Searle means by objective: I think it is important to be clear what 
Searle means when using the terms objective and subjective, because it is illuminating for the 
way in which he sees experiences as somewhat private.  For Searle, objective items’ existence 
is independent of any particular subject’s feelings, perceptions, thoughts, opinions or 
experiences.  The existence of a subjective item is dependent on a particular subject’s feelings, 
perceptions, thoughts, opinions or experiences.  The example of an epistemologically 
objective statement I gave in quadrant A is “Emily is 172cm tall”.  For Searle this is objective, 
epistemologically speaking, in the sense that the truth of the statement “Emily is 172cm tall” 
is knowable whether anybody had ever met her or not, whether anyone had ever compared 
her height to theirs, whether someone thought her particularly short or tall.  Emily just is 
172cm tall.  The other quadrant in the table above involving objectivity is ontological 
objectivity in quadrant B.  For Searle, this refers to items which exist independently of any 
particular subject, meaning that they would exist even if there were no subjects to view, 
interact or appreciate them.  Searle’s point is that it is of no consequence to the existence of a 
cup of coffee whether someone thinks that it smells appetising or is too hot for them to drink.  
Their thoughts, opinions, feelings and attitudes have no bearing on whether they exist or not.  
Quadrant B will include all physical items in the world, like aeroplanes, crystals, cups of coffee 
or icebergs.  I will now look at how the way Searle considers items to be objective elucidates 
his take on what subjective means. 
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Contrasting Searle’s meaning of objective with his meaning of subjective: Objective, for Searle, 
denotes observer, or subject-independent features of the world, whether epistemological 
statements or ontological items.  In other words, an objective phenomenon ‘is not dependent 
on any stance, attitudes, or opinions of observers’.32  In contrast, subjective features are 
basically the opposite of objective ones.  So whereas the truth or falsity of an 
epistemologically objective statement is, according to Searle, independent of any thoughts, 
feelings, attitudes or experiences of subjects, the truth or falsity of what Searle denotes as an 
epistemologically subjective statement is entirely dependent on such features of subjects.  In 
quadrant C I gave the example of the statement “a rainbow lorikeet is prettier than an eastern 
rosella parrot”.  There is nothing that can be said, independent of a subject’s personal 
opinions that can definitively deem such a statement true or false.  Its truth or falsity is 
entirely in the hands of the subject stating it.  Searle takes this subject-dependent nature of 
epistemological statements and translates it across to ontological items.  The corresponding 
claim is that rather than the truth or falsity of statements resting on the experiences and 
beliefs of subjects, the actual existence of certain items is entirely dependent on a subject.  
This is expressed by Searle through his claims that experiences only exist as experienced and 
that pain is always somebody’s pain.  Experiences then are really the only inhabitants of 
quadrant D, and one therefore wonders what it is about them that means they are so heavily 
dependent, as in not independent from, the subject undergoing them. 
Shouldn’t Searle’s view of experiences as biological features of the brain mean they are in 
quadrant B?  Insisting that ‘consciousness does not exist in a separate realm’33 and that  ‘there 
is nothing in your brain except neurons (together with glial cells, blood flow and all the rest of 
it) and sometimes a big chunk of the thalamocortical system is conscious’,34 it might seem 
strange that Searle thinks experiences are dependent on the subject having them at all.  For if 
‘consciousness is just a brain process…a qualitative, subjective, first-person process going on 
in the nervous system’35 then why would consciousness not be objective in the way that the 
process of digestion is?  The key to answering this question is appreciating the implications 
that normally accompany an objective view of the world.  If all features of the world are 
deemed to be objective, then they should be equally accessible to all observers, given that by 
Searle’s definition they are independent of any observer.  For Searle, experiences differ from 
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other biological, and therefore objective features, because they resist external access from 
subjects who are not the one undergoing the experience.   
Searle is not alone in believing that experiences resist objective access: Nagel has written 
extensively on the idea that experiences are necessarily a way the subject is accessing the 
world from their own point of view, rather than being able to be accessed independently in 
any objective way.  For example, Nagel states, 
‘Subjective points of view are themselves parts of the real world, and 
if they and their properties are to be described adequately, their 
ontologically subjective character – the subjectivity of their nature – 
must be acknowledged’36 
For Nagel, this is because, ‘every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single 
point of view’,37 highlighted by his discussion of how it would be impossible for him to know 
‘what it is like for a bat to be a bat’ because he is restricted to ‘the resources of my own 
mind’.38  That is to say, each kind of experience is a point of view on the world and to know 
what that point of view is like, for example which qualitative feelings it involves, one has to 
inhabit that point of view, or at least another point of view very similar to it.  I think that such 
ideas can be seen in Searle’s claim that experiences only exist as experienced, which I believe 
is indicative of how Searle sees experiences as restricted to the subject undergoing them in 
this sense.  Searle’s claim that experiences are firmly in quadrant D, the ontologically 
subjective quadrant, I think is an expression of his belief that experiences are partly private, in 
as much as being restricted to the first-person point of view of the subject having them.   
Searle seems to find even particular experiences only accessible from the individual subject’s 
point of view: Nagel claims that types of experiencers (bats, wasps, humans) are restricted to 
their own point of view, which is why he is unable to know what it is like to be a bat.  Searle 
seems to see experiences as restricted to even an individual’s point of view.  So although I and 
my friend may both be able to experience the same type of experience, maybe the very 
peculiar taste of a durian fruit, Searle sees our individual experiences as restricted in relation 
to one another, hence the claim that ‘I can feel my pains, and you can’t’.  I see the world from 
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my point of view; you see it from your point of view’.39  This has the consequence that, for 
Searle, in relation to a particular pain, 
‘No description of the third-person, objective, physiological facts 
would convey the subjective, first-person character of the pain’40 
In this subsection I have looked at what Searle’s use of the term “subjective” amounts to and 
concluded that it is the related ideas of restricting the way that a phenomenon’s essential 
features can be grasped to the first-person point of view, which makes experiences in some 
way private or have a limited sort of access.  I will now look at what I believe to be the other 
feature of first-person ontology; the qualitative feel of experiences. 
b) Qualitative feel is integral to first-person ontology  
Searle’s view of the qualitative nature of experiences:  Searle sees experiences as having an 
essentially qualitative aspect to them;  
‘Any account of the mind that leaves out these qualitative 
experiences is inadequate’41 
‘Conscious experiences have a qualitative aspect. There is a 
qualitative feel to drinking beer, which is quite different from the 
qualitative feel of listening to Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony’42 
Phenomenal feel is an essential part of what an experience is: The redness of a rose, the 
softness of velvet and the smell of freshly cut grass are classic examples that are often given 
to explain what we mean by qualitative character, phenomenal qualities or the felt aspects of 
experiences.  In other words, ‘to say that something is qualitative is to say that there is an 
answer to the question: ‘What is it like?’43  The qualitative nature of experiences is well known 
in philosophy of mind and made famous by Nagel’s article “What is it like to be a bat?” where 
he finds the phenomenal character of experiences to be fundamental to what experiences 
are; ‘fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something 
that it is like to be that organism – something it is like for the organism’.44  In this way, 
phenomenal feel is an essential part of what an experience is, and is therefore also a central 
aspect of Searle’s notion of first-person ontology, which he sees as expressing the true nature 
of experiences. 
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Explaining Searle’s use of qualitative feel:  The importance of experiences being experienced 
by an experiencer returns at this point when using qualitative what-it-is-likeness to make 
sense of first-person ontology.  For Searle, the forces exerted on a braking car are assumed 
not to be qualitative because the car is not a conscious subject undergoing an experience from 
its own point of view.  So in this scenario, the car is not seen as having a first-person ontology 
because it is assumed that it does not have a point of view on the world, nor is there 
something it is like for the car to feel the forces exerted upon it.  However, the feeling of 
despair is qualitative in the sense that there is a certain “what it is like” for any conscious 
creature as they are experiencing it, that is to say that when someone is in despair they see 
the world in a certain way, from a certain point of view which is unique to them.  So despair 
would be seen by Searle as having a first-person ontology because it feels a certain way to 
undergo despair, and any subject doing so would be doing it from their own personal point of 
view.    
Using qualitative character to make sense of first-person ontology: In this way, Searle joins 
together qualitative feel and the perspectival point of view aspect of experiences together 
when he stipulates that something has a first-person ontology.  Indeed, Searle clearly states 
that subjectivity, which I explored in the subsection above, and qualitative feel ‘together imply 
“first-personal”’.45  So, Searle views the qualitative feel of experiences and their subjective 
nature as bound together by jointly implying that the phenomenon in question has a first-
person ontology.   
In this section I have analysed first-person ontology by breaking it down into its constituent 
concepts of subjectivity and qualitative feel, and further explored subjectivity in terms of 
perspectivalness, privacy and types of access.  In the next section I will consolidate these 
concepts and summarise what Searle’s claim of first-person ontology actually amounts to, and 
assess whether it easily fits alongside the other claims of Biological Naturalism. 
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5. Assessing first-person ontology 
In this section I will first set out what I believe first-person ontology to amount to, namely the 
two-part claim of the subjectivity and qualitative nature of experiences.  I will then assess the 
notion itself.  I will look at whether first-person ontology is really as eccentric as some of 
Searle’s critics see fit to suggest, and I will conclude that it really only expresses views that are 
presented in a more conventional way by other philosophers.  I will then look at how first-
person ontology fits into Searle’s theory of Biological Naturalism and whether it can be made 
sense of in light of Searle’s other commitments.  I will conclude that first-person ontology 
creates a difficulty for Searle by introducing a tension between his desire to hold experiences 
as essentially subjective and qualitative, and his commitments to a roughly materialist view of 
the world.   
a) Making sense of first-person ontology 
No difficulty understanding first-person ontology: With all the problems philosophers have 
making sense of Searle’s work I have begun assessing the various aspects of Biological 
Naturalism by looking at his notion of first-person ontology.  I do not find there to be any 
difficulty in understanding Searle’s first-person ontology, although I have had to look closely at 
his writing and interpret what he says in order to reach a position where I feel I can clearly 
state his intentions.   
First-person ontology is in the realm of subjective ontology, in quadrant D: In section 3 I 
tabulated the fourfold distinction Searle makes between ontology and epistemology, 
subjectivity and objectivity.  I find it clear that Searle strongly believes in keeping 
epistemological issues separated from ontological ones.  With his notion of first-person 
ontology he goes to some length to ensure his readers know that he is making a claim about 
the ontology of experiences, about their essence, their nature, rather than about how we can 
come to know about them.  For example, he insists that ‘”subjective” refers to an ontological 
category, not to an epistemic mode’.46  In other words he means his discussion of first-person 
ontology to refer to quadrant D as opposed to quadrant B in my table, rather than making any 
comment about the epistemological quadrants A and C. He states that ‘we can have an 
epistemically objective science of a domain that is ontologically subjective’,47 again showing 
his desire to separate studying experiences, and coming to know things about them, from 
their essential natures. 
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First-person ontology’s dual notions: So, with his notion of first-person ontology, I think Searle 
is trying to explain what he sees as the essential nature of experiences.  From my discussion in 
the previous sections I think first-person ontology amounts to a claim by Searle that 
experiences have two main essential features: 
1. A perspectival nature whereby they are restricted to being 
experienced from within the point of view of the subject 
undergoing them 
2. A what-it-is-like, phenomenal feel 
Having set out the two features of first-person ontology, I will move onto ascertaining 
whether it is really so unusual a notion as is usually made out in the critical literature. 
b) Is first-person ontology really an unconventional notion? 
First-person ontology baffles Searle’s readers: Many of Searle’s commentators seem baffled 
by first-person ontology and seem to find it difficult to understand what Searle means when 
he uses the term.  For example, Dennett refers to ‘the metaphysical extravagance (at best just 
peculiarity or at worse incoherence) of "subjective ontology".’48  However, I think that with 
close reference to Searle’s writing, it becomes clear that first-person ontology is a relatively 
uncontroversial view about the essential features of experiences, albeit wrapped up in some 
idiosyncratic terminology. 
First-person ontology is nothing new: If I am right about the characterisation I gave first-
person ontology above, then Searle is not making any astonishingly novel claims by insisting 
that experiences have a first person ontology.  The fact that experiences have a perspectival 
nature which restricts the ability to fully grasp them to the first-person point of view is a point 
well explored by Nagel in his article “What is it like to be a bat?”  Nagel sees experiencers as 
limited to grasping only experiences from points of view that are similar enough to their own.  
Hence the belief that experiences have an essentially first-personal, perspectival nature.49  The 
second aspect of first-person ontology, the fact that experiences have a phenomenal feel or 
qualitative aspect when experienced by a subject, is a claim that has already created a 
plethora of philosophical comment and criticism, namely through Jackson’s thought 
experiment about Mary the colour scientist who, so the argument goes, learns something new 
on her release into the world of colour when she sees a red rose for the first time.  She is 
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supposed to learn a new fact about the world, in other words, knowing what it is like to see 
red.  Jackson was trying to show that experiences have an essentially phenomenal character 
which evades capture in physical terms.  
Searle is not alone in his views about the essential nature of experiences: The fact that many 
other philosophers have made similar points to Searle in seminal papers in philosophy of mind 
shows that Searle’s views are not as extravagant as some of his critics suggest.  I will now look 
at how first-person ontology might suggest to Searle’s readers that he should be interpreted 
as a dualist.  I will then look at how Searle also claims to make monistic or broadly materialist 
claims within biological naturalism, concluding that first-person ontology creates a tension 
within Biological Naturalism that would need to be resolved if we are to fully make sense of 
Biological Naturalism. 
c) First-person ontology might suggest a dualistic interpretation of 
Searle 
At first glance, first-person ontology might suggest a dualistic aspect to Biological Naturalism: 
Many people might initially see Searle’s first-person ontology as implying dualism of some sort 
as it seems to advocate the primacy of the subjective point of view and of treating experiences 
as irreducibly fundamental parts of reality.   Philosophers might consider first-person ontology 
to put the subject at the centre of the picture with Searle’s inclusion of the perspectival nature 
of experiences.  They might also consider first-person ontology’s focus on the qualitative 
character of experiences, or Searle’s insistence that experiences only exist as and when 
experienced by a subject to emphasise the world as it is for the subject.  Collins points out 
that, 
 ‘Traditionally, in contrast to most materialists, many philosophers 
who emphasize the importance of consciousness also embrace 
dualism.  Their reasons usually involve the subjective character of 
consciousness’50 
Dualists would also accept the separation of quadrants B and D in my fourfold table above, 
separating mental, subjective items off from objective physical ones.  This implies that not all 
features of the world are objective, which is something Searle also agrees with, for he says, 
‘the real world, the world described by physics and chemistry and biology, contains an 
ineliminably subjective element’.51 
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A convincing case for dualism can be made if you exclusively consider Searle’s notion of first-
person ontology: Certain claims Searle makes do appear to commit him to a dualistic 
interpretation of his work, particularly given that he points to the ontological irreducibility of 
experiences, based on what he sees as their first-person ontology, as a cornerstone of 
Biological Naturalism.  I will now turn to the other end of the monism-dualism spectrum in 
philosophy of mind and show that Searle also makes claims which could be interpreted as 
monistic or broadly materialist. 
d) Searle makes monistic or materialistic claims too 
Searle wants to see experiences as ordinary biological features of the world: Searle is adamant 
that if we should view experiences as anything, it should be as normal biological features of 
the world, just like all the others we see going on in our bodies; 
‘Consciousness, in short, is a biological feature of human and certain 
animal brains.  It is caused by neurobiological processes and is as 
much a part of the natural biological order as any other biological 
features such as photosynthesis, digestion, or mitosis’52  
Causal reduction and Searle’s monistic intuitions: In addition to his notion of first-person 
ontology, which is the basis for his claim that experiences are ontologically irreducible, Searle 
also claims that experiences are causally reducible.  I will look at what this amounts to in more 
detail in the next chapter, but briefly, it is the idea of ascertaining which lower-level features 
“cause”, in Searle’s particular sense, the higher-level feature of conscious experiences.  Searle 
is clear in his monistic beliefs, stating that he sees the universe as ‘entirely made up of 
physical particles that exist in fields of force and are often organized into systems’.53  To most 
people, this suggests that Searle believes that all real features of the world fit into quadrant B 
in my table, that they are ontologically objective, given that they are physical.  In fact, despite 
his idea that experiences have a first-person ontology, Searle is adamant about the ontological 
status of experiences not being something to do with dualism; 
‘What is the ontology, what is the form of existence, of these 
conscious processes? … Does the claim that there is a causal relation 
between brain and consciousness commit us to a dualism of 
`physical' things and `mental' things? The answer is a definite no’54 
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Searle could easily be read as endorsing an anti-dualistic stance: So it seems that Searle views 
experiences as ‘natural processes’ in the brain, and holds that ‘there is no metaphysical gulf’55 
between mental features and physical features of the world.  In this way, if Searle’s overall 
theory and aims are taken into account, including his insistence that experiences can be 
causally reduced, even if not ontologically reduced, and that when an experiencer has an 
experience, there is nothing more going on metaphysically than some particular activity in 
their brain, I think the dualistic interpretation of what first-person ontology amounts to 
becomes much less convincing, and an interpretation of materialism or monism becomes 
more plausible.  In chapter 5 I will assess whether these two features of Searle’s Biological 
Naturalism, first-person ontology and causal reduction, can be legitimately held together.  I 
will now look at the tension caused by these two features of Searle’s Biological Naturalism. 
e) So, when seen in light of the wider claims of Biological 
Naturalism, first-person ontology highlights a problematic tension 
Experiences as irreducible but not too irreducible: Searle’s take on consciousness and 
experiences is grounded in an intuition of materialism.  However, he rejects mainstream 
physicalism as a whole theory on the grounds that ‘it ends up saying falsely that there are no 
ontologically irreducible mental phenomena’.56  This is exactly what first-person ontology aims 
to show and justify – that experiences are irreducibly subjective and qualitative features of 
reality – but not for the purely dualistic purposes that some might first consider Searle to be 
endorsing.  In fact, he also discards dualism because he believes that ‘it ends up saying falsely 
that these [experiences] are something apart from the ordinary physical world we all live in, 
that they are something over and above their physical substrate’.57  It is almost as if Searle 
wants experiences to have the status of being irreducible, but not too irreducible.   
First-person ontology is in tension with reductive desires: Materialists and monists typically 
deny that mental features of the world are anything over and above physical features, which 
can lead to a desire to reduce mental experiences to other, physical features.  In other words, 
there is a desire to reduce the items in quadrant D to those in quadrant B, given that quadrant 
B is considered unproblematically compatible with a physical view of the world.  However, 
stating that ‘conscious states, with their subjective, first-person ontology, are real phenomena 
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in the real world’,58 Searle is implying that they should not be reduced in favour of other 
features, whether causal, functional or otherwise.   
Searle’s denial of conceptual dualism and accepting subjective features as “physical”: What 
Searle wants to claim is that experiences are subjective, as in perspectival in nature, and 
qualitative, that is to say they have what he calls a first-person ontology.  However, he also 
holds that this does not, as almost everyone else in philosophy seems to assume, mean that 
they are not part of the ordinary “physical” world.  This is because he denies what he calls 
conceptual dualism, or the way in which he thinks traditional philosophy pits mental against 
physical and defines physical so as to include mental from the start.  He says of traditional 
approaches to mind and brain that 
‘it is assumed that “mental” and “physical” name mutually exclusive 
ontological categories.  If it is mental then it cannot be in that very 
respect physical.  And if it is physical, then it cannot be in that very 
respect mental.  Mental qua mental excludes physical qua physical’59 
So Searle is trying to simultaneously claim that experiences are reducible to brain processes, 
albeit in his restricted “causal” sense of reduction, and that they are also irreducible in his 
“ontological” sense.  Searle sees no conflict with these two statements, but according to the 
usual terminology in philosophy, this is akin to trying to have your cake and eat it; to say that 
experiences are both reducible and irreducible, both essentially mental and essentially 
physical at the same time.   
First-person ontology as a contradiction of monistic metaphysics: It is understandable why 
first-person ontology is seen as a dualistic type of claim for it renders experiences somewhat 
“special” in their unique way of first-person point of view access, and that these certain 
configurations of activity in the brain feel a certain way for a subject when instantiated in 
them.  This seems at odds with Searle’s idea of a monistic world of physical entities.  However, 
Searle vehemently denies that there is any contradiction in his dual claims of causal 
reducibility and ontological irreducibility.  He says,  
‘I deny that the ontological irreducibility of consciousness implies 
that consciousness is something ‘over and above’, something distinct 
from, its neurobiological base. No, causally speaking, there is nothing 
there, except the neurobiology, which has a higher level feature of 
consciousness. In a similar way there is nothing in the car engine 
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except molecules, which have such higher level features as the 
solidity of the cylinder block, the shape of the piston, the firing of the 
spark plug, etc. ‘Consciousness’ does not name a distinct, separate 
phenomenon, something over and above its neurobiological base, 
rather it names a state that the neurobiological system can be in. 
Just as the shape of the piston and the solidity of the cylinder block 
are not something over and above the molecular phenomena, but 
are rather states of the system of molecules, so the consciousness of 
the brain is not something over and above the neuronal phenomena, 
but rather a state that the neuronal system is in’60 
Corcoran sums up the tension between first-person ontology and views on the physical world 
when he says 
‘Whereas Searle’s discussion of “first-person ontology” and the 
“subjective ontology of consciousness” seems to be suggestive of 
dualism, his claims about consciousness being physical and therefore 
spatial is suggestive of materialistic monism’61 
I will take a closer look at this tension in chapter 5, when I assess whether Searle should be 
interpreted as a property dualist.  In the next chapter, I will analyse the seemingly conflicting 
aspects that Searle wants to include in his ontology.  This will include an exploration of his idea 
of levels of description, as well as his claim that experiences are both caused by and realised in 
the brain.  I will use a discussion of the problem of mental causation to further explicate 
Searle’s position.  I will conclude that the tensions which seem to plague Searle’s position at 
first glance dissolve once it is made clear that Biological Naturalism seems to be some form of 
token identity theory. 
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Chapter 4 – Making sense of levels of 
description and causal reduction 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I tried to make sense of Searle’s claim that experiences have a first-
person ontology, which I believe means simply that experiences have a what-it-is-like 
qualitative feel, and a perspectival nature.  In this chapter I will look at the ontological view of 
the world that Searle sets out in order to then fit experiences into it.  He makes the claim that 
experiences are causally reducible to neurological processes happening in a subject’s brain.  It 
is not immediately clear exactly what this amounts to as it is not standard practice to qualify 
reduction as specifically causal.  By looking at the various aspects of Searle’s characterisation 
of ontology and its component parts, such as properties, I will try to uncover what Searle 
means when he claims that experiences have different levels of description, and that they are 
causally reducible to lower level processes going on in the brain.  Before looking at each 
aspect of Searle’s ontology individually, I will start by clearly setting out the features he seems 
to want to include, in relation to experiences.  I hope that this will help to shape the 
forthcoming exploration of his ideas and keep the links between his different claims clear.   
 The idea of different levels of description permeates Searle’s work, so I will begin in section 3 
by looking at exactly what he means by this, as he often expresses his ideas by referring to 
different levels of description.  For example,  
‘We can describe my arm going up at the level of the conscious 
intention-in-action to raise my arm, and the corresponding bodily 
movement, or we can describe it at the level of neuron firings and 
synapses and the secretion of acetylcholine at the axon endplates of 
my motor neurons, just as we can describe the operation of the car 
engine at the level of piston cylinders and spark plugs firing, or we 
can describe it at the level of the oxidization of hydrocarbon 
molecules and the action of metal alloys.’1 
It is hard to talk about different levels of description of a system or phenomenon without 
running into the question of whether the different descriptions, or levels of description, relate 
to different properties.  I strongly believe that this question cannot be answered satisfactorily 
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until it is clear what is meant by “property” and how one property is being individuated with 
respect to another.  Therefore, in section 4 I will explore the difference between 
differentiating between properties extensionally and intensionally, and show how Searle’s 
differing levels of description do not imply different properties, given his extensionalist view 
of property identity criteria.   
Being clear that the neuronal description and experiential description of any particular brain 
state do not, at least for Searle, imply different mental and physical properties, I can approach 
the questions relating to mental causation with clarity.  In section 5 I will set out how the 
problems that surround maintaining the causal efficacy of the mental can be diagnosed as 
relating to competing properties, mental and physical, and the view that this results in 
competing mental and physical causal powers and all the questions about overdetermination 
and epiphenomenalism which abound in the literature on mental causation.  I will show how 
Searle’s denial that there are neither different properties nor different causal powers at work 
at each level of description dispenses with the problem of mental causation that beset other 
approaches to the mind-body problem.2   
I will then tackle the seeming problem of Searle’s claim that experiences are both caused by 
and realised in the brain in section 6.  One way to make sense of this claim requires an 
acceptance of Searle’s broadening of the meaning of cause, which is wider than the standard 
sense of a relation between distinct existences over time.  An alternative is to see his 
simultaneous style of causation as tantamount to realization itself, thus also dispelling the 
tension.  At this point I will be in a position to demonstrate in section 7 that by “causal 
reduction” Searle means an asymmetrical dependency relation between experiences and the 
brain where if the neuronal state is instantiated, the experiential state is also present.  This 
amounts to the claim of the neuronal level being logically sufficient for the experiential.  
Searle’s causal reduction also refers to his belief that the causal powers of the higher level are 
not anything over and above the causal powers of the lower level because Searle considers 
there to only be one causal sequence differently described. 
I will begin by setting out the features of an ontological picture in which Searle sits his theory 
of Biological Naturalism. 
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2. A seemingly conflicting wish list 
An ontological wish list: Having set out how he believes experiences have a first-person 
ontology, Searle needs to create an ontological picture of the world which they can fit into.  
He does so by considering what experiences are, how they relate to the brain, whether they 
cause things to happen and indeed what causes them in the first place.  Although he does not 
explicitly set it out like this, it seems that Searle has the following wish list of features to fulfil 
when creating a picture of how the mind relates to the brain: 
1. A view where there are different levels of description for any 
particular item or event 
2. Experiences are just a state the brain can be in 
3. Experiences are causally efficacious 
4. Experiences do not have any causal powers above and 
beyond those of their neuronal base 
5. Experiences are caused by lower level neuronal processes 
6. Experiences are realised in the brain as a higher level system 
feature 
 
Conflicting requirements: The problem is that some of these conditions, at least on the face of 
it, appear to be incompatible.  For example, how can the desire for experiences to be causally 
efficacious be reconciled with the claim that they do not have any causal powers above and 
beyond those of the neuronal base?  General approaches in philosophy of mind would suggest 
that in order to uphold some form of mental causation for experiences, they need to have 
their own, specifically mental effects, or else be rendered epiphenomenal.  There is also 
tension in Searle’s claim that experiences are both caused by lower level neuronal processes 
in the brain, and also realised in the brain as a higher level system feature.  At first glance that 
pair of claims seems to suggest that for a given neuronal feature, it both causes the 
experience and is what the experience is realised in, which seems contradictory.  There is also 
the issue that causation is usually meant as a relation that holds between distinct existences, 
but realisation is more of an overlapping relation of instantiation, where a certain type of 
phenomenon is thought to be realised, or instantiated, in a particular token instance.  Searle 
claims both a relation of causation and realisation for experiences, which immediately 
provokes the question of whether or not neuronal activity in the brain, and the experiences 
subjects undergo, are distinct existences, or not.   
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I will now explore each of the features of Searle’s wish list to ascertain what each requirement 
amounts to, in Searle’s eyes, and whether there is, in fact, an insurmountable conflict 
between the different elements.  In the process of doing this the central importance of a view 
of the world based on different levels of description, and the meaning of Searle’s claim that 
experiences are causally reducible will become clear, namely that experiences do not have 
their own separate causal powers independent of, and over and above, those of the neuronal 
activity in the brain. 
3. Levels of description 
Any real, concrete happening will have an infinite number of potential descriptions.  How 
these descriptions are organised, or relate to each other, has bearing on your view of the 
world.  Searle makes great use of differing descriptions of a single phenomenon in his 
explanation of how he sees experiences relating to the brain and the wider physical world.  I 
will first look at how his use of levels of description might at first seem to be like different 
metaphysical levels, given some of the ways he expresses his ideas.  I will then challenge that 
initial interpretation before going on to look at whether different levels of description 
necessarily mean that there are different properties in play in section 4. 
a) Levels of description – different metaphysical levels? 
Searle relies heavily on talk of different levels of description: Throughout his work Searle often 
uses the terminology of “levels of description” which he applies to different ways of looking at 
the same phenomenon or system.  For example, he says,  
‘Any complex system can be described in different ways.  Thus, for 
example, a car engine can be characterized in terms of its molecular 
structure, in terms of its gross physical shape, in terms of its 
component parts, etc.’3 
Levels of description are often used to refer to a vertically layered, metaphysical picture: 
Talking about levels of description is usually applied to ontological approaches where differing 
vertical layers are metaphysically dependent on each other – each one supervenient upon or 
realised by the one directly below it.  The way that Searle expresses his views about levels of 
description can make it appear that he advocates this vertically layered metaphysical picture.4   
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A picture where the levels are more and more micro: Searle insists that the ‘same system can 
have different levels…within a single unified causal system’,5 and he can seem to suggest that 
each layer is explainable by the level directly below it, such that eventually the true 
explanations of things can be captured in terms of the physical micro features of phenomena, 
‘Essential to the explanatory apparatus of atomic theory is not only 
the idea that big systems are made up of little systems, but that 
many features of the big ones can be causally explained by the 
behaviour of the little ones.  This conception of explanation gives us 
the possibility, indeed the requirement, that many sorts of 
macrophenomena be explicable in terms of microphenomena.  And 
this in turn has the consequence that there will be different levels of 
explanation of the same phenomenon’6 
A vertically layered metaphysical picture implies metaphysically distinct levels: Such a 
vertically layered metaphysical view implies that there are entities or properties that are 
specific to each level.  A related point is that if you believe causal powers to work through 
properties, then there will be causal powers which are specific to, and indeed restricted to, 
each level.  This view suggests that levels of description are somehow distinct and 
metaphysically separated from each other, each with their own properties.  This prompts 
questions about how the levels are related to each other and in which level causation really 
occurs.  I do not believe this is the best interpretation of what Searle means when he talks of 
levels of description, which I will now try to show. 
b) Non-hierarchical levels of description 
The different levels of description are not metaphysically distinct existences: I think the key to 
understanding Searle’s approach to levels of description is to emphasise how he does not 
believe the levels to be hierarchically ordered, because he emphasises they’re not in 
competition and not even distinct in a metaphysical way.  Although Searle admits that when 
you believe that systems can be described in different ways,  
‘It is tempting to describe this variability of descriptive possibilities in 
terms of the metaphor of “levels,” and this terminology has become 
generally accepted.  We think of the microlevel of molecules as a 
lower level of description than the level of gross physical structure of 
physical components, which are higher levels of descriptions.’7 
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Searle denies the different levels are metaphysically distinct: Although Searle’s talk of “levels” 
is the accepted terminology, it implies the vertically layered picture of metaphysically 
dependent levels.  However, Searle asserts that the ‘same system can have different levels of 
description which are not competing or distinct’.8  Relating to causation, Searle also denies 
that the levels are separate causal structures, stating that his use of levels of description relate 
to ‘a single causal structure described at different levels.’9 
Searle accepts levels of description but not the usual metaphysical picture which accompanies 
such parlance: Let me be clear what I think Searle is claiming here.  He most definitely talks 
about levels of description, stating that ‘because mental states are features of the brain, they 
have two levels of description – a higher level in mental terms, and a lower level in 
physiological terms.’10  However he denies the metaphysical picture that usually accompanies 
such a belief, namely that the levels involve distinct existences, and are in need of having their 
relation to each other spelled out; ‘same system can have different levels of description which 
are not competing or distinct’.11  This means that for Searle, ‘the fact that the brain has 
different levels of description is no more mysterious than that any other physical system has 
different levels of description’12  and consciousness is rendered a ‘system-level, biological 
feature in much the same way that digestion, or growth, or the secretion of bile are system 
level, biological features’.13  Perhaps the next question that most people will want answering 
is “what entitles Searle to reject the metaphysical consequences that most people connect 
with levels of description?”  I think the answer lies in Searle’s beliefs about how to individuate 
different properties.  In the next section I will explore the extensionalist and intensionalist 
approaches to property individuation and show how this relates to Searle’s view of levels of 
description.  I will also demonstrate how Searle’s view of a single token brain state, that can 
come under, and be picked out by, two different types, is linked to his notion of different 
levels of description. 
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4. The importance of how to individuate properties 
In this section I will be drawing a distinction between using different levels to illustrate a 
metaphysically vertically layered view of reality, where the different levels have their own 
properties and causal powers, and different levels of descriptions simply referring to different 
descriptions of a particular happening or occurrence in the brain with a single set of causal 
powers.  Searle’s position is the latter option, and I believe the difference between the two 
can be teased out by looking at the underlying criteria used to individuate properties.   
a) Different ways to individuate properties 
Property identity criteria are something to be decided and stipulated: I take it as 
uncontroversial that any concrete happening will have an infinite number of potential 
descriptions.  This plethora of descriptions will fall under different levels of description, such 
as atomic, molecular, chemical, biological, social or economic.  Whether the different levels of 
description mean that there are different properties relating to each level depends on how 
you individuate one property from another.  There are a number of options and your choice or 
adherence to a particular approach to properties will have metaphysical consequences 
regarding the levels of description and whether they contain their own in-level properties and 
causal powers. 
Intensionalist vs. extensionalist property individuation criteria: I wholeheartedly agree with 
Howell when he states that ‘it is crucial that we be clear on whether or not properties are 
individuated intensionally or extensionally’.14  Deciding when you have different properties or 
not, you could have property individuation, or you might say a property identity criterion, 
which is either extensional or intensional.  Extensional property individuation involves ‘mind-
independent individuation conditions for properties’15 and an example would be the belief 
that if there are two different properties there must be two different sets of causal powers.  
Alternatively, intensional property individuation means that ‘properties are individuated in 
part by the way we can think about them’16 and an example of this would be the claim that 
every different predicate or description of an item corresponds to a different property.   
Does deciding what properties there are depend on our concepts or descriptions?  The main 
point is that intensional criteria for deciding how many properties exist are dependent, at 
least to some degree, on how we think about properties.  In other words, properties are 
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‘metaphysically individuated by conceptual abilities’17 and if we can conceptualise it 
differently, or apply a different concept to it, then that indicates that a given property is really 
different in the world.  Extensional criteria are the converse, in that the criterion for 
individuating properties is independent of our conceptual or epistemological convictions.  On 
this view then, properties are out there in the world, irrespective of our ability to describe or 
conceptualise them.   
Searle individuates properties extensionally: Although he is not explicit about his views in this 
area, it seems Searle uses an extensionalist criterion of property individuation.  In particular, 
Searle seems to use differing causal powers to differentiate different properties.  For example, 
he says, 
‘If two things in the real empirical world have an independent 
existence they must have different causal powers’18 
This makes Searle an extensionalist when it comes to individuating between properties, 
specifically individuating them via differing causal powers.19  I consider this to be a plausible 
view which is held by others in the philosophical literature.20  Individuating properties by their 
differing causal powers allows for an uncomplicated metaphysical picture where it is possible 
to have a single property with different descriptions of the property.  This is contrary to a 
picture based on intensionalist individuation, for any different description could result in a 
different property.  This is the beginning of an explanation for Searle’s view that regarding 
experiences; there is a single occurrence going on in a subject’s brain which has two equal 
descriptions, at different levels; the neuronal and the experiential.  In the next section I will 
expand on this idea further. 
b) The consequences of different property individuation procedures 
Are there different properties at each level of description? When you talk of levels of 
description there will be questions that arise about properties.  Your choice or belief about 
how to individuate properties has a big impact on the metaphysical picture that ensues.  If you 
opt for the intensional individuation of properties, any two descriptions of a phenomenon 
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may correspond to two different properties.21  To stress the point, the number of ways that 
we have to describe a phenomenon, or perhaps the number of concepts we have that relate 
to it, dictate how many properties we consider that phenomenon to possess.  On an 
extensional view, the number of properties a phenomenon has is independent of our 
considerations about it and on the example I am using, is dictated by the different causal 
powers of the phenomenon itself.  This means that it has the properties it does, 
independently of the number of ways that we have to describe it or conceptualise it. 
The intensionally individuated properties view: When describing the kind of layered view of 
reality that he believes Searle to be endorsing, Kim states that, 
‘it is usually supposed that for each level there exists a set of 
properties characteristic of the entities at that level.  For example, 
transparency and inflammability are associated with the molecular 
level; biological properties make their appearance at the level of 
cells and multicelluclar organisms; and so on’22 
In the picture Kim presents each level of description refers to different properties, so the 
chemical level of description results in chemical properties of a particular phenomenon, and 
the biological level of description results in biological properties.  Given that with this view the 
way we think about the different levels, for example how many there are and what features 
they include, dictates what properties the phenomenon has, it seems to me that Kim must be 
presenting a picture using intensionalist property individuation, meaning that what makes a 
property is, at least in part, based on how we arrange the descriptions of a phenomenon into 
different levels. 
Extensional property individuation allows for single properties with multiple descriptions of 
them: Searle seems to prefer the extensional version of property individuation, specifically, 
individuating via differing causal powers, so he might claim that, contrary to the intensionalist 
view, it makes more sense to say that the different descriptions of a system do not invoke 
different properties of that system.  This is exactly what can be found in Searle’s writing, 
where he states, 
‘We can describe my arm going up at the level of the conscious 
intention-in-action to raise my arm, and the corresponding bodily 
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movement, or we can describe it at the level of neuron firings and 
synapses and the secretion of acetylcholene at the axon endplates of 
my motor neurons, just as we can describe the operation of the car 
engine at the level of piston cylinders and spark plugs firing, or we 
can describe it at the level of the oxidization of hydrocarbon 
molecules and the action of metal alloys. In both the case of the 
brain and the case of the car engine, these are not separate causal 
structures; it is a single causal structure described at different 
levels.’23 
‘Once you see that the same system can have different levels of 
description which are not competing or distinct, but rather different 
levels within a single unified causal system, the fact that the brain 
has different levels of description is no more mysterious than that 
any other physical system has different levels of description.’24 
Properties are a way that something can be, and a brain can be in a particular state at a 
particular time.  For Searle the brain is in a particular state in virtue of instantiating a certain 
property at a time, and the brain state consists in that instantiation.  As he says,  
‘The consciousness of the brain is not something over and above the 
neuronal phenomena, but rather a state that the neuronal system is 
in.’25   
So for Searle, brains can be in certain states, some of which will be able to be picked out or 
described experientially as well as neuronally.  Crucially though, this does not, for Searle, 
mean that there are separate mental and physical properties, there is just a single property of 
the brain, described in different ways.  That is to say, although he believes in different levels of 
description for brain states, he does not view experiences as mental properties of the brain 
state, as the intensionalist about property individuation might.  Rather, an experience is a 
particular token brain state, which when instantiated comes under two types; “experience” 
and “neuronal activity”.  The experiential is one way of picking out the brain state in question.  
This is Searle essentially disagreeing with the assumption inherent in the intensionalist 
metaphysical picture demonstrated above.  That is, that there being two different ways of 
describing, or two different concepts of, a token brain state ‘entails nothing at all about how 
many properties there are’.26 
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Dealing with one and two on Searle’s ontological wish list: In summary, I believe that Searle 
individuates properties extensionally via their differing causal powers meaning that there 
being different causal powers is what fixes how many properties there are.  This means that it 
is possible to have a single brain feature with more than one way of describing it, that is, a 
token brain state that can be brought under more than one type, namely experiential and 
neuronal.  This is what Searle proposes in all his writings regarding the relation of experiences 
to the brain.  This discussion has been a way of understanding and reconciling points one and 
two on Searle’s ontological wish list, that is, that there are different levels of description for 
any token particular, and that experiences are just a state the brain can be in.  I will now turn 
to examining the consequences of this view regarding causal powers.  This will help me 
explain, in section 5, how Searle wishes to maintain both features three and four on his wish 
list, namely that experiences are causally efficacious, whilst at the same time they do not have 
any causal powers above and beyond those of their neuronal base. 
5. Mental Causation 
In this section I will look at points three and four on Searle’s list of ontological requirements; 
that experiences are causally efficacious yet they do not have any causal powers above and 
beyond those of their neuronal base.  These two features are directly related to the large 
literature about mental causation in philosophy of mind.  Given a broadly physicalist view of 
the world, the problem of mental causation involves maintaining the causal efficacy of the 
mental so as to satisfy our intuitions that our experiences can cause things to happen.  For 
example, it is my belief that it will rain soon that makes me reach for an umbrella when I leave 
the house.  I will try to make sense of Searle’s claim that the problem of mental causation 
simply does not apply to his theory of Biological Naturalism.  Because he opts for a form of 
token identity, Searle bypasses such concerns, for they simply cannot apply to his ontological 
picture of a single property and single causal sequence described and picked out in differing 
ways.  I will begin by setting out what the problem of mental causation is and will proceed to 
argue that Searle is right to claim that the problem of mental causation and any related 
‘problems about epiphenomenalism and the causal closure of the physical simply do not arise 
for me’.27 
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a) The problem about mental causation 
Setting up the problem of mental causation: The problem of mental causation arose because 
physicalists wanted to claim that mental properties do not reduce to physical ones, yet are still 
physical.  Kim generated the puzzle of mental causation for them on the assumption that 
mental properties are causally efficacious.  Therefore, discussions about mental causation all 
ultimately centre around maintaining the causal efficacy of the mental, given a physicalistic 
world view28.  It is a consequence of a broadly physicalist view of the world that physical 
properties are causally efficacious and have the powers to cause physical effects.  Our 
intuitions about our experiences also tell us that they are causally efficacious.  Mental-mental 
causation is relatively uncontroversial, such as my feeling of thirst causing my desire to seek 
out a drink.  The type of causation which prompts philosophers to pause and think is mental-
physical causation.   
Mental-physical causation: Mental-physical causation causes problems for physicalistic views 
of the world because when mental properties and physical properties are considered to be 
distinct, they compete with each other to be the one through which the causation takes place.  
This assumes that causal powers work through particular properties of items.  Suppose there 
is a physical event, P, a neurological happening in my brain, which causes a physical effect, P*, 
a different neurological happening in my brain.  Let us say that M is a mental state which is 
realised, or supervenes upon the physical, neurological state P, and M* is a mental state 
which is realised, or supervenes upon, the physical, neurological state P*.  The problem of 
mental causation here is how M can be said to cause M*, or P*, give that M* is realised by P*.  
P causes P* which suffices for M*, by hypothesis of physicalism.  However, what is left for M 
to do, especially if it is insisted that M is not identical to P? Kim expressed such concerns in 
diagrammatic form like this, 
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Because the mental and physical properties are distinct and potentially have their own causal 
powers working through them, they compete for which one is the cause of P*, for as the 
problem is set up, there seems to be two causes of P* - P and M.   
Overdetermination:  Fundamental to many definitions of physicalism is that every physical 
effect has a sufficient physical cause.  This is effectively the claim that P is a sufficient cause of 
P*.  Remember, however, that the problem of mental causation is finding a way to include the 
causal efficacy of the mental in a physicalistic world view, which would require M having 
causal powers of its own.  This leaves the situation where P* seems to have two sufficient 
causes – M and P.  Any situation where an effect has more than one sufficient cause, and the 
causes are distinct, is a case of overdetermination.  In the problem of mental causation, the 
point is that a physical effect seems to have both a mental sufficient cause (M) and a physical 
sufficient cause (P).  This allows a way in for dualistic theories, for they could claim that whilst 
every physical effect does have a physical cause, some physical effects also have mental 
causes.  This is why the causal argument for physicalism29 includes a clause ruling out 
overdetermination.  This is so as to rule out a situation where an accepted sufficient physical 
cause for a particular physical effect, is also accompanied by an independent sufficient non-
physical mental cause for the same effect. 
Epiphenomenalism: To some, although not all, overdetermination is an unpalatable result of 
thinking about mental causation, and having specifically mental causes seems to let dualism 
get a foot in the door, for there is then a dualism of causes – mental and physical.  An 
alternative option for reconciling the apparent double sufficient cause for P* is to deny that 
the mental property has its own causal powers.  In effect, this erases the higher level of 
specifically mental causes, thus leaving the uncontroversial physical-physical cause of P to P*, 
leaving M causally impotent, or epiphenomenal.  By stipulating that the causal powers are 
working through the physical properties, there is no causal job for the mental properties to 
do.    
Having set up the problem of mental causation, I will now turn to the ontological 
commitments that underpin the framework in which the problem of mental causation sits. 
                                                          
29
 See Papineau D. Thinking About Consciousness, Chapter 1 
84 
 
b) The ontological commitments which underpin the problem of 
mental causation 
Questions that arise from thinking about mental causation: The tension inherent in Kim’s 
diagrammatic formulation of mental causation leads to questions being asked like “Where is 
the causation really happening – at the lower level of neurons or the higher level of 
experiences?”30  Such a question requires that there is a possibility of different properties at 
the mental and physical levels so that different causal powers can work through the different 
mental and physical properties.   
The landscape of mental causation: The problem of mental causation requires separate 
properties at the mental and physical level, so that different causal powers can work through 
these different properties.  If reduction or identity is assumed between property instances, 
then there is no room for different mental and physical causal powers to work through any 
differing mental and physical properties.  This will be central to understanding Searle’s answer 
to the problem of mental causation.  I will now look at how Searle’s view of different levels of 
description within Biological Naturalism compares to the differing levels implied by the 
problem of mental causation.  I will also look at how Searle’s view of experiences as brain 
states picked out by different terms, allows him to avoid the problem of mental causation. 
c) How Searle’s view deals with the problem of mental causation 
In Searle’s own words: I think it might be useful to first quote Searle at length as he works 
through the way he believes Biological Naturalism responds to the problem of mental 
causation.  I will then explain the features in light of the issues I have previously discussed in 
this chapter.   
‘We cannot make sense of the idea of mental causation.  There are 
four propositions that taken together are inconsistent. 
1. The mind-body distinction: the mental and the 
physical form distinct realms 
2. The causal closure of the physical: the physical realm is 
causally closed in the sense that nothing nonphysical 
can enter into it and act as a cause 
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3. The causal exclusion principle: where the physical 
causes are sufficient for an event, there cannot be any 
other types of causes of that event. 
4. Causal efficacy of the mental: mental states really do 
function causally. 
These four together are inconsistent…In general, as we have seen 
over and over, when you have one of these impossible philosophical 
problems it usually turns out that you were making a false 
assumption.  I believe that is the case in the present instance.  The 
mistake is expressed in proposition 1, the traditional mind-body 
distinction…this mistake arises from supposing that if there is a level 
of description of brain processes at which they contain real and 
irreducible sequences of conscious states, and there is another level 
of description of brain processes at which they are purely biological 
phenomena, and the states of consciousness are not ontologically 
reducible to the neurobiological phenomena, then these two levels 
must be separate existences…The way out of this dilemma is to 
remind ourselves…[that] the reality and irreducibility of 
consciousness do not imply that it is some separate type of entity or 
property “over and above” the brain system in which it is physically 
realized.  The consciousness in the brain is not [a] separate entity or 
property; it is just the state that the brain is in’31 
A single causal event described at different levels: Searle’s reliance on levels of description is 
really highlighted in his approach to mental causation.  Rather than adopting the standard 
view of distinct mental and physical properties which each provide distinct causal powers, 
Searle’s metaphysical picture is one of a single causal event, a causal sequence,  which has at 
least two descriptions; neurological and experiential.  It is important to be clear that for any 
causal event Searle does not consider there to be both mental and physical properties and 
mental and physical causes in play.  As he puts it, 
‘there are not two independent phenomena, the conscious effort 
and the unconscious neuron firings.  There is just the brain system, 
which has one level of description where neuron firings are occurring 
and another level of description, the level of the system, where the 
system is conscious and indeed consciously trying to raise its arm’32 
It is a standard belief that causal powers work through properties, such as a ball rolling 
because of its property of being round.  Searle considers an experience to be a ‘state that the 
brain is in’33 which means that there is a single property in play for any possible causation to 
work through.  Searle’s view therefore involves just a single set of causal powers, a single 
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causal event, that can be described both experientially at a higher level of description, or 
neurologically at a lower level of description.  This is the essence of his response to the 
problem of mental causation.  
On Searle’s view it makes no sense to ask which level the causation is really happening at: The 
problem of mental causation is about which level a particular instance of causation is really 
happening at.  For example, is there causation at the mental level?  If not, the mental 
becomes epiphenomenal.  Is there causation at the mental and the physical level? If this is so, 
then we have a case of overdetermination.  Is there only causation at the mental level?  If so, 
then causal closure of the physical is violated.  However, such questions cannot be applied to 
Searle’s view of a single property with corresponding causal powers and different 
descriptions.  This is because the question would have to be translated as “at which level of 
description is the causal power really happening?” and it seems unmotivated to say that the 
causation has to be at one level of description or another.  Any concrete happening in reality 
has an infinite possible number of descriptions, so if someone wants to know which level the 
causation is really happening at, they must first give a reason why it should only be thought to 
be properly described at one level of description.  Let me reiterate that Searle’s picture is one 
of a single causal event with different levels of description, not different levels of events, so it 
does not really make sense to ask which description is the one where the causation really 
happens.34  I am now in a position to explain why the problem of mental causation does not 
apply to the approach to properties and causes presented in Biological Naturalism. 
Biological Naturalism deals with the problem of epiphenomenalism at its core: Searle is 
allowing for causal powers at the higher experiential level, but believes that descriptions of 
these causal powers are simply re-describing the causal powers of the brain state, which can 
also be equally described at the neuronal level.  To be clear, it is not that there are separate 
causal powers which happen to be the same in scope at the mental and the physical levels, it’s 
that there is just one set of causal powers, differently described.  Epiphenomenalism is a 
situation where the higher level mental properties do not have any causal powers; they are 
rendered powerless because the causation is thought to really be happening at the lower, 
physical level.  First, as I have already set out above, there is only one token property (with 
different descriptions) in Searle’s view of experiences and the brain, so there are not even 
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separate mental properties capable of having (or not having) any causal powers of their own.  
In this way it is not the case that Searle posits mental properties but denies they have any 
causal consequences, he does not even get as far as separate mental properties.  Second, for 
Searle, the mental or experiential description does not describe something powerless as such, 
in the way that epiphenomenalism suggests.  The lack of causal power for mental properties 
comes from the causation really happening at the lower level.  I showed above how that 
question cannot apply within the framework of properties and causal powers that Searle 
holds.  Therefore, I think Biological Naturalism deals with the problem of epiphenomenalism 
before it even gets going because the causal powers that work through the brain state 
property are equally captured at the experiential or the neuronal level.  The mental is 
therefore not left causally impotent; it has just as many causal powers as the neuronal level, in 
the sense that the two levels of description are describing the single, same causal sequence.  
Any claim that in Searle’s view the mental is rendered epiphenomenal should acknowledge 
that this also means the neuronal is just as epiphenomenal. 
Worries about overdetermination do not apply to Biological Naturalism: In a similar way, 
concerns about overdetermination cannot apply to the picture of properties and causal 
powers put forth in Biological Naturalism.  As overdetermination in relation to mental 
causation is the situation where a particular effect has, simultaneously, both a physical and a 
distinct mental sufficient cause, this again cannot apply to Searle because he posits only a 
single property and single corresponding causal sequence.  There is a duality of descriptions 
but not a duality of causes, so there simply cannot be any concern about overdetermination.  
As Searle puts it, 
 ‘The relation of consciousness to brain processes is like the relation 
of the solidity of the piston to the molecular behaviour of the metal 
alloys, or the liquidity of a body of water to the molecular behaviour 
of the H+2+O molecules, or the explosion in the car cylinder to the 
oxidization of the individual hydrocarbon molecules.  In every case 
the higher-level causes, at the level of the entire system, are not 
something in addition to the causes at the microlevel of the 
components of the system.  Rather, the causes at the level of the 
entire system are entirely accounted for, entirely causally reducible 
to, the causation of the microelements.  That is true of brain 
processes as it is of car engines, or of water circulating in washing 
machines.  When I say that my conscious decision to raise my arm 
caused my arm to go up, I am not saying that some cause occurred in 
addition to the behaviour of the neurons when they fire and produce 
all sorts of other neurobiological consequences, rather I am simply 
describing the whole neurobiological system at the level of the 
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entire system  and not at the level of particular 
microelements…there are not two independent descriptions of two 
independent sets of causes, but rather they are descriptions at two 
different levels of one complete system’35 
 
Concluding remarks about mental causation: In this section about mental causation I have 
looked at the issues surrounding points three and four on Searle’s ontological wish list; that 
experiences are causally efficacious, but that experiences have no causal powers above and 
beyond those of their neuronal base.  These two demands can seem initially contradictory, for 
surely to cause things to happen, what is usually considered to be a mental property needs to 
have its own causal powers?  However, I have shown in this section how Searle’s ontological 
approach and extensional method for individuating properties means that the concerns 
surrounding mental causation, the threat of epiphenomenalism and the issue of 
overdetermination, are rebutted by Biological Naturalism at the most fundamental level.  I will 
now turn to the final pair of features on Searle’s ontological wish list; that experiences are 
both caused by and realised in the brain and will again show how despite first appearances, 
these are compatible beliefs.   
6. Searle’s claim that experiences are caused by and realised in 
the brain 
Searle claims that experiences are both caused by and realised in the brain; 
‘Consciousness is a biological phenomenon like any other.   It 
consists of inner qualitative subjective states of perceiving, feeling 
and thinking.    Its essential feature is unified, qualitative subjectivity. 
Conscious states are caused by neurobiological processes in the 
brain, and they are realized in the structure of the brain.  To say this 
is analogous to saying that digestive processes are caused by 
chemical processes in the stomach and the rest of the digestive tract, 
and that these processes are realized in the stomach and the 
digestive tract.’36 
To many of Searle’s readers his joint claims of causation and realisation regarding experiences 
seem, at least on the face of it, to be mutually exclusive.  Causation is usually considered to 
involve two distinct entities related in sequence over time, whereas realisation is a form of 
instantiation relation where a particular token instantiates a type at a certain time.  This 
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means that realisation rules out the kind of entity distinction that causation requires, hence 
why it might seem odd to claim, as Searle does, that ‘mental features are caused by, and 
realised in neurophysiological phenomena’.37 
In this section I will show that Searle does not use causation in the standard way but in a wider 
sense to include what he refers to as ‘non-event causation’.38  This wider sense of causation 
does not conflict with his claim of realisation because it does not involve the same distinct 
entities required for the standard meaning of causation.  I will begin by looking at what Searle 
actually means when he claims there is a relation of causation between experiences and the 
brain, followed by a review of what he means by realised, which I believe to be a fairly 
standard construal of the notion.  In the final section I will draw the two previous sections 
together to show that Searle’s caused-by and realised-in claims are compatible.  
a) Searle’s use of “cause” 
Causation as discrete existences ordered sequentially: Causation between two events is 
usually seen as requiring ‘at a minimum that the two be distinct events.’39  Hume’s 
investigations into causation reveal such an assumption when he says that; 
‘After the constant conjunction of two objects, heat and flame, for 
instance, weight and solidity, we are determined by custom alone to 
expect the one from the appearance of the other’40 
Such a view of causation should allow for the cause and the effect to exist separately.  For 
example, if a particular causal event is a hammer breaking a window, it is possible to imagine a 
hammer without any windows, and a broken window that has never been touched by a 
hammer.  This applies to tokens of events as well as types; you could have had either without 
the other.  Thus with this construal of causation, the cause and the effect are distinct entities, 
sequenced over time.  This is the uncontroversial meaning of a causal relation. 
Simultaneous causation: When Searle refers to experiences being “caused” by neurological 
happenings in the brain, he is referring not to the standard format of causation but a type of 
simultaneous causation, where cause and effect happen at the same time.  As he puts it, 
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‘The causal order of nature is often not a matter of discrete events 
sequential in time, but of microphenomena causally explaining 
macrofeatures of systems’41 
This is very different to the one-after-another setup of standard causation where effects 
follow after causes.  For Searle though, such simultaneous causation is commonplace in the 
world around us.  Take the example of a cat curled up in some long grass – there is an 
indentation in the grass caused by the cat’s body flattening the blades.  It does not only 
appear once the cat has stood up again, but is in fact present as the cat is sitting on the grass.  
The indentation and the cat sitting in the grass are happening at the same time, but few would 
deny that the cat sitting in the grass is the cause of the indentation.  Searle expresses it thus: 
‘In lots of cases of causation the cause is simultaneous with the 
effect.  Look at the objects around you and notice that they are 
exerting pressure on the floor of the room you are in.’42 
Examples of simultaneous causation might be the strong intermolecular bonds between 
molecules of a substance simultaneously causing its feature of solidity, or the arrangement of 
molecules in such a way as to let light easily travel through causing a material’s transparency.   
Searle denies some of the assumptions inherent in the standard use of “causal”:  Searle uses 
“cause” in a wider sense than merely the one-after-another sequencing of distinct existences.  
He tries to use the relation of causation to explain the relation between a brain state 
neuronally described and that same brain state psychologically or experientially described.  
Given the ontological framework within which he positions his theory of Biological Naturalism, 
which I outlined in the section above, the standard use of causation would be an odd thing for 
Searle to use.  This is because the standard use of causation involves discrete existences, and 
Searle is best interpreted as believing in a single brain state property with different 
descriptions, rather than different mental and physical properties.  This does not mesh well 
with a causal claim between neuronal activity and mental experiences based on the standard 
construal of causation, because for Searle these are not the distinct existences required by 
standard causation.  Searle seems to acknowledge that his view of causation might be 
different from what people normally expect with a causal relation, for he refers to a specific 
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sort of ‘non-event causation’43 and tries to justify his approach by claiming that it is not 
unprecedented;  
‘There are many examples in nature where a higher level feature of a 
system is caused by lower level elements of that system, even 
though the feature is a feature of the system made up of those 
elements. Think of the liquidity of water or the transparency of glass 
or the solidity of a table, for example.44 
Searle should acknowledge that he is not accepting the assumptions that most people require 
for causation, and that his use of “causal” to describe the relation between a brain state 
described at a lower neuronal level and a brain state described at a higher experiential level, is 
not the standard construal.   
Summarising Searle’s position: To be clear, when Searle says that experiences are caused by 
the brain, he does not mean that there is a brain state which causes a separate entity that is 
an experience, as the standard view of causation would imply.  What Searle means is a more 
simultaneous style of causation, where an experience is a state the brain can be in at a certain 
time; 
‘If brain processes cause consciousness, then it seems to many 
people that there must be two different things, brain processes as 
causes and conscious states as effects, and this seems to imply 
dualism.  This…derives in part from a flawed conception of 
causation.  In our official theories of causation we typically suppose 
that all causal relations must be between discrete events ordered 
sequentially in time.  For example, the shooting caused the death of 
the victim.  Certainly, many cause-and-effect relations are like that, 
but by no means all.  Look around you at the objects in your vicinity 
and think of the causal explanation of the fact that the table exerts 
pressure on the rug.  This is explained by the force of gravity, but 
gravity is not an event.  Or think of the solidity of the table.  It is 
explained causally by the behaviour of the molecules of which the 
table is composed.  But the solidity of the table is not an extra event; 
it is just a feature of the table.  Such examples of non-event 
causation give us appropriate models for understanding the relation 
between my present state of consciousness and the underlying 
neurobiological processes that cause it.  Lower-level processes in the 
brain cause my present state of consciousness, but that state is not a 
separate entity from my brain; rather it is just a feature of my brain 
at the present time.’45 
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A legitimate question might be what philosophical work Searle’s inclusion of a causal relation, 
as well as realisation, is doing.  Searle’s simultaneous style of causation could be seen as very 
similar to standard realisation, which I will explore in the next subsection.  Having tried to 
make sense of Searle’s claim that experiences are caused by the brain, number five in his 
ontological wish-list, I will turn to number six, that experiences are realised in the brain. 
b) Searle’s use of “realised” 
In Searle’s own words: 
‘Conscious states are realized in the brain as features of the brain 
system, and thus exist at a level higher than that of neurons and 
synapses.’46 
‘My brain processes both cause and realize my present pain in 
exactly the same way that the molecular behaviour of the molecules 
of an object both cause and realize its solidity’47 
‘Consciousness and other sorts of mental phenomena are caused by 
neurobiological processes in the brain, and they are realized in the 
structure of the brain’48  
Realisation as a form of instantiation relationship: Realisation is a kind of instantiation 
relationship; it is an instantiation of a type by a token.  For example, the type “pain” can be 
instantiated, or realised, in my token c-fibre stimulation.  Realisation is more like an 
overlapping relation where a token is said to be a certain type, rather than of two separate 
existences ordered sequentially.  Where with causation it is possible to imagine the cause and 
effect separately, with realisation it is not possible to do this in the same way.  This is because, 
if A, a higher level feature, is realised by B, a lower level feature, then whenever B occurs, A is 
always instantiated by metaphysical necessity.   
 
Relating realisation to Searle’s view of levels of description: A realisation claim regarding 
experiences and brain states can be thought of as a particular token brain state, instantiating 
two different “types”.  In other words, one and the same brain state instances the types 
“neuronal activity” and “pain experience”.  This mirrors Searle’s view regarding levels of 
description which I set out above, namely that a particular token state, happening or 
occurrence in my brain has two non-equivalent descriptions, a lower level neuronal 
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description and a higher level experiential description.  In this way, I think Searle uses 
realisation in a fairly uncontroversial way.   
Having established that Searle uses realisation in a standard way I will now try to reconcile it 
with his non-standard use of causation, thereby dissolving any feeling of tension between the 
two claims. 
c) Experiences are caused by and realised in the brain? 
In Searle’s own words: Let me start by recapping what Searle says in his own words, 
‘Many causal forces are continuous through time.  Gravity, for 
example. The causal explanation of why this table exerts pressure on 
the floor is the force of gravity, but gravity does not consist of a 
sequence of discrete events. And lots of causal relations are bottom 
up and simultaneous with the effect. For example, the causal 
explanation of why this table supports objects is in terms of the 
behavior of the microparticles, but the causal explanation of why the 
table supports objects is not given by first specifying one event, the 
molecular movements, and then a later event, the support of the 
object. Rather the two are simultaneous. Similarly the causal 
explanation of why my brain is in its present state of consciousness is 
in terms of, let us suppose, massive rates of synchronized neuron 
firings at synapses. But this does not require that, first, the brain 
behave in a certain way and then, later, consciousness exists, rather 
the conscious states are realized simultaneously with the neuron 
firings.’49 
Caused by and realised in seem to be contradictory claims: The original problem with these 
joint claims is that when both terms are used in the standard way, they seem contradictory, 
because causation requires distinct entities sequenced through time, but realisation is about 
the overlapping of types and tokens for a single entity at any one given time.  Nevertheless, 
Searle is clear that regarding experiences, he believes; 
‘The surface feature is both caused by the behaviour of micro-
elements, and at the same time is realised in the system that is made 
up of the micro elements’50 
Reconciling Searle’s causal and realisation claims:  The solution to resolving the tension 
between the causal and realisation claims lies in understanding Searle’s non-standard 
formation of causation.  Because Searle purports a form of token identity, he ends up positing 
a single brain property which has, among others, mental and neuronal levels of description.  
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This bars him from using causation in the standard way if he wants to claim that experiences 
are caused by the brain, because that would require experiences to be a separate entity 
distinct from the brain, rather than a mere description of a brain state because experiences 
cannot be caused by the same brain feature which realises them.  Searle therefore widens the 
notion of causation when he claims that experiences are caused by the brain, to mean a 
simultaneous dependency relation which is not sequenced over time, but instead one where 
cause and effect are concurrent.  Although Searle tries to persuade his reader that there are 
many examples of this sort of “causation” in the natural world, such as gravity holding objects 
to the floor, he should really openly admit that when he claims experiences are caused by the 
brain he does not mean what most people mean by “caused”.   
Searle’s causation as tantamount to realisation: There are times when Searle even comes 
close to admitting that his notion of causation is tantamount to realisation: 
‘Similarly the causal explanation of why my brain is in its present 
state of consciousness is in terms of, let us suppose, massive rates of 
synchronized neuron firings at synapses. But this does not require 
that, first, the brain behave in a certain way and then, later, 
consciousness exists, rather the conscious states are realized 
simultaneously with the neuron firings.’51 
In other words, Searle’s claim that experiences are “caused by” brain states could be seen as a 
claim of realisation, and the statement that ‘mental features are caused by, and realised in 
neurophysiological phenomena’52 would become a tautology tantamount to “mental features 
are realised in and realised in neurophysiological phenomena”.  I believe this to be the source 
of confusion and why many of his critics find it difficult to make sense of his claim that 
experiences are both caused by and realised in the brain, and if Searle’s notion of causation is 
seen in the light of realisation, the apparent tension in Searle’s position can be resolved.   
I will now consolidate all the previous areas I have discussed to make sense of Searle’s claim 
that experiences are what he calls causally reducible. 
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7.  Causal reduction 
a) How Searle describes causal reduction 
In Searle’s own words: I am now in a position to consider what Searle means by his claim that 
experiences are causally reducible to neuronal processes going on in the brain.  I believe that a 
clear understanding of causal reduction can be achieved by drawing on all the sections 
discussed in this chapter; levels of description, the way you choose to individuate properties, 
Searle’s response to the problem of mental causation and his particular meaning of 
simultaneous style causation.  First, however, I will present what Searle says about causal 
reduction, in his own words: 
‘A relation between any two types of things that can have causal 
powers, where the existence and a fortiori the causal powers of the 
reduced entity are shown to be entirely explainable in terms of the 
causal powers of the reducing phenomenon’53 
‘We can say that phenomena of type A are causally reducible to 
phenomena of type B, if and only if the behaviour of A’s is entirely 
causally explained by the behaviour of B’s, and A’s have no causal 
powers in addition to the powers of B’s’54 
‘Causally speaking, there is nothing there, except the neurobiology, 
which has a higher level feature of consciousness. In a similar way 
there is nothing in the car engine except molecules, which have such 
higher level features as the solidity of the cylinder block, the shape 
of the piston, the firing of the spark plug, etc.’55 
b) Explaining Searle’s claim that experiences are causally reducible 
I think that Searle’s claim that experiences are causally reducible to neurological processes in 
the brain, is best interpreted as the claim that there are no causal powers of an experience 
that are over and above the causal powers of the brain state that the experience-based 
description picks out.  This means that for any causal event there are different levels of 
description, two of which are the mental and physical descriptions in our case.  However, this 
does not mean that there are two properties through which different causal powers can work 
– there remains just a single set of powers working through the single brain state.   
Let me try to be very clear here; although Searle says that there are no causal powers over 
and above those of the neuronal base, he does not mean, despite how it might sound, that 
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the causation really happens at the lower level.  Instead, he means that there is only one 
causal event going on, differently described.  In other words, 
 Searle does not mean “experiences have no causal powers above 
and beyond those of where the real causation happens, i.e. at the 
physical level” 
Searle does mean “experiences have no causal powers above and 
beyond those of the brain state which has an equally valid physical 
description” 
Inherent in Searle’s claim is a certain directionality of causation – the experiential has no 
causal powers above the neurological goings on in the brain – not the other way around.  In 
the next section I will explain this directionality of causal reduction. 
c) Explaining the directionality of causal reduction 
Highlighting the directionality of Searle’s causal reduction: When Searle expresses his idea of 
causal reduction, it is always in a way that is directional from experiences to neurological brain 
processes.   Therefore, the following question might arise: 
Why not say that the physical has no causal powers above and 
beyond the mental level?  Why is there an in-built directionality in 
causal reduction? 
Neuroscience has provided familiar and uncontroversial explanations at the neuronal level: 
Searle always likes to start by trying ‘to describe the facts.’56 We already know from our 
empirical investigations into neuroscience that the neuronal activity in our brains can cause 
other neuronal activity (and onwards along the causal chain through to different physical 
effects in other parts of our bodies).  I think this is one reason why Searle phrases his denial of 
multiple sets of causal powers as “experiences have no causal powers beyond those of the 
neuronal base” rather than “the neuronal activity in our brain has no causal powers beyond 
those of the experience”. 
Directionality due to the difference between higher-level and lower-level descriptions: 
Another reason for the directionality of causal reduction is that if you accept Searle’s point 
about consciousness being a system-level feature, and the neurons being the more basic 
building blocks of the system, then there is an obvious sense in which conscious experiences 
arise out of the lower level base.  Realisation just is a directional relationship. 
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The possibility of neuronal processes having causal powers that experiences do not: Another 
reason it is experiences that reduce to neuronal processes and not the other way around is 
because nothing rules out neurons having other causal powers, as well as the ones describable 
at the level of experiences.  The claim is that the mental has no causal powers that the 
physical doesn’t also have, which is different to the other way round.  In a Venn diagram, the 
circle of causal powers for the physical is (potentially) bigger than the one for experiences, 
which resides fully inside the physical one, not the other way around. 
Summarising causal reduction: Searle’s notion of causal reduction is a product of his belief 
that brain states have different levels of descriptions – neuronal and experiential.  The single 
brain state property, as opposed to separate mental and physical properties, relates to a 
single causal sequence, again, differently described at different levels.  Causal reduction 
amounts to the claim that the experiential description of the brain state and the neuronal 
level description of the brain state will both reference the same set of causal powers.  In this 
way Searle’s claim that experiences causally reduce to neuronal processes amounts to the 
claim that there is one set of causal powers, differently described. 
I will conclude this chapter by revisiting Searle’s ontological wish list which I set out at the 
start of the chapter.  I hope to show that although it might have first seemed to include 
numerous contradictions or claims which are mutually exclusive, given my interpretation of 
Searle, they become not only compatible, but supportive of each other. 
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8. Conclusion 
Dissolving the tensions: I will now revisit the wish list of Searle’s ontological view, and show 
how the different features are no longer incompatible in light of my discussion of Searle’s 
notions in the previous sections. 
Searle wants an ontological picture which incorporates the following ideas: 
1. A view where there are always different levels of description for any particular item or 
event 
2. Experiences are just a state the brain can be in 
3. Experiences are causally efficacious 
4. Experiences do not have any causal powers above and beyond those of their neuronal 
base 
5. Experiences are caused by lower level neuronal processes 
6. Experiences are realised in the brain as a higher level system feature 
Summarising Searle’s whole approach: I will recapitulate Searle’s whole approach to levels of 
description, properties, mental causation and experiences to make his position clear.  I would 
describe his approach like this: 
There is a certain occurrence that happens in my brain.  This token, 
particular happening falls under two different types at the same time 
–“being a particular configuration of neuronal activity” and “being a 
feeling of pain” for example.  So the one brain state is both a specific 
pattern of neurological activity and a feeling or experience, hence 
the claim that experiences are just a state the brain can be in at a 
particular time.  There are two descriptions, at different levels, which 
correspond to this picture – there is a neuronal description of the 
brain state, and an experiential or phenomenological description of 
the brain state.  Because Searle supports an extensional criterion for 
individuating properties, namely the having of different causal 
powers, these two different descriptions of the brain state do not 
imply two different token properties, a mental property and a 
physical property because what counts as a property is not 
dependent on how we conceptualise or describe them.  This results 
in a much simpler picture when the desire to ascribe causal efficacy 
to mental happenings is approached, for there is simply one 
property, with one set of causal powers in play, albeit differently 
described by non-equivalent descriptions.  This means that the 
occurrence in my brain, which is both a pattern of neuronal activity 
and an experience, has causal powers, but there is only one set of 
causal powers in play, only one sequence of causal events.  This 
means that there is no problem of overdetermination because there 
are not even two sets of causal powers to worry about, and there is 
no threat that experiences are epiphenomenal because the 
psychological description is just as valid a description of the causal 
sequence of events as the neuronal description.   
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Revisiting Searle’s wish list of ontological features: To ensure that the position Searle is 
putting forward is completely clear, I will revisit Searle’s wish list and interpret what each 
means in light of the issues I have explored in this chapter: 
1. A view where there are always different levels of description for any particular item or 
event. 
o Any concrete happening in reality will have an infinite number of descriptions 
of it. 
2. Experiences are just a state the brain can be in 
o For any token happening in my brain that occurs when I have an experience, it 
should be considered as both a pattern of neuronal activity and an 
experience. 
3. Experiences are causally efficacious. 
o There is only one set of causal powers and they can be described at the 
experiential level in terms of my arm moving because it hurt, or at the 
neuronal level in terms of my muscles contracted because the c-fibres were 
activated. 
4. Experiences do not have any causal powers above and beyond those of their neuronal 
base. 
o There is just one set of causal powers, with multiple descriptions, two of 
which are “neuronal” and “experiential” - it makes no sense to talk of multiple 
causal powers when there is just one causal sequence in play 
5. Experiences are caused by lower level neuronal processes. 
o There is a dependency relation between experiences and the brain state that 
they pick out experientially; if the brain state occurs, that is sufficient for the 
subject to undergo an experience and for the experiential description to pick 
out the brain state. 
6. Experiences are realised in the brain as a higher level system feature 
o My particular token brain state can come under different types – in fact it 
comes under both the type “pattern of neuronal activity” and “pain”, the 
latter being the higher level system feature. 
 
Dissolving any apparent contradiction in Searle’s claims: In this chapter I hope to have shown 
how many of Searle’s claims, despite seeming initially incompatible, are in fact able to be 
interpreted as different features of Searle’s overall approach to levels of description and 
properties.  I do not believe Searle’s claims that experiences are both caused by and realised 
in the brain are problematic, because when his particular form of causation is analysed in 
detail it basically amounts to realisation, and there is no tension between twice claiming that 
experiences are realised by the brain.  Nor do I think that there is any tension in Searle’s 
approach surrounding the problem of mental causation, which is dealt with before it can even 
become established, because Searle’s acceptance of some form of token identity rules out 
two competing causal powers. 
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Alongside Searle’s claim that experiences are causally reducible to neurological processes in 
the brain, he maintains that experiences are nonetheless ontologically irreducible.  This dual 
claim of reducibility and irreducibility is a great barrier to making sense of Searle because it 
looks at first glance to be contradictory.  In the next chapter I will look more closely at Searle’s 
notion of ontological irreducibility.  By comparing it to the ontological irreducibility of the 
property dualist I will be able to assess the claims made by some of Searle’s critics that 
Biological Naturalism is a form of property dualism.  I will conclude that because they mean 
different things when they use the term “irreducible”, Searle is not making the same claims as 
a property dualist, and Biological Naturalism should therefore not be seen as a form of 
property dualism.   
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Chapter 5 –  
Is Searle a property dualist? 
1. Introduction 
Searle’s Biological Naturalism is often interpreted by others as a form of property dualism.  I 
believe this is because Searle’s claim that experiences are ontologically irreducible to brain 
processes, due to their first-person ontology, seems to mirror the irreducibility claims of the 
property dualist.  I have split this chapter into two halves; the first will investigate whether 
Searle should be seen as a property dualist.  I will first explore property dualism in section 2 
and look at its main features.  I think it is important to have a clear idea of what property 
dualism is if I am to assess whether it is the best interpretation of Biological Naturalism.  I 
believe that the central thesis of property dualism should be considered to be an ontological 
separation and divide between mental and physical features of the world.  I will look at the 
sorts of arguments which persuade property dualists that there is what Searle describes as a 
‘metaphysical gulf’1 between subjective, mental phenomena and objective, physical 
phenomena.  I will explore Kripke’s argument against identity theory and Nagel’s work on 
whether we can ever know what it is like to be a bat to reveal an anti-reductionist foundation 
of property dualism, and Jackson’s knowledge argument for property dualism and Levine’s 
explanatory gap, which aims to show that experiences cannot be explained in purely physical 
terms.  All of these arguments fuel the property dualist’s view of mental phenomena as over 
and above physical phenomena.   
In section 3, I will motivate the view that Searle should be interpreted as a property dualist, so 
as to fairly assess the claim.  I will look at both the views of his critics, and the way he 
expresses his own ideas, such as his claim that experiences have a first-person ontology, and 
the way his vocabulary choice sometimes suggests a fundamental separation between mental 
and physical features. 
Given that mental properties are seen as something over and above the brain by property 
dualists, which renders them irreducible to those brain properties, in section 4 I will look at 
Searle’s notion of reduction, and hence irreducibility.  This will prepare the ground for section 
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5, where I compare and contrast Searle’s notion of irreducibility with that of the property 
dualist, concluding that they do not mean the same thing when they each use the terminology 
of “irreducible”.  I believe that whilst the property dualist is using “irreducible” in the standard 
sense of mental phenomena being over and above brain phenomena, Searle means his 
irreducibility claim in a merely “inapplicable” sense whereby reduction just cannot apply to 
experiences, because of the way he believes we define and use reduction.  I believe that the 
drastic difference in meaning between Searle’s “irreducible” and the property dualist’s 
“irreducible” is sufficient to reject any reading of Searle as a property dualist. 
In the second half of the chapter I will look at a tension which remains in Searle’s position; his 
desire to downplay irreducibility to a merely inapplicable sort, yet maintain that experiences 
have a first-person ontology.  In section 6 I will consider the consequences of Searle’s trivial 
variety of irreducibility, and whether he can achieve his seeming desire to render experiences 
irreducible but not too irreducible.  I look at Searle’s denial of what he calls “conceptual 
dualism”, a metaphysical framework in which he views mental and physical as mutually 
exclusive, and conclude that Searle’s position regarding the triviality of irreducibility can only 
be reconciled with his claim that experiences have a first-person ontology if his underlying 
denial of conceptual dualism is also accepted.  In section 7 I will look at the underlying 
substantive problem of trying to fit first-personal features into an otherwise third-personal 
objective world.  I will look at the work of Howell and show how his subjective physicalism 
shows great semblance to Searle’s Biological Naturalism.  I will explore the importance of 
Howell’s claim that certain brain states have to be instantiated in order to be fully grasped, try 
to show how this mirrors Searle’s claim that experiences are a state the brain can be in, and 
conclude that the tension between first-personal experiences and third-personal brain states 
is diminished by understanding Howell’s requirement for instantiation. 
2. Property dualism 
Before assessing whether Searle’s Biological Naturalism should be best understood as a form 
of property dualism I think it is important to be clear about exactly what property dualism 
covers and what tenets you must hold in order to come under the umbrella of property 
dualist.  I will first look at the central idea of property dualism; that conscious experience is 
fundamentally different from the brain in that experiences are over and above, or irreducible 
to, any physical feature of the brain.  In order to tease out the reasons why property dualists 
view experiences as irreducible, I will look at Kripke’s argument against identity theory and 
Nagel’s work surrounding the inherent subjectivity of conscious experience.  Having motivated 
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the property dualist’s claim that experiences are irreducible, I will look at how this claim is tied 
up with being unable to explain experiences in purely physical terms by looking at Jackson’s 
knowledge argument and briefly, Levine’s explanatory gap.  Overall, this section aims to set 
out the reasons behind a property dualist view, and highlight that the key feature of the 
position is seeing mental properties as metaphysically distinct from physical features.  Once 
this characterisation of property dualism is in place, I can then turn to looking at whether 
Searle’s claims mirror those of the property dualist, which I will do in the forthcoming 
sections. 
a) Mental phenomena are over and above, or irreducible to, physical 
phenomena 
Mental phenomena as fundamentally distinct from physical phenomena: Viewing mental and 
physical properties as fundamentally distinct and ontologically separate is not a new idea in 
philosophy of mind.  Descartes, for example, drew a distinction between his essence, which he 
thought consisted solely in the fact that ‘I am a thinking thing…I am a thinking, non-extended 
thing’, and his body, which was ‘merely an extended, non-thinking thing’.2  This expresses the 
metaphysical divide inherent in property dualism between mental and physical, which echoes 
Descartes’ non-extended and extended, soul and body.  It is not always clear to me whether 
property dualists are persuaded by anti-reductionist arguments because they believe in a 
fundamental difference between mental and physical,3 or whether being persuaded by such 
anti-physicalist arguments leads them towards their property dualism.  Either way, at the 
heart of property dualism is the belief that the mental is somehow something over and above 
the physical, that is to say, ‘the dualist takes the mental and the physical realms to be 
ontologically separate’.4  Of course, given that I am referring to a dualism of properties, I 
should point out that the contention is that mental and physical properties are ontologically 
separate, but that they both are properties of physical existents.  In other words, 
‘All concrete particulars in this world are physical, but certain 
complex structures and configurations of physical particles can, and 
sometimes do, exhibit properties that are not reducible to “lower-
level” physical properties.’5  
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An ontological divide between mental and physical: I believe that the irreducibility of mental 
properties to physical brain properties is the central linchpin claim of property dualism and is 
an expression of the idea that ‘a dualist, whether of the substance or property version, 
maintains that there are two distinct and unreducible categories of reality’.6  This is meant as a 
meaningful ontological claim that when we survey our ontology of the world, psychological, 
mental, experiential properties have to be included in their own right rather than reduced to 
physical features or played down, so as to perhaps be thought of as any other objective 
physical feature of the world.  In effect, this is the claim that ‘experience is different in kind 
from any other physical feature’.7  I think the underlying intuition that the ontological 
irreducibility claim of the property dualist is trying to satisfy is that experiences are real 
phenomena in the world that should be accommodated in any theory of consciousness in 
their own right.  Zimmerman phrases it thus; ‘the mental properties of a person are 
significantly independent of, or in some other way distinct from, the physical properties of 
persons’8 and I think that in the eyes of property dualists, such an idea entails a claim of the 
irreducibility of experiences to brain states.   
Summary of property dualism: So a monistic position about what things exist is coupled with 
the view that some of the things that exist are experiences, and those experiences are so 
sufficiently different from all other features of the world as to be considered to be in their 
own fundamental ontological category.  As Levine puts it, property dualism is ‘the doctrine 
that mental properties are non-physical’.9  In summary, property dualists hold irreducibility at 
the centre of their theory.  As Chalmers put it, ‘there are properties of individuals in this world 
– the phenomenal properties – that are ontologically independent of physical properties’, that 
is to say, they are ‘fundamentally new features of the world’.10  This is based on the claim that 
mental properties are irreducible to physical properties in that they cannot be fully described 
by the physical properties and the mental properties are something over and above the 
physical properties.   
Looking to anti-reductionist arguments to explain why property dualists believe experiences to 
be irreducible: I will now turn to the reasons why property dualists see mental properties as 
irreducible to physical brain properties.  The standard anti-reductionist arguments in 
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philosophy of mind can be used by the property dualist as reasons why experiences should be 
considered irreducible to brain states.  I will first look at Kripke’s argument against identity 
theory, and then Nagel’s work on the inability of experiences to be captured in an objective, 
third-personal physical way. 
b) Kripke’s argument against identity theory 
If true, identities are necessarily true: Kripke’s argument against identifying experiences with 
neuronal activity is based on his ideas surrounding identity and rigid designators, which are 
designators which pick out the same thing and not anything else in all possible worlds, that is 
to say, they pick out the same item they pick out in the actual world, in all worlds where that 
item exists. Kripke argued that terms like ‘water’ are rigid designators, in that, ‘in every 
possible world it designates the same object’.11  He held that where an identity concerns rigid 
designators, if true, an identity claim is necessarily true because each term will pick out the 
same pair of items in every world, so if they are identical in this world they are bound to be 
identical in every world.   However, a problem arises from the apparent contingency of certain 
identity statements, for example water=H2O, where it certainly seems perfectly possible that 
the clear liquid stuff that falls from the sky and comes out the tap might have had a different 
molecular makeup.  Another example is heat where it seems a contingent fact that the 
phenomenon we register as felt heat is the mean kinetic energy of molecular motion in the 
thing that is hot, yet the fact that heat is identical to the mean kinetic energy of molecular 
motion, that is “heat is the mean kinetic energy of molecular motion”, has been empirically 
discovered to be true.  The task becomes explaining away the apparent contingency in an 
identity relation which if true, must be necessarily true.   
Needing to explain away the apparent contingency: For examples like water=H2O, the 
apparent contingency can be explained because when it seems that water=H2O is a contingent 
relation, despite being necessary, it is because what we are actually imagining is something 
that has the same appearance as water and which does all the watery things water does, but 
is not actually water, given that it is not in fact H2O.  In other words, we cannot in fact imagine 
that water is not H2O, given that it actually is.  This explanation of the contingency rests on a 
difference between appearance and reality, so in the water=H2O case, the appearance of the 
actual clear liquid stuff that falls from the sky and comes out the tap can be separated from 
the reality of it being the molecular substance H2O.  However, the thrust of the argument 
against identity between experiences and brain processes comes from the claim that no such 
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separation of appearance from reality can be made in the case of experiences.  In other 
words, if the having of an experience is considered to be an appearance, there is no separate 
underlying reality beneath the feeling of hotness, for to appear to have an experience is 
simply to have an experience.  There is no way that the experience can be disconnected from 
the appearance of the experience, or as Kripke puts it, ‘in the case of mental phenomena 
there is no ‘appearance’ beyond the mental phenomenon itself’.12   
The inability to explain away the apparent contingency of pain=c-fibres: Kripke’s argument 
against identity theory comes then from demanding of the identity theorist an explanation of 
the apparent contingency of identifying experiences with brain states.  Take the classic 
example in philosophy of mind of pain=c-fibre firing.  It seems possible, so the argument goes, 
that there can be pain without c-fibres firing, for example, in animals with different 
physiological makeups.  If pain=c-fibres firing is to remain an identity, the apparent 
contingency needs to be explained.  If the same process that I discussed above for water=H2O 
is applied to pain, it would be the claim that when it seems that pain is not identical to c-fibres 
firing, it is because what we are actually imagining is something that has the same appearance 
as pain, and does all the painy things pain does, but isn’t actually pain, given that there are no 
c-fibres firing.  However, this type of approach, Kripke argues, cannot work for pain because if 
something feels painful then it is a pain; if it appears to me that I am experiencing a pain, then 
I am experiencing a pain.  In other words, there is no appearance/reality distinction for pain, 
so you cannot explain the apparent contingency by saying we are imagining the appearances 
without the corresponding underlying reality, because the appearance is the reality.  The anti-
identity argument proceeds by declaring that there is no explanation for the apparent 
contingency of a relation that the identity theorist claims is identity, and according to Kripke 
must therefore be necessary, and concluding that the claim of identity is not in fact necessary 
and is therefore false.  Property dualists agree with the sentiment of Kripke, indeed, property 
dualism is in fact a plausible consequence of Kripke’s anti-reductionist argument.  This anti-
reductionist argument is one reason why property dualists see experiences as irreducible to 
physical states of the brain.   
I will now look at Thomas Nagel’s work and how his ideas on the perspectival nature of the 
subjective character of experiences motivates property dualism.  
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c) Nagel and the essential subjectivity of experiences 
Every experience is essentially from a particular point of view: Nagel has written extensively 
on anti-reductionism,13 and in his seminal article “What is it like to be a bat?” Nagel sets out 
an argument against reduction of experiences to brain states.  He finds the subjective, 
phenomenal character of experience captures the essence of what an experience is, saying ‘an 
organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that 
organism – something it is like for the organism’.14  The purpose of the bat example in the 
article is to highlight how the subjective character of experience is not captured by any of the 
reductive physicalist theories of mind, because they do not take into account experience’s 
subjective nature in itself, instead trying to claim it is “nothing but” a different physical 
feature.  Nagel sees accounting for the phenomenological features of experience as essential 
to any theory of mind and this is impossible for reductive theories because their aim, as Nagel 
sees it, is to generalise out from a particular individual’s experience to a generalised, in other 
words an objective, conception of what an experience is.  Along the way Nagel sees the 
essentially perspectival nature of experiences being inevitably lost.  As Nagel puts it; ‘every 
subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems 
inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view’.15 
Studying a subjective experience objectively does not capture its essence: The problem that 
arises when we try to ascertain what it would be like to be a bat and perceive the world via 
sonar is that the bat is substantially different from our own make-up, and navigating by sonar 
is so different from our own senses that we could not comprehensively put ourselves in the 
point of view of the bat.  Given that Nagel thinks that having a particular point of view is 
essential to what experiences are, the fact that physicalist theories strive for objective 
accounts of subjective phenomena means they are bound to fail, because, as Nagel asks, 
‘what would be left of what it was like to be a bat if one removed the viewpoint of the bat?’.16  
He puts the point like this: 
‘If the facts of experience – facts about what it is like for the 
experiencing organism – are accessible only from one point of view, 
then it is a mystery how the true character of experiences could be 
revealed in the physical operation of that organism.’17 
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Physicalist approaches to the mind abstract out from a particular point of view: The argument 
against reduction then rests on Nagel’s belief that experiences are essentially always from a 
particular point of view, and that reductive or physicalist approaches in philosophy of mind 
always try to abstract away from the individual and how the experience is for them, instead 
focusing on objectively identifiable brain states or processes.  The point is that the physical 
account is designed to be understandable to any creature, even one with quite different 
experiences. So it seems impossible that the specifics of the experience to be explained could 
be captured.  The argument then proceeds by claiming that firstly, any physicalist account of 
the mind will, almost by definition, exclude an essential characteristic of experiences – their 
perspectival subjectivity.  Second, there is a related claim that if a physicalist account of the 
mind must comprehensively explain the essentially subjective, perspectival, first-personal 
features of experience, we simply have no concept of what that would even look like, or how 
it would work.  Although Nagel does not see this part of his argument as an out and out denial 
of physicalism, he does believe that, 
‘Physicalism is a position we cannot understand because we do not 
at present have any conception of how it might be true’18 
The focus on an irreducibly subjective character of experiences is something property dualists 
will agree with, along with Nagel’s resistance against reductive theories of mind.  In fact many 
dualists have been motivated specifically by Nagel’s arguments.  In this way, Nagel is another 
way to explain what motivates the property dualist in their belief that experiences are 
irreducible to physical properties, leaving them ontologically distinct.   
Similarities between Searle and Nagel: There are a number of features of Nagel’s work which 
mirror what Searle claims within Biological Naturalism.  For example, Nagel’s claim that every 
experience is essential from a particular point of view seems to echo Searle’s claim that 
experiences have a first-person ontology in that they are essentially subjective and 
perspectival.  Where Nagel claims that objective study of experiences cannot capture their 
subjective essence, Searle states his belief regarding experiences such as pain as, ‘no 
description of the third-person, objective, physiological facts would convey the subjective, 
first-person character of the pain.’19  Whilst Nagel warns against abstracting out from the 
subjective point of view to study of consciousness objectively, Searle says, 
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‘For any conscious being, there is a what-it-is-like aspect to its 
existence.  And this is left out of any objective account of 
consciousness because an objective account cannot explain the 
subjective character of consciousness.’20 
The interesting point is that many philosophers have used Nagel’s arguments as a reason to 
reject physicalism and embrace a form of dualism, and yet Searle makes all these similar 
claims to Nagel, whilst also wanting to reject dualism.  I will explore whether he is entitled to 
this view in the second half of this chapter. 
I will now turn to another facet of the property dualist’s position – the idea that mental 
properties cannot be comprehensively and completely explained in purely physical terms. 
d) Mental properties cannot be explained in terms of physical 
properties 
Experiences have a qualitative nature: It seems intuitively true to many people that the 
qualitative, experiential, phenomenal states we experience have a certain nature which 
precludes them from being captured in purely physical terms.  As Jackson puts it, 
‘I think that there are certain features of the bodily sensations 
especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no 
amount of purely physical information includes. Tell me everything 
physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain, the 
kind of states, their functional role, their relation to what goes on at 
other times and in other brains, and so on and so forth, and be I as 
clever as can be in fitting it all together, you won't have told me 
about the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of 
jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, 
smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky.’21 
Physicalists try to explain the qualitative nature in terms of something that can be physically 
captured: The physicalist agenda is to go against this intuition and try to explain mental 
properties in terms of physical features of the world, so as to unproblematically incorporate 
them into a physicalist ontology.  Property dualism is a reaction against this and incorporates 
the belief that experiences and mental properties cannot be fully explained solely in terms of 
physical properties.   
Jackson’s knowledge argument: Jackson’s thought experiment involving Mary the colour 
scientist22 helps to explain this point because Mary is supposedly in the position of knowing all 
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the physical facts of the world, but when she experiences seeing a red rose, she is supposed to 
learn something new, exclaiming that she now understands what it is like to see red.  Jackson 
describes the situation thus, 
‘Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through 
black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black-and-
white television.  In this way she learns everything there is to know 
about the physical nature of the world.  She knows all the physical 
facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of ‘physical’ 
which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and 
neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and 
relational facts consequence upon this…it seems, however, that 
Mary does not know all there is to know.  For when she is let out of 
the black-and-white room or given a color television, she will learn 
what it is like to see something red, say.  This is rightly described as 
learning – she will not say “ho, hum.”  Hence, physicalism is false’23 
From an epistemic lack to an ontological divide: This is known as Jackson’s knowledge 
argument because it works by apparently showing that Mary does not know all of the facts 
about the world because on her release into the world of colour she learns a new fact about 
what it is like to see red despite already having all the physical facts about the world.  Her 
epistemic lack regarding experiential facts, despite knowing all the physical facts, is then taken 
by Jackson to be indicative of a metaphysical gap between physical properties and experiential 
properties.  In other words, she learns about a new, non-physical property.  The Mary scenario 
is trying to show that mental properties cannot be fully captured in physical terms, for if they 
could, so the argument goes, Mary would not have learned anything new on her release.  The 
inference which follows is that physicalism is false. 
The conclusion is that physicalism is false: A view prompted by Jackson’s Mary story is both 
anti-physicalist and anti-reductionist in that the physical facts are not a complete set of facts 
about the world, or Mary would not have learned something new.  So, in summary, a premise 
of Mary’s situation is that the experiential facts about the world are not capturable in purely 
physical terms, evidenced by Mary’s surprise at seeing red on her release and her realisation 
that she had not understood what seeing red was like pre-release.  This leads to the 
conclusion that physicalism must be false.  Indeed, Jackson embraces a form of property 
dualism at the end of his article about Mary.24 
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The explanatory gap as showing an inability to explain experiences in purely physical terms: 
Levine’s explanatory gap argument also highlights how there seems to be no intelligibility to 
how our mental states can be explained in terms of the physical happenings in our brain.  Less 
problematic examples include the solidity of a table, which can be intelligibly explained, so the 
argument goes, in physical terms, by the structure of molecules and the strong bonds 
between them.  Levine believes that regarding physical explanations, ‘in the case of qualia, the 
subjective character of qualitative experience is left unexplained, and therefore we are left 
with an incomplete understanding of that experience’.25  The demand for intelligibility as to 
how and why experiences occur when we undergo certain brain states is the explanatory gap 
in Levine’s argument, along with the belief that at present we cannot bridge such a gap of 
explanation.  An inability to capture the qualitative subjective aspects of experience in purely 
physical, structural or functional terms agrees with the ideas of property dualists, who claim 
that mental properties should be included in our ontology in their own right, because they are 
not fully capturable in any other terms.  It is to this claim of property dualism, that mental and 
physical properties must be fundamentally metaphysically distinct, that I now turn. 
I have surveyed property dualism and explored its central tenets including what I think is the 
most important feature of the irreducibility of experiences to brain states.  I will now turn to 
the question of whether Searle’s Biological Naturalism is best interpreted as a variety of 
property dualism.  I will start in section 3 by motivating such an interpretation of Searle, 
looking at what his critics charge him with and how he incriminates himself towards such an 
interpretation in the way he expresses his ideas.  I will then proceed in sections 4-6 to show 
why I believe this is not the best interpretation of Searle’s Biological Naturalism.  
3. Motivating the interpretation of Searle as a property dualist 
Before assessing whether property dualism is the best interpretation of what Searle’s 
Biological Naturalism amounts to, I have first explored what property dualism is, and its 
central claims of non-reductivism, viewing mental properties as ontologically distinct and 
separate from physical properties, that is, seeing mental properties as something over and 
above physical features of the world.  Before assessing Biological Naturalism as a form of 
property dualism I will look at why the charge of property dualism might be brought against 
Searle.  This will help me focus my assessment of the correct interpretation of Biological 
Naturalism. 
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a) Why Searle’s critics claim he is a property dualist 
Searle’s irreducibility claim makes him seem like a property dualist: In chapter 2 I looked at a 
variety of criticisms of Searle including the charge that Biological Naturalism is simply a form 
of property dualism in disguise.  Many of Searle’s critics are adamant that the right 
interpretation for Biological Naturalism is one of property dualism.  For example, Feser 
believes that ‘Searle is, whether he realizes it or not, a property dualist’.26  These criticisms are 
mostly based on Searle’s claim that experiences are ontologically irreducible to brain states.  
For example, Kim says, in answering whether experiences are reducible to features of the 
brain,  
‘Searle’s answer, like the property dualist’s, is a forceful no.  But it is 
precisely this negative answer that defines property dualism.’27 
Searle’s irreducibility claim as implying an ontological separation of mental and physical 
properties: The reason that Searle’s irreducibility claim leads to so many interpretations of 
Biological Naturalism as a form of property dualism is because of the central role that 
irreducibility plays in property dualism.  I explored above how the irreducibility claim links all 
other aspects of property dualism together; the fundamentally separate natures of mental 
and physical properties, and therefore that experiences as mental features are something 
over and above physical features of the world, in particular brain states.  Any claim of 
irreducibility of experiences to brain states will therefore automatically invite interpretations 
of property dualism, and the irreducibility of brain states is a constant theme throughout 
Searle’s writing, such as when he claims that ‘in the case of consciousness…we cannot make 
an ontological reduction’.28 
I will now look at how Searle expresses his ideas within Biological Naturalism, and how this 
might lead his readers to interpret him as being a property dualist. 
b) Things Searle says that motivate an interpretation of property 
dualism 
Searle seems to openly admit that he agrees with the property dualist: Searle is all too aware 
that ‘many mainstream philosophers still believe that if one grants the existence and 
irreducibility of consciousness one is forced to accept some sort of dualistic ontology’.29  
Therefore, his insistence on the ontological irreducibility of experiences to brain states will 
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mean that Biological Naturalism will be automatically interpreted as a form of property 
dualism by some of his philosopher critics.  However, this does not seem to stop Searle from 
stating his position in such a way as to sound uncannily like property dualism.  For instance, 
Searle asks ‘what is property dualism other than the view that there are irreducible mental 
properties’?30  He then goes on to confidently claim that ‘the property dualist and I are in 
agreement that consciousness is ontologically irreducible’.31 
Searle often talks in a way that suggests he believes in the ontological divide between mental 
and physical properties: When talking about the impossibility of fully describing the world, 
including its subjective features, in purely third-person terms, Searle says, 
‘No third-person description of a physical system will entail that it 
has conscious states because there are two different phenomena, 
the third-person behavioural, functional, neurobiological structures 
and the first-person conscious experience’32 [my emphasis added] 
The use of the phrase “two different phenomena” immediately suggests some form of 
property dualism, echoing its core belief that mental and physical properties are ontologically 
distinct categories.  This is further echoed in Searle’s discussions of neuron firings, where he 
says that ‘The neuron firings cause the feeling, but they are not the same thing as the 
feeling’,33 again implying that mental and physical are distinct.  This idea resurfaces in Searle’s 
discussion of the impossibility of reducing experiences to brain states, where he writes that 
‘the music critic who writes, “All I could hear were wave motions”, has missed the point of the 
performance’,34 suggesting that physical wave motions and auditory musical experiences are 
fundamentally different categories. 
First-person ontology as parallel to the claims of the property dualist: The fundamental 
difference between mental and physical might furthermore be seen in Searle’s reference to an 
asymmetry between experiences and non-experiential phenomena; 
‘There is an asymmetry.  Where color is concerned we are willing (or 
at least some of us are willing) to carve off the conscious 
experiences, the color experiences with their first-person ontology, 
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to set them on one side, and then redefine the color words in third-
person terms’35 
The fact that experiences have a distinctive “ontology” from brain states seems evident from 
Searle’s description of his notion of first-person ontology, 
‘Consciousness has a first-person ontology.  It exists only as 
experienced by a human or animal subject and in that sense it exists 
only from a first-person point of view’36 
The first-person ontology of Biological Naturalism, which Searle cites as the reason why 
experiences are irreducible, might seem to be a direct parallel to the irreducibility of 
experiences that the property dualist holds, based on the supposed essential subjectivity of 
experiences. 
Throughout his writings on philosophy of mind, Searle seems to cover all the major tenets of 
property dualism – the inability to reduce experiences to brain states, the idea that mental 
properties are ontologically distinct from physical ones, and that a physical description of the 
world will leave out the ontologically non-physical mental properties.  Given such strong 
support from Searle’s critics for a property dualistic interpretation of Searle’s position, I want 
to be very clear exactly what Searle means by reduction and irreducibility, so that I will be in a 
position to assess whether or not Searle is a property dualist.  It is to this task that I now turn. 
4. Searle’s notion of reduction and ontological irreducibility 
a) Searle’s general idea of reduction 
In Searle’s own words: I cannot start a discussion about Searle’s notion of ontological 
irreducibility without first being clear what he means by ontological reduction.  Perhaps letting 
Searle put it in his own words is a good place to start.  In The Rediscovery of the Mind Searle 
sets out what he sees as the process of reduction for perceivable features of the world such as 
heat and solidity, which he later uses as a parallel to explain why experiences are ontologically 
irreducible.  For Searle, ontological reductions involve a “nothing but” claim and often follow 
on from causal reductions, 
‘The basic intuition that underlies the concept of reductionism seems 
to be the idea that certain things might be shown to be nothing but 
certain other sorts of things’37 
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 ‘Often, indeed typically, in the history of science we make an 
ontological reduction on the basis of a causal reduction.  We say: 
solidity is nothing but a certain sort of molecular behaviour.’38 
When put into practice, Searle believes this to result in the following reductive process; 
‘We discovered that a surface feature of a phenomenon was caused 
by the behaviour of the elements of an underlying 
microstructure…the point of the reduction was to carve off the 
surface features and redefine the original notion in terms of the 
causes that produce those surface features.  Thus, where the surface 
feature is a subjective appearance, we redefine the original notion in 
such a way as to exclude the appearance from the definition.’39 
Using the example of heat he elaborates on his idea of ontological reduction; 
‘Pretheoretically our notion of heat has something to do with 
perceived temperatures: Other things being equal, hot is what feels 
hot to us, cold is what feels cold.  Similarly with colours: Red is what 
looks red to normal observers under normal conditions.  But when 
we have a theory of what causes these and other phenomena, we 
discover that it is molecular movements causing sensation of heat 
and cold (as well as other phenomena such as movements of light 
meters).  We then redefine heat and color in terms of the underlying 
causes of both the subjective experiences and the other surface 
phenomena.  An in the redefinition we eliminate any reference to 
the subjective appearances and other surface effects of the 
underlying causes.  “Real” heat is now defined in terms of the kinetic 
energy of the molecular movements, and the subjective feel of heat 
that we get when we touch a hot object is now treated as just a 
subjective appearance caused by heat, as an effect of heat.  It is no 
longer part of real heat’40 
Ontological reduction as a process of redefinition: The process of ontological reduction for 
what Searle calls ‘perceivable’ features then is one of pre-theoretically defining phenomena as 
whatever the cause of our particular experiences were (what feels hot to us, what looks red 
etc.).  This is what Searle means when he sees phenomena as defined pre-theoretically via 
their surface features.41  This is followed by empirical scientific discoveries which uncover an 
underlying causal reality which can explain the surface features.  The reductive part of the 
ontological reduction is choosing to redefine what the phenomenon is in terms of the newly 
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discovered underlying causal processes, which leaves the surface features, our experiences, 
mere effects of what is then to be considered the “real” phenomenon.  The key then is that 
the redefinitions that Searle believes to be inherent in an ontological reduction ‘are achieved 
by way of carving off all the surface features of the phenomenon, whether subjective or 
objective, and treating them as effects of the real thing’.42  I will tabulate this process to make 
the different steps clear: 
Searle’s process of ontological reduction of perceivable features: 
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 Heat Red  
Pre-theoretic 
Heat = something 
which feels hot 
Red = something 
which looks red 
The phenomenon is defined by 
the surface features and with 
reference to the effect it has on a 
subject 
Scientific 
discoveries 
Atomic theory, 
vibration of molecules 
etc. 
Light reflectance, 
electro-magnetic 
spectrum etc. 
We discover the underlying causes 
of the surface features 
Redefinition 
REAL heat = kinetic 
energy of molecular 
movements 
REAL red = photon 
emissions of 600nm 
Redefine the phenomenon to the 
underlying explanations; the 
phenomenon is now defined 
without any reference to any 
effect it has on a subject 
Surface 
features then 
become 
mere effects 
The effect of REAL 
heat= the feeling of 
hotness 
The effect of REAL 
 red = the visual 
experience of 
redness 
The surface features become 
merely effects of the real 
phenomenon rather than part of 
the definition of the phenomenon 
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The importance of how phenomena affect us as experiencers:  I want to draw attention to the 
feature of Searle’s reduction that pre-theoretically, he sees phenomena as defined in terms of 
how they affect us. Heat, for example is what seems hot to us and red is what looks red.  After 
Searle’s process of ontological reduction has been carried out, that same phenomenon is then 
defined in terms that are independent of how the phenomenon affects us – those become 
mere effects.  This carves off the experiences of an experiencer from the definition of a 
particular phenomenon that has undergone Searle’s form of ontological reduction.  This will 
become important when I discuss below the way that experiences are ontologically irreducible 
because of Searle’s belief that first-personal features cannot be captured in third-personal 
terms.   
In summary: For Searle, reduction regarding perceivable features of the world is a “nothing 
but” relation; ‘A’s can be reduced to B’s, iff A’s are nothing but B’s’.43  Scientific discoveries 
uncover an underlying causal reality which can explain all the higher level surface features.  
Pre theoretically those surface features were defined in terms of how that phenomenon 
affected us as subjects (e.g. causing hot feelings).  Post-theoretically, if an ontological 
reduction is to be made, Searle believes that phenomenon becomes defined as the discovered 
underlying causal processes and the way it affects us as subjects becomes merely an effect of 
the phenomenon.  Incidentally, Searle sees this reductive process as applying equally to what 
he calls ‘observer-independent’ features such as solidity.  He describes solidity post-
ontological reduction: ‘solidity is defined in terms of the vibratory movements of molecules in 
lattice structures, and objective, observer-independent features, such as impenetrability by 
other objects, are now seen as surface effects of the underlying reality’.44 
Having set out what Searle sees as the process of reduction for features of the world that can 
be perceived by us, I will now turn to why he claims that such an ontological reduction cannot 
be carried out for experiences. 
b) Why Searle claims you cannot perform an ontological reduction of 
experiences 
If reduction is a “nothing but” relation for Searle, then a claim of ontological irreducibility for 
conscious experiences is a denial that experiences are “nothing but” brain states or neuronal 
activity in the brain.   
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Searle sees ontological reductions as dependent on our interests: The first part of the 
reductive process is the discovering of underlying causal features which can account for the 
surface level, higher-level appearances, by which the phenomenon was originally defined.  
This is Searle’s process of causal reduction which I explored in chapter 4. For Searle, it seems 
that the decision about whether an ontological reduction can proceed from there is not 
always automatic.  Searle acknowledges that ‘often, indeed typically, in the history of science 
we make an ontological reduction on the basis of a causal reduction.  We say: solidity is 
nothing but a certain sort of molecular behaviour.’45  However, Searle holds the view that the 
acceptance of an ontological reduction or not depends on our interests and what we find 
useful.  Generally, Searle reasons,  
‘To get a greater understanding and control of reality, we want to 
know how it works causally, and we want our concepts to fit nature 
at its causal joints.  We simply redefine phenomena with surface 
features in terms of the underlying causes.’46 
The importance of reductions as carving off subjective experiences: So for many phenomena, 
and most scientific phenomena, it is the causal workings of it that interest us most and allow 
us to understand it most fully.  Searle describes the process of ontological reduction as the 
desire to ‘carve off the subjective experiences and exclude them from the definition of the 
real phenomena, which are now defined in terms of those features that interest us most’.47  
Searle’s contention is that this is not the case for experiences.  For Searle, pre-reduction, 
experiences are defined in terms of how it affects an experiencer, but the process of 
ontological reduction renders that experience of the experiencer as a mere effect of the 
phenomenon, newly defined in terms of underlying causal workings.   
Searle thinks that with experiences it is the appearances that interest us: For non-experience 
ontological reductions, the process involves being able to ‘distinguish between the subjective 
appearance on the one hand and the underlying physical reality on the other’48 and finding 
that the underlying reality, as Searle refers to it, is most interesting to us because it is most 
useful for understanding the phenomenon.  However, with experiences, Searle reasons,  
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‘we are reluctant to carve off the surface feature and redefine the 
notion in terms of the causes of the surface feature, because the 
point of the concept is to identify the surface features’49 
No appearance/reality distinction for experiences: By this I think he is referring to the way in 
which experiences are what we experience of them.  I think Searle is echoing Kripke’s point 
that I detailed above, that there is no appearance/reality distinction for experiences; they 
cannot come apart because the appearance is the reality.  In other words, if it appears to me 
that I am having an experience, a feeling of despair for example, then I am just having that 
feeling.  I believe this is what Searle means when he says that ‘for the definition of “pain” we 
care more about how pains feel to us’.50 
Because Searle’s reduction is about carving off the surface features, it therefore cannot be 
applied to experiences: Searle’s argument for the irreducibility of experiences is that 
reduction cannot apply to experiences because it would carve off the very thing that we are 
interested in trying to understand better.  Searle does not see experiences as unique in this 
regard; 
‘There are lots of concepts where the surface features of the 
phenomena are more interesting than the microstructure.  Consider 
mud or Beethoven’s Ninth symphony.  Mud behaviour is molecular 
behaviour but that is not the interesting thing about mud, so few 
people are anxious to insist: “Mud can be reduced to molecular 
behaviour”, though they could if they really wanted to.  Similarly 
with Beethoven.  Performances of the Ninth can be reduced to wave 
motions in the air, but that is not what is interesting to us about the 
performance.  The music critic who writes, “All I could hear were 
wave motions”, has missed the point of the performance.’51 
In summary: The important factor is what most interests us, in terms of understanding any 
particular phenomenon most fully.  For experiences, what we are trying to understand are the 
qualitative feely aspects that occur for the subject undergoing the experience.  If the process 
of reduction, as Searle claims, is one of carving off these appearances, then doing an 
ontological reduction of experiences becomes self-defeating.   
Having explored Searle’s ideas about the process of reduction and his thinking behind his 
ontological irreducibility of experiences claim, I am now in a position to assess whether 
Searle’s concept of irreducibility is the same as that of the property dualist.  In the next 
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section I will show that they are not in fact the same and the difference in resulting positions 
justifies rejecting a property dualist interpretation of Searle. 
5. Contrasting Searle’s notion of ontological irreducibility with 
the irreducibility claim of the property dualist 
Having set out what property dualism is and what motivates property dualists to adopt the 
position, I proceeded to show why it is understandable that some critics have interpreted 
Searle as a property dualist.  However, Searle vehemently denies such an interpretation of 
Biological Naturalism, citing the ontological irreducibility of experiences to brain features as 
‘the crucial distinction between my view and property dualism’.52  Therefore, I will now 
compare and contrast the irreducibility claims of Searle and the property dualist.  I will show 
how Searle’s claim of ontological irreducibility is an inapplicable sort of irreducibility, rather 
than the metaphysically substantial variety held by the property dualist.  Searle’s take on 
irreducibility does not result in any ontological gap between ‘mental’ and ‘physical’, as the 
property dualists’ version of irreducibility arguably does.  Following this, in the next section, I 
will assess whether Searle is entitled to his restricted sense of irreducible whilst also claiming 
experiences have a first-person ontology, and are causally reducible to the neuronal processes 
going on in our brains.  In effect, I will try to ascertain whether Searle manages to walk the 
very fine line between experiences being irreducible, but not too irreducible. 
a) Ontological irreducibility as inapplicability 
In Searle’s own words: Searle is clear that for him, the ontological irreducibility of experiences 
is a ‘trivial consequence of our definitional practices’.53  Searle also expresses this downplaying 
of his irreducibility claim like this; 
‘Once you know all the facts about heat – facts about molecule 
movements, impact on sensory nerve endings, subjective feelings, 
etc.- the reduction of heat to molecule movements involves no new 
fact whatever.  It is simply a trivial consequence of the redefinition’54 
Searle’s view of the property dualist position: Searle believes the property dualist to be 
claiming, when they argue for the ontological irreducibility of experiences, that 
‘Because mental states are not reducible to neurobiological states, 
they are something distinct from and over and above neurobiological 
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states. The irreducibility of the mental to the physical, of 
consciousness to neurobiology, is by itself sufficient proof of the 
distinctness of the mental, and proof that the mental is something 
over and above the neurobiological’55 
The key difference between Searle’s notion of irreducibility and that of the property dualist is 
that he denies the first sentence.  That is to say, just because experiences are not reducible to 
neurological states, does not imply that they are distinct from and over and above those 
neurological states.  I think this is the essence of Searle’s triviality clause for irreducibility and 
is his way of restraining the ontological consequences of the irreducibility to avoid experiences 
being “over and above” neurological states, as he thinks the property dualist believes them to 
be. 
Irreducibility as the inapplicability of the process of reduction: Remember that for Searle, 
experiences are what he calls ontologically irreducible because he believes the process of 
reduction simply cannot be applied to experiences.  He sets out reduction as the practice of 
carving off appearances and redefining a phenomenon in terms of its underlying causal reality, 
as he puts it.  However, because with experiences, it is the subjective appearances themselves 
which are the experiences, which are essential to them, and which interest us most, if you 
apply reduction to experiences you would be carving off the very thing you are trying to 
understand by focusing on experiences in the first place.  In this way, Searle’s construal of 
reduction means that experiences are unable to be reduced because it would be self-
defeating; reduction simply cannot apply to experiences.  As Searle puts it, the irreducibility of 
experiences, 
‘merely shows that in the way that we have decided to carry out 
reductions, consciousness, by definition, is excluded from a certain 
pattern of reduction.  Consciousness fails to reduce not because of 
some mysterious feature, but simply because by definition it falls 
outside the pattern of reduction that we have chosen to use for 
pragmatic reasons’56 
Searle is very clear about this point.  To highlight the way in which for him, the irreducibility of 
experiences to neuronal activity in the brain is merely a pragmatic point, he says, 
‘When I speak of the irreducibility of consciousness, I am speaking of 
its irreducibility according to standard patterns of reduction.  No one 
can rule out a priori the possibility of a major intellectual revolution 
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that would give us a new – and at present unimaginable – 
conception of reduction, according to which consciousness would be 
reducible’57 
b) Searle’s “inapplicable” meaning of irreducibility is not the same 
as the property dualist’s “over-and-above” meaning of 
irreducibility 
Searle’s use of “irreducible” seems substantively different to the usual meaning of “ over and 
above” physical features:  Many of Searle’s critics find his inapplicability version of 
irreducibility confusing because they take any claim of irreducibility to mean a chasm between 
mental and physical features of the world such that they are so different from each other as to 
be not only reducible, one to another, but indicative of a fundamental difference in 
ontological category.  In other words, the deep divide indicated by property dualists as the 
consequence of experiences being irreducible.  Searle’s critics believe that any fundamental 
physical/mental divide is counteracted by Searle’s triviality claim, feeling that either a claim of 
irreducibility is a substantive claim because it separates off mental from physical, or it is 
merely a linguistic comment about how we use words.  In other words, Searle’s critics are 
uncomfortable with his use of the term “irreducible” when it means simply that ‘the 
irreducibility of consciousness is relative only to our pragmatic notion of reducibility’.58 
The property dualist assumes, and Searle denies, that an irreducibility claim implies over-and-
aboveness: I believe that whilst Searle is trying to make a substantive point about experiences, 
namely that they are essentially qualitative and first-personal, hence the first-person ontology 
claim, the label of “irreducible” is not indicative, for him, of an ontological division between 
mental and physical.  Searle does not see the irreducibility of experiences as implying that 
they are “over and above” the physical features of the brain.  For Searle, the step to an 
ontologically separated “mental” category for experiences, which the property dualist sees as 
inherent in a claim of irreducibility, is an extra commitment which he does not wish to make.  
In Searle’s eyes, experiences remain an ordinary biological feature of the brain, meaning that 
he does not concur with the property dualist’s feeling that the mental is distinctively separate 
from the physical.  As Jacquette puts it, Searle ‘does not believe, as do most property dualists, 
that the irreducibility of the mind and the mental is due to the peculiar ontological nature of 
psychological properties.’59As I said at the start of this section, he is denying what he sees the 
property dualist as claiming, namely that ‘Because mental states are not reducible to 
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neurobiological states, they are something distinct from and over and above neurobiological 
states’.60  Searle expresses this point quite clearly when he says that the dualist, 
‘ends up saying falsely that these are something apart from the 
ordinary physical world we all live in, that they are something over 
and above their physical substrate’61 
And that, 
 ‘The dualist is trying to say, truly, that ontologically irreducible 
states of consciousness do exist, but he ends up saying, falsely, that 
these are not ordinary parts of the physical world.’62 [my emphasis 
added] 
Is Searle entitled to use irreducibility in this way? I find it fairly clear that despite using the 
same terminology, the property dualist and Searle are not talking about the same thing when 
they refer to experiences being “irreducible” to neuronal activity in the brain.  However, 
Searle’s triviality claim refers merely to how, or whether, we can apply the process of 
reduction to a specific phenomenon, namely experiences.  I believe that the difference 
between what the property dualist and Searle mean by irreducibility is sufficient to justify a 
rejection of the claim that Biological Naturalism is a form of property dualism.   
That Searle believes reduction cannot apply to experiences is one thing.  The reason it cannot 
apply is because of the essential features of experiences – their qualitative and perspectival 
nature – their first-person ontology.  So the consequent question becomes whether Searle is 
entitled to downplay the significance of his irreducibility claim to being a mere consequence 
of our definitional practices, whilst holding that the reason reduction cannot apply is because 
of experiences’ special type of ontology.  In the second part of this chapter I will look more 
closely at whether Searle can legitimately maintain both beliefs at the same time.  
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6. Irreducible but not too irreducible 
First-person ontology suggests the property dualist’s type of “irreducible”: Having shown the 
difference between Searle’s notion of irreducibility and the property dualist’s version, I will 
now assess whether Searle is entitled to claim that experiences are “irreducible” given his 
other commitments from within Biological Naturalism.  Searle claims that experiences have a 
first-person ontology.  I explored what he meant by first-person ontology in chapter 3 and 
concluded that he was referring to the essential perspectivity and qualitative nature of 
experiences.  This is, so far, in agreement with anti-reductionists and property dualists.  The 
problem arises because such a view usually renders experiences irreducible in the substantive, 
over-and-above the physical sense, yet Searle’s irreducibility as mere inapplicability seems to 
contradict this.  In other words, in claiming that, 
‘it does not make any difference at all to our scientific world view 
that it should be irreducible.  It does not force us to property dualism 
or anything of the sort. It is a trivial consequence of certain more 
general phenomena’63 
Searle is clearly trying to distance himself from the dualist’s position, yet at the same time he 
professes that experiences have a first-person ontology, the very sort of thing that dualists 
rest their substantive irreducibility claim upon.   
Searle is trying to achieve a position where experiences are irreducible but not too irreducible: 
It seems to me that Searle is trying to walk the very fine line between an irreducibility claim 
that experience is irreducible, but not too irreducible.  That is to say, irreducible enough to 
distance himself from reductive physicalists, hence the first-person ontology claim, yet not so 
irreducible as to tip over into dualism, hence his caveat about triviality.  In this section I will 
look at Searle’s ideas of conceptual dualism and a denial of an ontological difference between 
mental and physical features of the world.  This will be in an attempt to reconcile his claim 
that experiences have a first-person ontology with his claim of trivial irreducibility.  The aim is 
to ascertain whether Searle has, as he clearly believes himself to have done, carved out a 
space between experiences being reducible and dualistically irreducible in which to position 
Biological Naturalism.   
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a) First-person ontology and conceptual dualism 
First-person ontology as the basis of irreducibility: Searle clearly links his belief that 
experiences have a first-person ontology to his claim that they are ontologically irreducible; 
‘You can do a causal reduction of consciousness to its neuronal 
substrate, but that reduction does not lead to an ontological 
reduction because consciousness has a first-person ontology, and 
you lose the point of having the concept if you redefine it in third-
person terms’64 
The fact that conscious experiences are essentially qualitative and perspectival, that is to say 
have what Searle is calling a first-person ontology, is the reason why he claims the process of 
reduction cannot apply to them.  It must follow that it is the qualitative and perspectival 
nature of experiences that comprise their appearances, as opposed to the lower-level causal, 
neuronal processes going on in the brain, for it is the refusal to carve off the essential 
appearances and redefine experiences as the lower level brain features that means they are 
irreducible in Searle’s sense.  The property dualist takes these essential features of 
experiences to imply that the “mental”, subjective aspect of experiences and the “physical”, 
neuronal aspect are ontologically separated, with the mental over and above any physical 
neuronal activity in the brain.  Searle specifically denies this; he rejects that accepting the 
qualitative or perspectival nature of a particular phenomenon renders it non-physical.  This is 
because of his denial of what he calls conceptual dualism. 
Searle’s conceptual dualism: Searle describes conceptual dualism thus; 
‘This view consists in taking the dualistic concepts very seriously, that 
is, it consists in the view that in some important sense “physical” 
implies “nonmental” and “mental” implies “nonphysical.”’ 65 
‘It is assumed that “mental” and “physical” name mutually exclusive 
ontological categories.  If it is mental then it cannot be in that very 
respect physical.  And if it is physical, then it cannot be in that very 
respect mental.  Mental qua mental excludes physical qua physical’66 
For Searle the whole framework that the mind-body problem works within is plagued by what 
he sees as the tendency to pit mental against physical, where something that is deemed to be 
“mental” is thereby excluded from being classed as “physical”.  This gets to the heart of 
Searle’s view of experiences, for although he sees them as essentially subjective and 
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qualitative, he denies that this means they are not fully incorporated into the “physical” 
world.   
b) Rejecting “mental” and “physical” as fundamental ontological 
categories 
The mind-body problem: Physicalism is a doctrine which sees the physical realm as the 
ultimate basis of reality.  The mind-body problem arises because experiences seem to have 
features which are not included in a physical view of what exists in the world.  The features 
that make conscious experiences puzzling are those very features which Searle sets out in his 
notion of first-person ontology, for example, the qualitative feel of experiences and the fact 
that they are tied to experiencing the world from an individual point of view.  This is contrary 
to the usual view of physical items in reality which are considered equally accessible to any 
subject and in no way linked or dependent upon a particular point of view of the world.  In 
other words, physical items are usually seen as objective and experiences as subjective, and 
therein lies the problem for incorporating experiences into a physicalistic world view because 
physicalists and dualists alike, 
‘think that to grant the reality of irreducibility of consciousness and 
other mental phenomena commits one to some form of 
Cartesianism, and they do not see how such a view can be made 
consistent with our overall scientific world picture.’67 
Searle’s critics charge him with replacing one dichotomy with another: Searle’s rejection of 
the traditional divides between mental and physical is picked up by his critics as being 
replaced with a parallel first-person/third-person divide, as I detailed in chapter 2.  The move 
Searle makes is that the philosophical tradition has developed so as to have defined mental as 
mutually exclusive with respect to physical, creating a dichotomy between mental and 
physical features which Searle thinks is fundamentally mistaken.  Whilst the physicalist counts 
up to one in number of ontological categories, accepting only physical features, and the 
dualist counts up to two, allowing for mental as well as physical, Searle does not want to start 
counting at all, finding the question itself unhelpful.  This is because, for Searle, the act of 
categorising types of features in the world is interest relative, meaning that you could group 
together “mental” features and “physical” features and divide them up into two groups if you 
wanted, but this would not reflect different fundamental, ontological categories; 
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‘There are not two (or five or seven) fundamental ontological 
categories, rather the act of categorization itself is always interest 
relative. For that reason the attempt to answer such questions as, 
‘How many fundamental metaphysical categories are there?’, as it 
stands, is meaningless. We live in exactly one world and there are as 
many different ways of dividing it as you like. In addition to 
electromagnetism, consciousness, and gravitational attraction, there 
are declines in interest rates, points scored in football games, 
reasons for being suspicious of quantified modal logic, and election 
results in Florida. Now, quick, were the election results mental or 
physical? And how about the points scored in a football game? Do 
they exist only in the mind of the scorekeeper or are they rather 
ultimately electronic phenomena on the scoreboard? I think these 
are not interesting, or even meaningful, questions. We live in one 
world, and it has many different types of features.’68 
Corcoran sees Searle as a property monist: Corcoran picks up on this denial of a 
mental/physical dichotomy within Searle’s theory and sees it as stopping any possible 
interpretation of Searle as a property dualist.  Indeed, Corcoran feels that if anything, Searle 
should, in light of this feature, be seen as a property monist; 
‘What exonerates Searle from all charges of being a property dualist 
is not the claim that the categories of “mental” and “physical” 
sometimes overlap, for a property dualist might countenance not 
only mixed mental-physical phenomena but also features that do not 
land comfortably under either one or the other of these categories, 
e.g. features of the world such as points scored in football games, 
invitations to parties and denials of tenure.  What exonerates Searle 
is the fact that for him there appear to be no non-physical properties 
i.e., the mental, although genuine and irreducible, is for all of that, a 
natural, physical phenomenon.  So Searle’s biological naturalism is 
not a version of property dualism, on the plausible assumption that, 
at a minimum, a property dualist insists that some properties (i.e., 
mental properties) are distinct from physical properties.  If, as Searle 
claims, mental properties are at some level of description physical, 
then Searle is, despite all his rhetoric to the contrary, a kind of 
property monist!’69 
Searle’s meaning of first-personal and third-personal: Searle does, however, maintain a 
difference between first-personal and third-personal, with experiences having this supposed 
first-person ontology.  The key to understanding how this is not simply a replacement of the 
mental/physical divide, as his critics charge him with, is that Searle does not mean first-person 
and third-person as fundamental ontological categories in the way that he thinks both 
physicalists and dualists accept “mental” and “physical” as opposing categories.  He sees this 
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as creating a conceptual space for him to claim that experiences are both qualitative and 
subjective and ordinary features of the world like any other, that is to say, ‘consciousness is a 
feature of the brain and thus part of the physical world’.70  He makes his point thus; 
‘”Mental” is defined as qualitative, subjective, first-personal, and 
therefore immaterial.  “Physical” is defined as quantitative, 
objective, third personal and therefore material…these definitions 
are inadequate to capture the fact that the world works in such a 
way that some biological processes are qualitative, subjective, and 
first-personal.’71 
Having looked at how and why “mental” and “physical” are considered fundamental 
ontological categories I will look at how Searle believes he undermines this standard view. 
c) Undermining the mind-body problem by rejecting the 
metaphysical framework in which is it situated 
Mental and physical as mutually exclusive: The tension highlighted at the end of chapter three 
is well described by Corcoran; 
‘Whereas Searle’s discussion of “first-person ontology” and the 
“subjective ontology of consciousness” seems to be suggestive of 
dualism, his claims about consciousness being physical and therefore 
spatial is suggestive of materialistic monism’72 
Searle deals with this charge by denying the metaphysical framework inside which such a 
worry arises.  Searle maintains that ‘not all of reality is objective; some of it is subjective.’73  In 
many places Searle asks us to start from the facts we know and base our conceptual 
framework and philosophical ideas on them.  This means, for Searle, there is both an 
acceptance of qualitative, subjective experiences as real features in their own right and a 
broadly monistic ontology in which ‘the universe is entirely made up of physical particles that 
exist in fields of force and are often organized into systems’.74   
Searle believes we should reject conceptual dualism because of the facts that we know: I think 
Searle sees many of the debates in philosophy of mind as trying to fit the facts around existing 
concepts and ontological commitments because he presents his ideas about rejecting 
conceptual dualism like this, 
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‘Given a choice between the facts as we know them—consciousness 
exists, it is caused by neuronal processes, it exists in the brain, and it 
has causal functions in the life of the organism—and various 
philosophical theories, I will take the facts any time.’75 
In other words, I think Searle sees the problems themselves as problematic because he rejects 
the ontological commitments on which they lie.  He clearly states his belief that ‘is it not a 
condition of being a mental phenomenon that it be nonspatial, nonexplicable by 
microprocesses, and causally inert’76 and that ‘there is no reason why a physical system such 
as a human or animal organism should not have states that are qualitative, subjective and 
intentional’.77  Consequently, Searle sees the mind-body problem as solvable at source; 
‘once you revise the traditional categories to fit the facts, there is no 
problem in recognizing that the mental qua mental is physical qua 
physical.  You have to revise the traditional Cartesian definitions of 
both “mental” and “physical”, but those definitions were inadequate 
to the facts in any case’78 
‘it is better not to use that terminology at all and just say that 
consciousness is a biological feature of the brain in the same way 
that digestion is a biological feature of the digestive tract’79 
Strawson incorporates experiential features into the “physical”: Searle is not alone in believing 
that experiential features can be incorporated into a “physical” reality.  For example, Strawson 
similarly believes, 
‘The truth is that we have no good reason to think that we know 
anything about the physical that gives us any reason to find any 
problem in the idea that mental or experiential phenomena are 
physical phenomena.’80 
This all relates back to the triviality of irreducibility claim.  In contrast to the doctrine of first-
person ontology, which was trying to resist reductive physicalism, Searle’s triviality of 
irreducibility claim is trying to downplay the “irreducible” aspect of experiences, so that they 
are able to be incorporated into his broadly monistic world view.  I take it that the reason why 
incorporating subjective phenomena into what is considered “physical” is normally resisted is 
because the features of conscious experiences, their qualitative, subjective nature, are seen as 
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so different to other features of most other phenomena, that they do appear to be  
fundamentally different.  So different, in fact, as to warrant a division of ontological category.  
Given that this is precisely what Searle denies, Searle’s rejection of the metaphysical 
framework in which the property dualist is working explains my rejection of a property dualist 
interpretation of Searle.81   
I will now turn to another complaint from Searle’s critics, that he uses examples of features 
which are ontologically reducible, such as solidity, to explain experiences, which are 
ontologically irreducible, according to Searle. 
d) Using ontologically reducible examples to explain the ontological 
irreducibility of experiences 
Searle’s critics complain that he uses inadequate examples: Searle tries to show how 
experiences are not separated off from other features of the world by giving examples which 
he means to be parallels to the relationship between experiences and the brain.  A favoured 
example by Searle is that of solidity as a higher-level feature being realised by a lower-level 
tightly bound structure of molecules.  For example, he says; 
‘I mean that consciousness is a state the brain can be in, in the way 
that liquidity and solidity are states that water can be in.’82 
Searle’s critics see his use of what they deem inappropriate examples as indicative of a 
confused theory.  They believe that it is inadequate to use examples of higher level features 
which do ontologically reduce to their lower-level features to try and explain experiences 
which are supposed to be higher-level features which do not reduce to their lower level 
biological features.  There is also a concern that Searle uses what are generally accepted as 
objective features of items, such as solidity, which are not restricted to particular points of 
view on the world, to try and explain experiences which Searle maintains have a first-person 
ontology and therefore an inherently subjective, rather than objective, nature.  So to his 
critics, Searle’s examples are simply not helpful for the explanatory work Searle is asking them 
to do. 
Searle’s examples do highlight experiences as higher-level system features: I believe that by 
comparing experiences to solidity, Searle is trying to stop conscious experiences from being 
too irreducible, too dualistic, and to present his belief that experiences are just like other 
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biological features.  To be fair to Searle, using solidity as an example to help understand 
consciousness and the brain does at least show a higher-level system feature which can also 
be picked out by its lower-level molecular makeup.  This does mimic Searle’s view of the 
relationship between the higher-level system level feature of consciousness and the lower-
level neuronal activity going on in our brains.  
How can a reducible phenomenon be explanatorily relevant to an irreducible one?  However, 
the tension that Searle’s critics feel comes from the combination of claiming that experiences 
are like solidity and that experiences have a first-person ontology, because solidity is 
ontologically reducible, according to Searle, yet first-person ontology is the very cause of the 
irreducibility of conscious experiences, so his critics wonder how one can help to explain the 
other.  I think a related issue is that on the one hand solidity, because it is ontologically 
reducible to its lower-level “physical” molecular structure, is generally considered 
unproblematically a physical feature of the world whereas on the other hand, first-person 
ontology seems to be similar to the exclusively mental features of the world proposed by 
dualists. However, Searle  clearly denies such a fundamental division between mental and 
physical, because he denies what he calls conceptual dualism and because his form of 
irreducibility is the technical, pragmatic variety which I detailed above in section 6a.   To recap 
in Searle’s own words; 
‘The property dualist and I are in agreement that consciousness is 
ontologically irreducible. The key points of disagreement are that I 
insist that from everything we know about the brain, consciousness 
is causally reducible to brain processes; and for that reason I deny 
that the ontological irreducibility of consciousness implies that 
consciousness is something ‘over and above’, something distinct 
from, its neurobiological base.83 
‘The irreducibility of consciousness is a trivial consequence of the 
pragmatics of our definitional practices.  A trivial result such as this 
has only trivial consequences.  It has no deep metaphysical 
consequences for the unity of our overall scientific world view.  It 
does not show that consciousness is not part of the ultimate 
furniture of reality or cannot be a subject of scientific investigation 
or cannot be brought into our overall physical conception of the 
universe.’84 
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e) Resolving the tensions – can Searle have a position which is 
irreducible but not too irreducible? 
Searle’s position cannot be reconciled on the standard meaning of “irreducible”: So how is the 
tension to be resolved?  It seems that Searle’s monistic instincts and desire to view 
experiences as nothing over and above the neuronal activity in the brain is incompatible with 
also claiming that experiences are ontologically irreducible because they have a first-person 
ontology.  To some extent it has to be acknowledged that if each of these terms are taken as 
their standard meaning in philosophy, it seems there is no way to reconcile Searle’s position.  
It just cannot be the case that experiences are both over and above brain states, as standard 
irreducibility would have it, and also nothing but brain states as Searle’s causal reduction 
might imply.  It also seems irreconcilable to claim that experiences have a first-person 
ontology, and are therefore limited to a particular individual’s point of view on the world, yet 
are modelled by objective features of the world such as solidity. 
Searle’s trivial sense of irreducibility allays some of his critics’ concerns: I have already tried to 
show how Searle’s notion of irreducibility is not the standard dualistic notion and is not 
intended to result in experiences being anything ontologically over-and-above the 
neurological features of the brain.  In Searle’s sense, experiences are irreducible because what 
he sees as the usual pattern of reduction is simply inapplicable to experiences, because you 
cannot split off appearances from an underlying reality.  This is because, Searle believes, if it 
appears to me that I am in pain, then I am in pain.  So on Searle’s account experiences are, or 
are realised by neuronal states in the brain, but are nevertheless irreducible in his inapplicable 
sense.  Appreciating the difference between the irreducibility claim of the property dualist and 
that of Searle goes some way to resolving the first tension.  Unfortunately, whilst alleviating 
the concern with the first tension, this seems to heighten the problems of the second tension.  
If Searle’s merely trivial sense of irreducibility is not the more substantive sense of the 
property dualist, it seems even further away from his first-person ontology claim.  
To resolve the tensions surrounding irreducibility and first-person ontology you must first 
accept Searle’s denial of conceptual dualism:  In one way, a solution can be reached, and 
these claims can make sense together, but only after accepting Searle’s underlying premise of 
the rejection of what he calls conceptual dualism.  With this, there is no tension between the 
triviality of irreducibility denying that ‘consciousness does not exist in a separate realm’85 and 
Searle’s first-person ontology claim, for neither would be excluded from a “physical” view of 
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the world.  Such a position might be phrased as Searle puts it as denying the categories of 
mental and physical as they currently exist and therefore that ‘there is no metaphysical gulf’86 
between experiences and other biological features; that ‘there is no reason why a physical 
system such as a human or animal organism should not have states that are qualitative, 
subjective and intentional’.87  Alternatively, it might be phrased as others have put it as 
broadening the scope of “physical” so as to include subjective features.  However, in another 
way Searle could be seen to just be playing with words rather than dealing with the underlying 
metaphysical issue.  Searle certainly says that experiences are simply the same as other 
biological features in our brain; 
‘the whole terminology of mental and physical was designed to try 
and make an absolute opposition between the mental and the 
physical, so maybe it is better not to use that terminology at all and 
just say that consciousness is a biological feature of the brain in the 
same way that digestion is a biological feature of the digestive 
tract’88 
However, one might still ask whether, regardless of what words are used to describe them, 
Searle makes any headway with dealing with the seemingly distinctive features of the mental, 
such as their subjectivity, which he not only acknowledges but actually builds into his theory 
under the notion of first-person ontology.  Unless he is able to answer, in what sense 
experiences are equally physical or biological, in the same manner as digestion, despite having 
their seemingly unique features of subjectivity and qualitative feel, Searle’s Biological 
Naturalism will remain unfulfilling to some readers.  Therefore, I will turn to this question in 
the next section. 
7. Has Searle dealt with the seemingly intractable problem of 
fitting together subjective experiences and objective brain 
states? 
a) Has Searle actually answered the problem? 
Has Searle tackled the substantive problem? There is a problem which seems to rear its head, 
despite Searle’s insistence that “mental” and “physical” are terms that are no longer useful in 
philosophy of mind.  Whichever words you choose to categorise experiences and brain 
processes, the substantive problem still arises.  Experiences seem to be essentially private 
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phenomena, subjective in that they are essentially tied to the first-person point of view of the 
subject undergoing them.  There also seem to be all the other non-experiential phenomena, 
what you might call “physical” phenomena.  These seem to be essentially objective and public 
in that they are not tied to any particular subject’s point of view.  This seems to lead towards 
two different ontological categories, two different categories of being, and yet we know that 
experiences depend heavily on, and correlate with, the objective neuronal states in our brain.  
This problem can be translated into Searle’s terminology; experiences have a first-person 
ontology, in that they are qualitative and subjective, and yet experiences are causally 
reducible to the underlying neuronal processes in the brain.   
Replacing subjective/objective with first-person/third-person: This intractable problem of 
reconciling an essentially subjective phenomenon, an experience, that so closely depends on 
an essentially objective phenomenon, a brain state, is referred to by Searle’s critics when they 
complain that he simply replaces the standard subjective/objective mind/body problem, and 
thus does not actually go any way to solving the mind-body problem at all.  As Olafson 
describes it, 
‘What [Searle] thus appears to be doing is reproducing all the 
inside/outside contrasts of traditional dualism quite literally inside 
our heads; and ‘brain dualism’ does seem the right name for such a 
paradoxical undertaking’89 
I think Howell’s theory of subjective physicalism can help to give an understanding as to why it 
is not mysterious that experiences depend upon on third-personal brain states given that they 
are essentially first-personal.  So it is to Howell’s theory that I now turn. 
b) Howell’s subjective physicalism  
Howell denies a metaphysical divide between mental and physical: According to Howell in his 
theory of subjective physicalism, it is the very act of instantiation which explains what it 
means for an experience to be “first-personal” as well as linking first-personal experiences to 
third-personal brain states.  Howell accepts that  
‘We find it hard to reconcile the continuity of constitution that holds 
between us and the rest of the world with a surprising discontinuity 
introduced by the presence of consciousness’90 
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Considerations of this type usually end up with the metaphysical gulf between subjective 
mental features and objective physical features of the world.  This is the kind of fundamental 
divide that is inherent in property dualism and its separation of mental and physical 
properties.  Such a metaphysical division is strongly denied by Howell because he sees the 
difference between mental and physical features not as some fundamental metaphysical 
difference, but simply as the claim that ‘there are aspects of the world that one cannot fully 
understand without occupying particular subjective states’.91  
First-personal is the need for a brain state to be instantiated in a subject: Howell phrases the 
difference between first-personal and third-personal in terms of the need to occupy certain 
brain states in order to fully grasp them.  He denies that this renders experiences as 
metaphysically distinct from all other objective features of the world; 
‘Minds are unique, however, in that the outside take is not the only 
one.  This doesn’t mean that a new fundamental type of property 
appears from the inside’92 
Subjective and first-personal means requiring instantiation in a subject: Howell’s take on the 
link between first-personal and third-personal features seems to rest on the belief that ‘what 
is essential to experience [is] the point of view its subject occupies’.93  If this is accepted, then 
it is not surprising that Howell believes that ‘subjective experience is not something that can 
be grasped, much less explained, from outside the machine’94 and that ‘“qualia” are somehow 
inextricably bound up with how they seem to a particular subject’.95   The “bound up” phrasing 
refers to the acceptance that certain brain states require being instantiated by a subject in 
order for that particular subject to fully grasp them.  Howell says, ‘states and properties are 
“subjective” in the sense that they cannot be fully grasped except by an agent that is 
undergoing them’.96 
The instantiation requirement does not make experiences non-physical: The crucial point 
here, in drawing both a distinction from the property dualist and a similarity to Searle is that 
the need to instantiate certain brain states in order to fully grasp them does not, according to 
Howell, mean that they are in any way non-physical; 
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‘One can learn about everything in the world through objective 
methods, but there will nevertheless be something more to be 
learned by occupying some of the states studied by those objective 
methods.  Those states are physical, but they cannot be fully 
understood without undergoing them’97 
When Howell says that ‘It is the necessarily experiential nature of qualitative states that 
makes them intractable for an objective description of the world’,98 this mirrors Searle’s claim 
that  
‘a complete description of the third-person objective features of the 
brain would not be a description of its first-person subjective 
features.’99 
and 
‘no description of the third-person, objective, physiological facts 
would convey the subjective, first-person character of the pain, 
simply because the first-person features are different from the third-
person features’100 
In summary: Reminding ourselves that ‘to have an experience is to take up a certain point of 
view towards the world’101 diminishes the problem of fitting together first-personal 
experiences and the third-personal brain states upon which they depend.  This is because the 
situation changes from being mysterious and unintelligible that first-personal subjective 
experiences arise from third-personal objective brain states to a situation whereby first-
personal experiences arise by instantiating a particular third-personal brain state.  Howell 
claims that certain brain states have to be instantiated in order to be fully grasped from the 
first-person point of view.  Searle claims that experiences are just a state the brain can be in 
and their first-person ontology is what makes reduction inapplicable to them, that is, why they 
cannot be fully grasped by third-personal objective means alone.  Just as Searle downplays his 
irreducibility claim to one of a trivial irreducibility, so Howell maintains that the requirement 
to instantiate certain brain states ‘does not show that they are not physical; it just shows that 
a complete grasp of them cannot be gained solely by objective theories’.102 
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I will now turn to the specific task of relating Howell’s requirement that certain brain states 
need to be instantiated in order to be fully grasped, to aspects of Biological Naturalism. 
c) Relating Howell’s instantiation requirement to Searle 
The need to match up the weight of an irreducibility claim with the weight of any claim about 
experiences: It seems to me that Searle has two options; either he accepts that the ontological 
irreducibility of experiences is a substantive metaphysical doctrine which results in the sort of 
mental/physical divide that we see in property dualism, or he demystifies the special nature of 
first-person ontology to fit with the downgraded trivial/inapplicable sense of irreducibility.  I 
believe that Searle in effect takes the second option, and that Howell’s insistence that certain 
brain states need to be instantiated in order to fully grasp them can help in explaining Searle’s 
position. 
Searle says many times that experiences exist only as experienced by a subject; 
‘Consciousness has a first-person ontology; that is, it only exists as 
experienced by some human or animal, and therefore, it cannot be 
reduced to something that has a third-person ontology, something 
that exists independently of experiences. It is as simple as that.’103 
Linking Searle’s claims that experiences exist only as experienced to the need to instantiate 
certain brain states: The meaning of this phrase is not immediately obvious for it could be said 
analogously that gusts of wind only exist when they are gusting, and what is special about 
that? I think that Howell’s insistence that some brain states need to be instantiated by a 
subject in order to be fully grasped is a way of understanding the ideas behind Searle’s claim 
of first-person ontology in a demystified way.  I have interpreted Searle’s claim of first-person 
ontology as the idea that experiences are both essentially qualitative and linked to a particular 
subject’s point of view on the world.  Such claims can seem to be so different in kind from 
anything that is said of objective physical properties of the world that it pushes experiences 
out into their own ontological category, away from, and over and above physical properties, 
as happens in property dualism.  Supposing the essentially first-person claim was to be 
understood as Howell’s requirement for instantiation in a subject, let me review the quote 
from Searle above.  It would amount to the claim that conscious experiences exist as 
experienced, in as much as certain brain states must be instantiated in a subject in order for 
an experience to occur.  Objective, third-personal phenomena are ones which are not tied to a 
particular subject’s point of view on the world, and which are equally accessible to any other 
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subject “from the outside”, so to speak.  It is not that experiences are bluntly tied to a first-
person point of view, on this interpretation there is more explanation to be given; they are 
tied to the first-person point of view on the world, because certain brain states, those which 
occur when a subject has an experience, need to be instantiated by a subject in order for them 
to be fully grasped, to be grasped experientially. 
Demystifying first-person ontology and irreducibility: The requirement of instantiation 
interpretation of Searle dissolves the metaphysical mysteriousness of first-person ontology 
because needing a brain state to be undergone in a subject’s brain does not mean that any 
separate mental realm is entered.  As Searle says,  
‘There are not two different metaphysical realms in your skull, one 
“physical” and one “mental.”  Rather, there are just processes going 
on in your brain and some of them are conscious experiences.’104 
This matches Searle’s notion of inapplicable irreducibility because given the required-
instantiation interpretation of Searle’s claim that experiences exist “as experienced” it plainly 
follows that phenomena whose nature require them to be instantiated by a subject in order to 
be fully grasped by that particular subject, cannot be reduced, that is, said to be nothing but, 
phenomena which are independent of any particular point of view on the world.  This could be 
seen as the reason why Searle claims ‘it is as simple as that’, because on this interpretation, 
both the irreducibility and the first-person ontology have been demystified to match each 
other’s status.  The end situation is one where property dualism proposes a weighty form of 
irreducibility because of a view of experiences with radically different properties than physical 
objects, but Searle can be seen to hold an inapplicable sense of irreducibility based on the 
requirement that certain brain states must be instantiated by a subject in order to be fully 
grasped, rather than because of any mysteriously unusual features of experiences 
themselves.105   
I will now turn to an outstanding question; why it is that some states of our brains are 
experiences when we instantiate them, and others are not. 
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d) But why is it that some brain states are experiential and others 
are not? 
Why are certain brain states experiential when instantiated? A question that Howell’s position 
might generate is why it is that certain brain states, those which occur in the brains of subjects 
when they undergo and experience, need to be instantiated by a subject in order to be fully 
grasped?  That is, why they have a first-personal aspect.  This “why” question can apply 
equally to all theories of mind; why is it that certain brain states feel a certain way for the 
subject, from their own point of view, when instantiated in their brains, and other ones feel 
no particular way whatsoever?  Howell is clear and honest on his response to such a question: 
‘Subjective physicalism does not put the mind body problem to rest, 
nor does it explain the subjective.  It would be nice, for example, to 
have a full explanation as to why certain physical states have aspects 
that reveal themselves when those states are occupied.  Subjective 
physicalism is not alone in its silence on this issue.’106 
Response options: It seems to me that the options open when dealing with the question of 
why some brain states are experiential when undergone by a subject, and others are not, are 
1) Deny that experiences are essentially tied to a first-personal point of view of the 
world 
2) Accept some form of panpsychism so that the experiential aspect is present “all 
the way down”, thus dispelling the mystery of how it suddenly appears at the 
higher level of conscious experience 
3) Bluntly assert that some brain states just are subjective 
Howell clearly opts for the third option of blunt assertion; 
‘According to subjective physicalism it is simply a fact that there is 
something that it is like to instantiate certain physical states.  
Instantiating those states is sufficient for there being conscious 
experience – something that objective sciences cannot fully 
capture’107 
Searle also opts for a blunt assertion: I think a strong case can be made for claiming that 
Searle also opts for a simple blunt assertion that some brain states just are experiential, in 
that when they are instantiated in the brain of a subject, that subject undergoes an 
experience.  Not only does Searle claim, similar to Howell that; 
‘No description of the third-person, objective, physiological facts 
would convey the subjective, first-person character of the pain, 
                                                          
106
 Howell R. The Ontology of Subjective Physicalism p.339 
107
 Howell R. “Subjective Physicalism” p.132 
140 
 
simply because the first-person features are different from the third-
person features’108 
He also talks about the facts that we know about experiences, and consciousness just 
following from the constitution of reality; 
‘The facts are that biological processes produce conscious mental 
phenomena, and these are irreducibly subjective’109 
‘Given the constitution of reality, consciousness has to follow in the 
same way that any other biological property, such as mitosis, 
meiosis, photosynthesis, digestion, lactation, or the secretion of bile, 
follows.’110 
e) How does this mean Searle deals with the problem of fitting first-
personal into third-personal? 
A fine balance between reductionism and dualism: Some responses to this problem try to 
downgrade subjective experiences as “nothing but” other physical features of the brain, such 
that they become unproblematically physical and the same as other brain states.  Such 
reductive approaches are well established in philosophy of mind, prompting Dupré to warn 
against the ‘tyranny of the microphysical’.111  Howell and Searle both want to reach the same 
end-point as the reductivist, namely that experiences are encompassed in the ordinary 
physical world along with all other physical things.  As Howell says, ‘It seems implausible that 
in this world of physical things our minds are the sole things that cannot be accounted for by 
physical laws, properties, and states of affairs’.112  However, Howell and Searle both want to 
keep the subjectivity of experiences in their own right, rather than rendering them “nothing 
but” different physical properties, whilst not sliding into property dualism.  Howell does this 
through his talk of subjectivity being the need to instantiate certain physical brain states in 
order to fully grasp them.  Searle does this through his insistence that experiences have a first-
person ontology whilst also being causally reducible to brain states, that is, the subjective 
aspect of an experience is just one way to refer to a particular brain state going on in the brain 
of a subject.  Howell puts the point like this; ‘”Subjective” properties are called physical 
because they are necessitated by the physical’113 and 
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‘Subjective physicalism maintains, whereas property dualism denies, 
that these qualitative states are completely metaphysically grounded 
in physical states’114 
Searle similarly claims that; 
‘The mind and the body interact, but they are not two different 
things, since mental phenomena just are features of the brain’115 
‘There is no reason why a physical system such as a human or animal 
organism should not have states that are qualitative, subjective and 
intentional’116 
The mutually exclusive 
natures of first-personal and 
third-personal: The way in 
which Howell, and I believe 
also Searle, deal with the 
problem of fitting first-
person subjective 
phenomena into an 
otherwise third-personal 
objective world is by claiming 
that an experience just is a 
subject undergoing a certain 
brain state, coupled with the 
blunt assertion that some 
brain states just are subjective when instantiated.  So, by the very nature of what it means to 
be first personal, even if you watch the brain activity of someone on an fMRI scan, if it’s not 
your brain that it’s happening to right then and there you will be missing the first-personal 
aspects of the brain state, because you won’t be undergoing the particular brain state in your 
own brain.  This is a picture taken from an fMRI scan I had.  It might be very informative in 
many ways, but no outside, objective information will be able to capture what I was 
experiencing as I underwent the scan. 
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8. Conclusion 
This chapter has been sectioned into two halves.  The first half dealt with whether Searle’s 
Biological Naturalism is, as some of his critics suggest, a form of property dualism.  I started 
this by looking at what property dualism is and finding that its central belief is the 
irreducibility of mental properties to physical properties, that is, mental properties being 
ontologically separated from physical properties.  I explored the motivations for property 
dualism and showed how arguments provided by philosophers such as Kripke and Nagel have 
fed the property dualists’ intuitions about the ontological distinctness of specifically mental 
properties.  This was important to do because many similar beliefs are held by Searle, such as 
the perspectivalness of experiences and the primacy of appearances as their deep reality. The 
interesting fact is that observing these features does not lead Searle to dualism as they do 
with other dualists. 
Having established the foundation of property dualism, in section 3 I looked at why Searle’s 
Biological Naturalism might be interpreted as a form of property dualism, showing how his 
notion of first-person ontology and irreducibility seem to mirror the way that the property 
dualist expresses their view of experiences.  Before assessing whether the interpretation of 
Searle as a property dualist was a legitimate one, in section 4 I set out Searle’s view on 
reduction as a process of carving off appearances of a particular phenomenon from its 
underlying causal reality and redefining that phenomenon as those lower-level features.  This 
means that Searle requires a distinction between the higher-level appearance and lower-level 
underlying causal processes in order for a reduction to apply. 
Searle does, like the property dualist, claim that experiences are irreducible, but in section 5 I 
showed how he does not mean it in the standard sense which renders mental properties as 
ontologically separated from physical properties.  Searle’s sense of irreducible is merely an 
inapplicable sense in which reduction cannot apply to experiences, because he denies that 
their appearances can be separated from any underlying reality; if it appears to me that I am 
feeling a sense of despair, then I am definitely feeling a sense of despair – the feeling cannot 
be mistaken.  In other words, Searle’s notion of first-person ontology of experiences means 
that they cannot undergo a reduction in the way that Searle believes us to standardly use the 
process.  I believe this difference in meaning of “irreducibility” is decisive in rejecting any 
interpretation of Searle as a property dualist. 
The second half of the chapter looked at a tension within Searle’s position; on the one hand 
Searle downplays the metaphysical importance of irreducibility, and uses examples of 
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reducible features like solidity to try to explain the relationship between consciousness and 
the brain.  On the other hand he maintains that experiences have a first-person ontology and 
are essentially subjective.  It is as if he is trying to make experiences irreducible enough to 
distance himself from reductive physicalism whilst at the same time making experiences not 
too reducible, thereby distancing himself, in the other direction, from property dualists.   
In section 6 I explored the issues surrounding this tension and found that one must accept 
Searle’s denial of conceptual dualism if the remainder of his theory is to be coherent.  In 
section 7 I looked at the substantive problem which remains, even with a denial of conceptual 
dualism; the seeming inability to reconcile first-personal phenomena being entirely dependent 
upon third-person phenomena.  I looked at the work of Howell whose subjective physicalism 
bears strong resemblance to Searle’s Biological Naturalism.   I highlighted how they both 
attempt to keep the subjectivity of experiences without reducing it to being “nothing but” a 
different physical feature.  I concluded that “subjective” is taken by them to mean inextricably 
tied up with the first-person point of view of a subject and that, consequently, certain brain 
states must be instantiated in order to be fully grasped.   
The fact that with this view experiences are in some sense simply token brain states 
undergone by a subject, the question might be raised as to how similar the position is to an 
identity theory of mind.  It is this question that I explore in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 –  
Is Searle an identity theorist? 
1. Introduction 
I will start this chapter by looking at what mind-brain identity theory is, and its central tenets 
of the mental and physical descriptions as co-referring to a single brain state and experiences 
being “nothing but” physical brain states, which masks a reductive privileging of the physical 
over the mental.  I will then look at what motivates an interpretation of Searle as an identity 
theorist by considering both what his critics accuse him of and the way he expresses the 
different aspects of his theory of Biological Naturalism.   
Traditional mind-brain identity theory assumes that a claim of identity is made in conjunction 
with a reduction of the mental to the physical, but I will show that it is possible to split apart a 
claim of identity from a claim of reduction and show that these are two separate steps to be 
taken, and they can be accepted or rejected individually.  Real identity, I argue, is identity 
without any additional reduction of mental to physical.  Once this is established, and the 
desire to reduce mental to physical is put in question, I will move on to showing why I think 
Biological Naturalism should be seen as a form of what I will call real identity theory, which is 
identity theory without any additional privileging of the physical over the mental.  To do this I 
will first point out the differences between the features of Biological Naturalism and 
traditional reductive mind-brain identity theory.  I will then look at why Searle insists that 
reality is not wholly objective, which points away from a reduction of mental to physical.   
Searle’s notion of different levels of description of a single system will then be explored, and I 
will show how Searle’s approach to these different descriptions backs the non-privileging 
aspect of real identity theory, using Howell’s theory of Subjective Physicalism as support.  I will 
conclude that whilst Searle is clearly not a traditional mind-brain identity theorist, in other 
words a reductive physicalist, he should be interpreted as a non-reductive identity theorist, as 
I have defined it. 
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2. Identity theory 
Mind-brain identity theory is an approach to the mind-body problem which resists any hint of 
dualism by identifying the mind with the brain.  That is to say, identity theory views 
experiences as identical to brain states, considering pains, for example, to just be certain 
configurations of activity in our brains.  In this section I will set out what I believe to be the 
two main principles of identity theory.  Firstly, that identifying experiences with brain states is 
to say that two descriptions which seem separate, the experiential description of conscious 
states and the neurological description of conscious states, are actually referring to, and 
picking out, the same single brain state.  Secondly, that experiences are considered to be 
“nothing but” brain states, which masks an inherent reductive privileging of the physical over 
the experiential within identity theory. 
a) Identity as two descriptions co-referring 
Two names or descriptions, but one referent: Identity is mostly considered to be a 
metaphysical relation concerning a thing and itself; something is always identical to itself; the 
process we use when we identify two things which we originally thought to be separate, but 
then realise are one and the same is a process of saying how two names or descriptions 
actually pick out the one same item in the world. For example, the morning star is identical to 
the evening star because they are both in fact Venus, and when we identify them, we come to 
realise that ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’ are both referring to the same feature of 
the world – the planet Venus.  As Levine puts it, ‘when A is identical to B, then in fact there is 
only one property, referred to in two different ways – “A” and “B”’.1 Using the example of a 
rainbow, it is not that there are rainbows and there are various refractions of light through 
water particles in the atmosphere, the process of identity shows that there is only one feature 
in the world, which can be picked out via the description “rainbow” or equally the description 
“various refractions of light through water particles in the atmosphere”.  As Place described it, 
identity theorists used identity to mean, ‘a relation between two different names or 
descriptions such that they both refer to the same individual’ such as ‘Bill Lycan is the 
American philosopher Ullin Place met for the first time in Sydney in 1983'2. 
Picking out the same feature in the world: In other words, the two states or features which 
were originally thought to be separate, are said to be one once identified, but there remains 
two names or descriptions, it is just that these are accepted, post identity, to co-refer and in 
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fact pick out the same feature in the world.  Kripke later showed that if the two terms which 
co-refer pick out the same thing in all possible worlds, that is, they are both rigid designators, 
then the identity statement is necessary.  This is because a rigid designator picks out the same 
individual in all possible worlds, which makes the identity between two such terms necessarily 
true in other words because the identity holds in all possible worlds.   
Smart worked before Kripke, but also described this process of two terms c-referring: 
‘Note that there are not two things: a flash of lightning and an 
electrical discharge.  There is one thing, a flash of lightning, which is 
described scientifically as an electrical discharge to the earth from a 
cloud of ionized water-molecules.’3 
This is what I consider to be the first main feature of mind-brain identity theory.  It is the pure 
identity part of the theory, showing that where we thought we had two separate features of 
the world, we in fact have just one feature and two terms referring to it.  I will now turn to 
what I consider to be the second feature of identity theory – an inherent reductionism and 
privileging of the physical over the mental. 
b) The “nothing but” claim and reductive privileging 
The extra claim of reduction included in identity: It might be thought that once I had explored 
the identity part of identity theory, as I did in the section above, I would have covered what 
identity theory means.  However, I think that identity theory has another main feature which 
is most often accepted without question or not even overtly realised to be a separate feature 
of identity theory at all.  This is the privileging of the physical over the mental.  To see how it is 
so often included as part and parcel of identity theory, I will quote the full passage from 
Smart, part of which I used above in section a).  I used the first part of this quote to explicate 
the idea of identity within identity theory.  Quoted in full, it reveals how a form of 
reductionism is tagged onto the identity, thereby privileging the physical over the mental; 
‘Note that there are not two things: a flash of lightning and an 
electrical discharge.  There is one thing, a flash of lightning, which is 
described scientifically as an electrical discharge to the earth from a 
cloud of ionized water-molecules…We say that what lightning really 
is, what its true nature as revealed by science is, is an electric 
discharge.’4 [my emphasis added] 
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The “nothing but” claim as a resistance against any hint of dualism: This is the basis of the 
“nothing but” phrasing so often associated with identity theory, generally along the lines of 
“experiences are nothing but neurological activity in the brain” or even “the mind is nothing 
but the brain”.  I believe this tendency to include a reduction of mental to physical can be 
traced back to the origins of identity theory; when it was first proposed.  In the late 1950s and 
1960s,5 mind-brain identity theory was a reaction against the prevailing behaviouristic 
theories of the time which equated conscious experiences with outwardly identifiable 
behaviours.  Believing that ‘organisms are able to be seen as physic-chemical mechanisms’,6 
Smart seemed to think that admitting of any irreducibly mental, or as he might phrase it, 
psychic aspect, is akin to some form of dualism.  Therefore, identity theorists, like Smart, 
specifically wanted to avoid any hint of dualism in their theory.  For example, Smart was very 
keen to show that the phrase “I am in pain” does not refer to ‘an irreducibly psychical 
something’.7  Indeed, Smart claims that the point of his article “Sensations and Brain 
Processes” is ‘to show that there are no philosophical arguments which compel us to be 
dualists’.8  His solution for avoiding the plight of dualism, as he saw it, was to identify the 
particular neuronal states activating in our brains, and the corresponding experiences that 
occur for the subject whose brain it is, which seem to be distinct.  Or as Lewis stated it, ‘every 
experience is identical with some physical state, specifically, with some neurochemical state’.9 
An in-built reductive privileging of the physical over the mental: However, the identification of 
experiences with properties of the brain usually includes an in-built privileging of the physical 
over the mental.  With early identity theorists, like Smart, this can be seen in the way mental 
descriptions are claimed to be topic-neutral, that is not saying anything at all about the 
experiential or mental nature of their referents, and hence when they co-refer with physical 
descriptions, the result is to physicalise the referent of the mental description.  Smart was 
particularly keen to avoid any idea that experience involves ‘an irreducibly psychical 
something”.10  Place counted the fact that identity theory is ‘effective in eliminating mental 
events and mental processes as a separate class of events’11 as a strength of the theory.  
Identity theory includes a covert reduction of mental to physical and corresponding privileging 
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of physical over the mental, which I will refer to as a reductive privileging.  Identity theorists 
are claiming that the essence of the mental is actually something physical; what is most 
important about our experiences, what is the key to making them what they are, is that they 
are in fact physical states.  Smart expresses the reductive privileging that I think has become 
inextricably entwined with identity theory when he says that, the identity between 
experiences and brain states shows an experience’s ‘true nature as revealed by science’.12   
Reductive privileging is in addition to a claim of identity: I should be clear that the reductive 
privileging of identity theory is, I believe, in addition to a pure claim of identity.  Mind-brain 
identity theory is not ambiguous in its claims; it is the idea that the mind is “nothing but” the 
brain.  This reflects the way that mind-brain identity theory includes a reductive privileging 
with its claim of identity.  You might hear from an identity theorist something like “mental 
states are actually physical states in our functioning brains”.  What you would not hear is 
something like “neuronal activity in our brains is actually just conscious experience”, which 
would be an example of reductive privileging in the opposite direction, with physical states 
thought to be nothing but mental states.  Neither do you generally hear about claims of 
identity where neither of the two referring descriptions is privileged over the other.  I believe 
that pure identity does not have the implication of reduction that identity theorists seem to 
assume; it is an extra claim that is being included. 
Having looked at the two main features of mind-brain identity theory, as it is used in the 
literature, I will now turn to Searle’s Biological Naturalism and explore the reasons why he 
might be interpreted as an identity theorist. 
3. Motivating the idea of Searle as an identity theorist 
I find it interesting that Searle’s Biological Naturalism has been interpreted both as a form of 
dualism, as I explored in the previous chapter, and as a variety of identity theory.  For 
example, Place considers Biological Naturalism as having an aspect of identity within it; 
‘According to Searle, mental states are both identical with and 
causally dependent upon the corresponding states of the brain. I say 
you can't have your cake and eat it. Either mental states are identical 
with brain states or one is causally dependent on the other. They 
can't be both.’13 
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In this section I will look at the reasons why Searle might be interpreted as an identity 
theorist.  If I am to accurately assess whether this is an appropriate interpretation I think it is 
important to understand all of the reasons which motivate such a view of Biological 
Naturalism.  I will start by revisiting some of the criticisms I first broached in chapter 2, looking 
at why Searle’s critics claim that Biological Naturalism is tantamount to identity theory.  I will 
then look at what Searle actually says and how the way he expresses his ideas can seem very 
closely allied with the views of mind-brain identity theorists.   
a) Why Searle’s critics interpret him as an identity theorist 
If conceptual dualism is wrong, why not embrace identity theory? Garrett finds fault with 
Searle’s inability to accept what Garrett sees as the consequences of Searle’s own views.  
Searle’s belief that modern philosophy of mind is in the grip of conceptual dualism, that is, the 
approach of pitting mental against physical and viewing them as mutually exclusive, leads 
Garrett to argue that Searle should simply reject such a picture, which he believes would leave 
Searle with a position of identity theory.  This is because if mental and physical are not set 
against each other, and all properties are accepted as physical, then why talk of ontologically 
irreducible subjective features of the world and of experiences having a first-person ontology?  
Why not, Garrett contends, simply embrace identity theory and accept that experiences are 
physical like all other properties in the world.  As Garrett puts it, 
‘What Searle owes us here is an answer to the query, Why do we 
need to understand consciousness as an emergent property given 
the falsity of conceptual dualism?  The tradition Searle rejects has 
motivations for such inclinations towards property dualism; the 
problem of multiple realisability and Kripke’s modal objections, 
being the most prominent.  But it is hard to understand why Searle 
speaks in the language of irreducibility, if the tradition is so 
confused.’14 
Interpreting causal reduction as the co-referring aspect of identity theory: Collins’ criticism of 
Searle focuses on Searle’s ideas about causal reduction.  The simultaneous style of causation 
that Searle employs in causal reduction is, for Collins, akin to the kinds of claims made by 
identity theorists.  Because simultaneous causation focuses on a micro-macro link between 
what Searle calls different levels of description of the same system, this can appear similar to 
an identity theorist claiming that there is just one feature here, but it has two co-referring 
descriptions – a lower-level neuronal description and a higher-level experiential description in 
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the case of conscious experiences.  Searle motivates such interpretations by expressing his 
views like this;  
‘Causally speaking, there is nothing there, except the neurobiology, 
which has a higher level feature of consciousness. In a similar way 
there is nothing in the car engine except molecules, which have such 
higher level features as the solidity of the cylinder block, the shape 
of the piston, the firing of the spark plug, etc. ‘Consciousness’ does 
not name a distinct, separate phenomenon, something over and 
above its neurobiological base, rather it names a state that the 
neurobiological system can be in. Just as the shape of the piston and 
the solidity of the cylinder block are not something over and above 
the molecular phenomena, but are rather states of the system of 
molecules, so the consciousness of the brain is not something over 
and above the neuronal phenomena, but rather a state that the 
neuronal system is in.’15 
Collins takes such a view as claiming that ‘solidity just is the molecular structure.  Solidity is 
identical with the molecules in lattice structures’.16  Hence Collins’ accusation that Searle is an 
identity theorist. 
Interpreting causal reduction as the identity theorist’s “nothing but” claim: Corcoran’s 
complaint against Searle rests on the fact that Corcoran reads causal reduction as implying 
that experiences are entirely explainable in purely physical terms.  Corcoran describes the 
picture of causal reduction as meaning that ‘for Searle, the mental causally supervenes on and 
so is wholly explainable in terms of lower level neurophysiological going-on in the brain’17 and 
considers that this implies that ‘consciousness is entirely caused by and so is wholly 
explainable in terms of the behavior of lower level biological phenomena’.18  This obviously 
motivates an interpretation of Searle as an identity theorist, for it is akin to the claim that 
experiences are “nothing but” brain activity.   
I will now look at some features of Searle’s theory and the way that his mode of expression 
often matches the way that the identity theorists articulate their views. 
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b) What Searle says that implies he is an identity theorist 
In Searle’s own words: 
‘Is consciousness identical with a brain process or not?  Well, 
obviously and trivially, as I have said, consciousness is just a brain 
process.  It is a qualitative, subjective, first-person process going on 
in the nervous system.’19  
‘There is nothing in your brain except neurons (together with glial 
cells, blood flow and all the rest of it) and sometimes a big chunk of 
the thalamocortical system is conscious.’20 
Just as the identity theorist does, Searle really wants to avoid any hint of dualism: Searle is 
more than clear about his desire to avoid dualism, firmly rejecting anyone interpreting him as 
holding ‘some crazy doctrine of property dualism’.21  Searle clearly declares that ‘I find 
property dualism unacceptable’22 and desires to keep experiences ‘as much a part of the 
natural biological order as any other biological features such as photosynthesis, digestion, or 
mitosis’.23  This mirrors the staunch rejection by traditional mind-brain identity theorists of 
anything dualistic or mentalistic.  In my discussion of identity theory in section 2 above, I 
showed how identity theory is founded on a rejection of dualism, with the aim of giving an 
account of seemingly mental features of the world in purely physical terms, for example, 
Smart wanted ‘to show that there are no philosophical arguments which compel us to be 
dualists’.24  The agreement between Searle and the identity theorists about the need to resist 
dualism and provide a physicalist, or at least naturalistic account of conscious experience 
could easily lead in the direction of interpreting Searle’s theory as a form of identity theory. 
Just as the identity theorist does, Searle could be interpreted as privileging the physical: Searle 
could be interpreted as denying the existence of any mental domain, for he believes that 
there is only your brain in your skull and just your active brain is all that is needed for 
conscious experience.  He holds that there is not mental stuff over and above, or in addition 
to, your functioning brain - ‘there are not two different metaphysical realms in your skull, one 
“physical” and one “mental”’.25  This certainly could seem like a reductive privileging of the 
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physical: ‘the real existence of consciousness is in human and animal brains’26 (my emphasis).  
If Searle sees consciousness as something completely ordinary in the physical/biological 
realm, then this might justify a reading of him as a traditional mind-brain identity theorist.  
When Searle says that consciousness is ‘as much a part of the natural biological order as any 
other biological features such as photosynthesis, digestion or mitosis’,27 it is natural to see a 
parallel to the mind-brain identity theorist’s claim that the mental is really nothing but the 
physical.  In other words, Searle and the mind-brain identity theorist both seem to agree on 
the physical brain-based nature of consciousness, in that a functioning brain is a conscious 
brain; ‘we know consciousness happens and we know the brain does it.’28   
Having explored a number of reasons that motivate an interpretation of Searle as an identity 
theorist, I will now turn to the task of assessing whether this is a fair construal of his position.  
First expanding on my claim that real identity can be separated from any claim of reductive 
privileging, I will look at the standard format of identity theory, and defend my belief that 
Searle’s Biological Naturalism should not be interpreted as a variant of traditional mind-brain 
identity theory, but can, and should, be seen as a form of real identity theory. 
4. Separating identity and reduction – real identity 
In the previous section I set out what motivates an interpretation of Biological Naturalism as 
really being a form of identity theory.  In this section I want to look more closely at what 
identity theory is, and develop a new terminology of real-identity, as opposed to privileging-
identity, depending on whether a reductive privileging is incorporated within the identity 
claim.  In section 5 I will develop a real identity theory which amounts to an approach to the 
mind-body problem based on an identity claim but without any accompanying privileging or 
reduction.  The purpose of this exercise will become clear in section 6 when I argue that 
although it is mistaken to view Searle as a traditional reductive identity theorist, Biological 
Naturalism can, and should, be viewed as a form of real identity theory. 
a) Standard identity regarding experiences includes a privileging 
claim 
Two meanings of reduction? As I briefly covered in section 2b) above, traditional mind-brain 
identity theorists assume that a claim of identity regarding experiences, and a reductive 
privileging of the physical over the mental go hand in hand.  Perhaps the sense of reduction is 
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ambiguous here.  I believe philosophers sometimes take reduction to be synonymous with 
identity, however, there also seems to be a clear sense in which reduction includes a 
privileging of physical over mental, for after all, in philosophy of mind, reductive theories 
always claim that experiences reduce down to brain states, as a justification for a materialist 
theory of mind.  If there are these two meanings of reduction, sometimes as a synonym of 
identity, and sometimes to mean a privileging of physical over mental, then perhaps this is the 
source of the covert inclusion of a reductive privileging of physical over mental within identity 
theory.  If the usage of reduction slips between the sense of simply being identified and the 
sense of privileging the physical as more fundamental or basic, then perhaps this is one way 
that standard mind-brain identity theory has come to include a surreptitious aspect of 
reductive privileging. 
Reduction as an additional claim beyond a claim of identity: It might be understandable that 
when it comes to the relation between experiences and the brain, reduction has come to be 
bound up with identity, because in one sense an identity relation occurs where you thought 
you had two phenomena, and it turns out that really you have got just one, picked out by two 
different descriptions.  In this way, the numerical reduction of two phenomena to one might 
lead to the inclusion within the identity claim of philosophical reduction, that is to say 
privileging one description over another.  However, I think that the relation of pure identity, 
based on two descriptions co-referring, is not privileging one description over another, nor is 
it commenting on which of the two descriptions reveals features more basic or essential to the 
phenomenon.  This identity relation itself makes no judgement about which one of the two 
ways of picking out the phenomenon reveals the truest or most fundamental of its features, it 
simply says that two terms co-refer.  There is no privileging going on here, and the dual 
meaning and uses of “reduction” are a way of building the privileging of the physical over the 
mental into the notion of mental-physical identity.  Indeed, part of the enterprise of the 
process of identification of experiences to brain states is to capture the folk phenomenon 
within the wider explanatory and ontological net of physical science. 
The main point I am trying to make is that identity itself does not imply reductive privileging of 
one description over another.  In the case of philosophy of mind, this means that identity 
claims between experiences and brain states do not imply that brain states are more 
essential, fundamental or basic than experiences.  Identity claims simply mean that 
experiential descriptions and neurobiological descriptions co-refer to the same conscious 
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phenomenon.  In order to be clear about this difference in the use of “identity”, I will 
introduce alternative terminology in the next section. 
b) Introducing alternative terminology for identity 
Being clear about the meaning of “identity”: I am aware that the standard use of identity is 
entrenched in philosophy of mind as two names or descriptions co-referring to a single 
phenomenon, and one of those descriptions being seen as more fundamental to the 
phenomenon, as revealing part of its essence.  In light of this I think I must introduce 
alternative terminology so as to be clear what I am referring to.  I believe that a pure identity 
claim is a non-privileging metaphysical relation based on two names or descriptions picking 
out one real feature of the world.  This makes no comment as to which, or indeed whether, 
either one of the two names or descriptions is more basic.  On this reading, identity is a 
neutral relation; whilst realising that two different terms can co-refer to a particular referent, 
any reduction or privileging of one description over another is an additional claim.  
In order to keep these ideas clear I will now use the following terminology: 
 
Real-identity: The neutral metaphysical relation where two 
terms are found to co-refer to the same referent. 
Privileging-  The compound claim found in traditional mind- 
Identity  brain identity theory, which amounts to a claim 
of real-identity plus an additional claim of the 
reductive privileging of the physical over the 
mental. 
 
 
5. Reclaiming identity theory as non-reductive and non-
privileging 
Having set out my belief that an identity claim does not include any reductive privileging (what 
I will call real-identity); in this section I want to explore an identity theory based on real-
identity rather than the traditional privileging-identity.  This will be a non-reductive, non-
privileging approach to the mind-body problem which remains neutral about the status of 
either of the two descriptions, neurological or experiential, which co-refer to the conscious 
experience. 
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a) Using real-identity to construct the position of real identity 
theory 
With the notion of real-identity I have tried to split identity from reduction and reclaim 
identity as a non-privileging relation, with reduction as a separate claim to be added on top of 
any question of identity.  As I have set out above, with this view, real-identity involves two 
terms picking out or referring to only one phenomenon.  It is a metaphysical relation that does 
not incorporate bias or fundamentality of one over another, and therefore makes no 
comment on which one of the two descriptions is the most real or most fundamental, or 
which best captures the essence of the phenomenon which they pick out.  I will now explore 
how real identity can be developed into a real identity theory relating to the mind/body 
problem. 
Summary of real identity theory: The real identity theory I am proposing is a form of token 
identity theory regarding the mind-body problem where for any particular brain state which 
occurs in the brain of an experiencing subject, there are two ways of picking out that token 
brain state – an experiential way and a neuronal way.  That is to say, any particular token 
brain state which occurs when a subject is having an experience will fall under two different 
types – both the “experience” type and the “neuronal activity” type.  As identity is a 
metaphysical relation between a thing and itself, the identity part of real identity theory is 
referring to the fact that where it was thought there was a neuronal state and a separate 
experience, in fact there is just a particular token brain state occurring in the brain of a 
subject, and that brain state is both an experience and a particular configuration of neuronal 
activity.  So, for any subject undergoing an experience, there is one token brain state going on 
in their brain which can be brought under two types; “experience” and “neuronal activity”.  
This view is token identity theory in as much as every time an experience is occurring for a 
subject, a particular state of their brain is coming under the type “experience” and, at the very 
same time, that very same brain state will also come under the type “configuration of 
neuronal activity”.   
An approach to the mind-body problem based on identity but without any privileging: Real 
identity theory based on real-identity would resist the move incorporated into traditional 
mind-brain identity theory of a privileging of the physical over the mental.  Real identity 
theory is based on the belief that identities involve parity rather than privileging.  An example 
might be illuminating here; a privileging approach to identity might claim that H2O is the more 
basic or fundamental description of water, or that H2O is more essential to what water is than 
“the wet clear stuff that actually falls out the sky and comes out the taps”.  Real identity is 
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more of a claim that H2O just is water, there is a relation of identity between the two, in other 
words, both “H2O” and “the wet clear stuff that actually falls out the sky and comes out the 
taps” pick out and refer to water, and given that this is the case, it makes no sense to ask 
which one is the most fundamental, for they both refer to one and the same thing.  Traditional 
mind-brain identity, based on privileging-identity, views a mental experiences as really a brain 
state, in other words that the experience’s true essence is of being a brain state.  Real identity 
theory makes no such claim about basicness or fundamentality and refrains from privileging 
one description over the other.  This fits with the water example above, where H2O is merely 
seen as water. 
Terminological precautions to avoid sliding into privileging-identity or property dualism: It is 
important to phrase my position carefully at this point, for it is very easy to either slide back 
into the locution of traditional privileging-identity, or in relation to experiences and brain 
states, to seem as if you are sliding towards property dualism.  To avoid the latter, I must be 
clear that the property of having a particular experience, of an itchy foot say, just is the 
property of having certain configurations of neuronal activity going on in my brain.  If I am 
now clear about this, the two different descriptions might seem disparate enough to warrant 
an interpretation of a dualism of properties.  The problem with using the “just is” terminology 
is that it almost suggests an inherent reduction or privileging of physical over mental.  I must 
be clear here that to avoid any confusion about a “just is” claim seeming reductive, when I 
claim that experiences “just are” certain patterns of neuronal activity going on in a brain, what 
I mean is that there is a single phenomenon going on in a subject’s brain, and that 
phenomenon can be picked out either in terms of neurological activity or in terms of being an 
experience – the two descriptions concerned co-refer.  This avoids any sense of reduction that 
might be caught up with the “is” or particularly the “just is” expression, which might seem all 
too close to the “nothing but” reductive claim of traditional mind-brain privileging-identity 
theorists. 
Finding a conceptual place for real identity theory: A question that often arises in relation to 
the levelism, and talk of different levels of description, which Searle employs, is the status of 
the relationship between the levels.   The levels are sometimes deemed to have their own 
specific properties, for example, solidity and transparency could be seen as properties of the 
molecular level.  If this is so, then the question becomes how do the properties of each of the 
levels relate to each other?  Kim phrases the question thus, 
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‘Are these higher-level physical features of the brain (a.k.a. mental 
properties) reducible to, or reductively identifiable with, the lower-
level properties’’29 [my emphasis added] 
I find it extremely revealing that Kim has specified “reductively identifiable with” rather than 
merely identifiable with.  Kim is claiming that unless higher level mental experiences are 
reductively identifiable to the lower level physical properties then we are dealing with an 
example of property dualism.  This is presumably because if reduction is rejected, he sees any 
form of irreducibility as tantamount to dualism.  I contend that rejecting reductive identity, or 
identity based on privileging-reduction as I have called it, still leaves open the option of real-
identity and real identity theory rather than having to simply settle for property dualism.  The 
difference between the two is that property dualism views the different properties as being 
metaphysically distinct and separate.  Instead, real identity theory does not see the different 
levels to be descriptions of independently existing separate features, where the higher level 
feature must be explained in terms of the lower level feature.  Rather, “experience” and 
“neuronal activity” are viewed as differing ways of picking out one and the same 
phenomenon.   
Clarification of real identity theory as giving no priority to one description over another: Let 
me be clear about what a real identity theory regarding the relationship between experiences 
and brain states amounts to.  The problems arise because of two appearances; the mental 
appearance of felt experiences and the physical appearances of neuronal activity in brains. A 
real identity theory based on real-identity is an attempt to say that both of those 
appearances, the experience and the neuronal activity, are equally of the phenomenon, and 
neither is more fundamental or essential than the other.  I take this to be in contrast to the 
privileging-identity claims that experiences are “nothing but” neuronal activity in our brains 
upheld by traditional mind-brain identity theorists.  So real identity theory is not only merely 
saying that there is one phenomenon with two different appearances or terms which pick it 
out, it is also saying that these appearances that we are tempted to ascribe separately to two 
phenomena both belong, and equally so, to the one phenomenon with no priority of one over 
the other.  This is the real-identity part of real identity theory coming to the fore, because 
other relations are asymmetrical, such as realisation where the instantiation of one property is 
sufficient for the instantiation of another, but not the other way around, but real-identity is 
symmetrical in comparison.  As Levine puts it, relations like realization involve ‘metaphysical 
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necessitation, but only in one direction’ but with identity ‘the metaphysical necessitation goes 
in both directions’.30 
How real identity theory compares to privileging mind-brain identity theory: A particular token 
brain process in a subject’s brain, one which is going on when they are undergoing an 
experience, falls both under the type “being an experience” and the type “being a pattern of 
neuronal activity”.  Early identity theorists, such as Smart, proposed that the mental 
description be topic neutral and, therefore, avoiding any reference to exclusively mental 
features.  This is clearly a privileging of the physical description over the mental.  More recent 
identity theorists could accept that the mental and physical description are equally real 
descriptions of the brain state, but would still want to ontologically privilege the physical 
description as the most fundamental.  In contrast, with real identity theory, not only are both 
descriptions of the token brain state, the one coming under type “experience” and the one 
coming under type “neuronal activity”, equally picking out the phenomenon, but there is no 
privileging going on as to which of those two descriptions reveals an aspect which more 
essential or fundamental. 
Idealists could also make identity claims based on privileging-identity: Note here that I have 
focused on reductive physicalist theories, but the charge of using privileging-identity could 
equally apply to an idealist who privileges the mental over the physical.  The idealist could 
make the same mistake as the physicalist but in the opposite direction; instead of claiming an 
identity between physical and mental and then making the extra claim that the mental was 
“nothing but” the physical, the idealist might claim the identity between mental and physical, 
yet make the extra claim that the physical was “nothing but” the mental.  Both positions are 
equally based on privileging-identity and sneak a reductive privileging into their picture of the 
mind-brain relation.  Such privileging is not part of real-identity, which is always a purely 
neutral relation. 
Multiple realisability and real identity as a token identity theory: Multiple realisability is an 
idea which originally threatened the early type identity theories which claimed identity 
between mental types and physical types, for example “pain” and “c-fibre stimulation”.  The 
argument against type identity rests on the belief that any mental kind can be instantiated in a 
variety of different physical ways.  For example, there are multiple ways that “pain” can be 
realised, so the argument goes, c-fibre excitation in humans, perhaps o-fibre excitation in 
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octopuses, or the excitation of a particular type of goo in aliens.  As Fodor puts it using an 
example outside philosophy of mind; ‘some monetary exchanges involve strings of wampum. 
Some involve dollar bills.  And some involve signing one’s name to a check’.31  Fodor adds that 
‘the reasons why economics is unlikely to reduce to physics are paralleled by those which 
suggest that psychology is unlikely to reduce to neurology’.32  By this he is referring to the fact 
that in relation to experiences, it does not matter what the different ways a type can be 
realised are, just that there are different ways, just as monetary exchanges can be realised in 
different ways.  This is because it is multiple realisability which, if true, contradicts the type 
identity theorist’s claim that mental types are identical to single physical types.  Real identity 
theory accepts the consequences of the multiple realisability of mental types, and hence is a 
version of token identity theory claiming identity for particular mental tokens rather than 
types. 
In summary: Traditional mind-brain identity theory, based on privileging-identity, privileges 
the physical over the mental, reducing the mental to “nothing but” physical goings-on.  Real 
identity theory is even-handed and non-judgemental towards the two ways of understanding 
the one phenomenon.  It is not that there are these funny experiential goings on and they 
must be captured in other, different, physical terms.  There is just an acceptance that the 
token brain states that are occurring when a subject undergoes an experience come under 
both the type “neuronal activity” and the type “experience”, and they do so equally, with 
neither being more essential or fundamental than the other.  As such, they should be included 
in our full understanding of reality.  So unlike the traditional mind-brain identity theorists, 
there’s no need to say that experiences are really neuronal processes or in any other way try 
to reinterpret experiences as non-subjective physical phenomena.  With real identity theory, 
the feature of phenomenality does not have to be explained away in non-phenomenal, 
neurophysiological terms.  Experiences just are what they are, and experience-talk is a way of 
picking out a phenomenon which is equally picked out by talk of occurrences of neuronal 
activity in the subject’s brain.  Real identity theory simply accepts that as well as the objective 
physical way of referring to experiential phenomena, there is also the route of picking 
conscious experiences out by how they feel for the subject undergoing them. 
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b) Strawson’s views are an example of real identity theory 
Strawson accepts experiences as physical features of the world:  Strawson’s notion of real 
physicalism includes experiences as real features of the world, which are irreducibly 
subjective, yet still physical.  He views experiences as physical features of the world, just like 
other non-experiential features, and feels confident that there is no reason to reduce away or 
explain away the subjective, mental features in non-mental or objective terms; 
‘Does one really have good reason to think that the phenomenon of 
consciousness or experience is not a physical thing, strictly on a par 
with the phenomena of mass and extension as apprehended by 
physics? I think not.’33 
Experiences as physical phenomena in the world with their own subjective features: 
Strawson’s real physicalism is a view of the world that encompasses a monistic tendency that 
all existents are made from one fundamental type of stuff.  The fundamentals might be 
quarks, superstrings or some other type of fundamental particle yet to be discovered.  Real 
physicalism includes the acceptance that experiences just are physical features and yet also 
have irreducible subjective, first-personal features: ‘experience is necessarily experience for – 
for someone or something’.34  
Strawson and real-identity can accept subjective experiences as part of the world without 
needing to reduce them: The traditional, reductive mind-brain identity theorist working with 
privileging-identity feels the need to see experiential phenomena as physical phenomena, 
which in their eyes makes them less problematic and able to fit into a physical picture of the 
world.  In contrast, Strawson simply accepts subjective features of reality in their own right 
without an accompanying desire to reduce them to objective features or explain them away in 
objective terms.  This might be very difficult for a physicalistic privileging-identity theorist to 
accept, but Strawson believes that; 
‘The truth is that we have no good reason to think that we know 
anything about the physical that gives us any reason to find any 
problem in the idea that mental or experiential phenomena are 
physical phenomena.’35 
Both Strawson and real identity theory insist on not privileging either mental or physical but 
simply accepting the reality of both: I believe Strawson’s relaxed acceptance of subjective 
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experiences into a physical view of the world parallels the non-privileging aspect of real-
identity.  Whereas the traditional mind-brain identity theorist’s position reduces the 
experiential to the physical, Strawson’s real physicalism accepts both the physical nature of 
experiences and the experiential nature of certain physical configurations of neuronal activity 
in the brain.36  This mirrors the way that real-identity sees the physical brain state description 
and the experiential description as equally co-referring to the same phenomenon, resisting 
any privileging move where one way of picking out the phenomenon is seen as more basic or 
more revealing of the phenomenon’s true nature.  As Strawson puts it, referring to physical 
stuff, ‘when you put it together in the way in which it is put together in brains like ours, it 
regularly constitutes – is, literally is – experience like ours’.37  It is not that the physical brain 
state is the real feature and another secondary way of describing it is via our vocabulary of 
experiences.  It is a view where experiential descriptions and physical brain state descriptions 
are irreconcilably different ways of understanding the same aspect of reality, just as happens 
in real-identity. 
In the past two sections I have explored real-identity in more detail, focussing on how it does 
not privilege either of the relevant different ways to pick one phenomenon out over the other.  
I will now apply the ideas that I have established of real-identity and real identity theory to 
Searle’s Biological Naturalism so as to ascertain whether or not Biological Naturalism is really a 
form of identity theory. 
6. Why Searle’s Biological Naturalism should not be seen as a 
form of traditional privileging identity theory 
In the previous chapter I looked at whether Searle should be interpreted as a property dualist.  
I concluded that he should not, based on how Searle and the property dualist disagree on the 
meaning of “irreducible” when applied to experiences.  The property dualist’s position 
includes a metaphysical gulf between mental and physical at its core, but Searle 
wholeheartedly denies such a picture, wanting to maintain that experiences are just part of 
the ordinary physical world like everything else.  In this section I will look at the reasons why, 
contrary to some of his critics, I think Searle should not be interpreted as a traditional 
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reductive identity theorist, using the privileging-identity conception of identity, because of his 
insistence on the irreducibility of experiences and their essentially first-person ontology. 
Searle does not feel the need to reduce mental features to physical ones in order to make 
them fit into his view of what physical is: As I showed above, reducing mental phenomena to 
physical ones is part of the driving force of mind-brain identity theory.  Smart talked of a 
desire not to involve anything ‘irreducibly psychical’38 and Place of ‘eliminating mental events 
and mental processes as a separate class of events’.39  More recent identity theorists might 
talk of trying to naturalise experiences, to capture them in physical terms as a way to tackle 
the problem of fitting seemingly subjective phenomena into what they see as an otherwise 
wholly objective world picture.  However, this is at odds with Searle’s treatment of mental 
experiences as irreducible to objective physical states; ‘Conscious states…are real parts of the 
real world and cannot be eliminated or reduced to something else’.40  In fact, Searle 
recognises that the idea of accepting subjective phenomena as features of reality in their own 
right, ‘does not give the materialists what they wanted’,41 in other words, a reduction of 
mental to physical.  This is one way that Searle is at odds with the traditional mind-brain 
identity theorists who base their approach on privileging-identity.   
First-person ontology and the acceptance of irreducibly subjective features of physical reality 
is contrary to the ideas of traditional mind-brain identity theory: Another feature of Searle’s 
Biological Naturalism that is contrary to traditional mind-brain identity is his belief in the first-
person ontology of experiences.  First-person ontology contrasts with the idea I outlined 
above, of the physicalist project of incorporating experiences into a physicalist view of the 
world, by explaining away the problematic subjective features as really just some sort of 
objective physical feature.  Explaining away subjective experiences by seeing them as 
objective physical features is the antithesis of Searle’s project, and directly contradicts his 
assertion that experiences have a first-person ontology.  What Searle wants to get across with 
his first-person ontology is similar to Strawson’s insistence I covered above, that experiences 
are real features of the physical world, yet nevertheless are subjective.  It also reflects Nagel’s 
concerns that you cannot eradicate the subjective perspectival nature of experiences without 
somehow eradicating the experience itself.  Such a view could not be more fundamentally 
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different from the traditional mind-brain identity theorist’s aims when using privileging-
identity to understand what experiences are. 
Not only do I think there are strong reasons to resist an equation of Searle’s Biological 
Naturalism with traditional, privileging-identity based mind-brain identity theory, I also think 
there are many reasons why Searle’s work should be interpreted as a form of real identity 
theory.  It is to these reasons that I now turn.  First focusing on Searle’s insistence that reality 
is not wholly objective, I then move onto Searle’s discussion of different levels of description 
for single systems. 
7. Why Searle’s Biological Naturalism should be seen as a form 
of real identity theory 
In this section, having set out my ideas on real-identity and real identity theory, I will assess 
whether Searle’s Biological Naturalism should be interpreted as a form of identity theory.  I 
will first draw links between real identity theory and Biological Naturalism by exploring their 
common view that reality is not wholly objective. Next, I will look at the links between 
Howell’s subjective physicalism, real identity theory and Searle’s Biological Naturalism.  I hope 
that such a comparison will help focus our understanding of Searle’s position.  I will then 
conclude that the most consistent and accurate way to interpret Searle’s theory of Biological 
Naturalism is as a version of real identity theory. 
a) Searle believes that physical reality is not exclusively objective 
A belief in a wholly objective reality forces the need to reduce mental features to physical 
ones: Including irreducibly subjective, first-personal features into your view of the world is the 
antithesis of the traditional mind-brain identity theorist’s assumption that reality is objective, 
in that its features are not dependent upon any particular subject’s point of view.  As Howell 
phrases it, ‘too often “objective” is used as a synonym of “real” thus leaving “subjective” a 
mark of ontological deficiency.’42  The corresponding claim that any real feature of the world is 
actually an objective physical feature, meant in a reductive sense of “actually” and an 
objective-only sense of “physical”, results in a need to explain mental phenomena in physical 
terms, or reduce experiential properties down to physical properties.  This view, were it to be 
real, is considered to be objective, is described by Nagel thus; 
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‘Objectivity is naturally linked with reality; it is easy to feel that 
anything has to be located in the objective world in order to qualify 
as real, and that it must have as its real nature some character 
which, whether physical or not, can be regarded impersonally and 
externally.’43 
Searle strongly resists such a reductive desire: Searle could not disagree more with this 
reductive, objectifying desire inherent in traditional mind-brain identity theory.  He says that 
‘ontologically, the claim that all of reality is objective is, neurobiologically speaking, simply 
false’.44  In fact, he openly criticises the view of reality as objective and third-personal, that the 
traditional mind-brain identity theorist, like Smart, holds; 
‘The conception of the mental employed by the tradition is 
misconceived from the beginning, for it is essentially an objective, 
third-person conception.  The tradition tries to study the mind as if it 
consisted of neutral phenomena, independent of consciousness and 
subjectivity.  But such an approach leaves out the crucial features 
that distinguish mental from nonmental.’45 
Howell agrees that the traditional mind-brain identity theorist’s aim to mould experiences into 
purely physical features, meaning objective features, is problematic.  He complains that, ‘too 
often “objective” is used as a synonym of “real” thus leaving “subjective” a mark of 
ontological deficiency’.46  Searle’s position seems sympathetic to Howell’s concerns, for he 
gives great importance to accepting experiences in their own right as experiential qualitative 
features within a view of what exists in the world.  Searle believes that ‘the ultimate absurdity 
is to try and treat consciousness itself independently of consciousness, that is, to treat it solely 
form a third-person point of view’.47  I think that by this, Searle is referring to a view where the 
brain state occurring when a subject undergoes an experience is seen as what the experience 
is, to the exclusion of the phenomenal feel that the subject experiences.  They are, for Searle 
both equal aspects of what an experience is and therefore just as much part of the ontological 
makeup of the world.  He says, 
‘On my view, consciousness does not need naturalizing: It already is 
part of nature and it is part of nature as the subjective, qualitative 
biological part.’48 
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Subjective mental features can be either separated from physical features or accepted as part 
of physical features: When trying to fit seemingly subjective features of reality into a 
seemingly otherwise objective world, I think there are two alternatives.  One option is to split 
subjective features from objective features, and hold onto a view that whatever exists is 
objective.  This forces the move of trying to objectify the supposedly subjective features so 
that they can fit into the objective world view.  As Levine describes this situation; ‘what the 
physicalist needs to maintain is that having a certain qualitative character is a physical or 
functional property.’49  The other option is to accept that when it seems that there are 
subjective features of reality, there really are, but try to accommodate them into your physical 
view of the world by accepting that not everything in physical reality is in fact objective.  It is 
this sort of approach that leads to a view where experiences are seen as physical, but also 
subjective, with the implication that one must simply accept that some physical phenomena 
have subjective features.  As Searle says, 
‘It seems to me we can treat one and the same event as having both 
neurobiological features and phenomenological features.  One and 
the same events is a sequence of neuron firings and is also painful’50 
51  
Other support for the view that not all of reality is objective: I can see the second option of 
accepting subjective features as part of the physical world echoed in Strawson’s real 
physicalism, in the non-privileging basis of real identity theory and in Searle’s Biological 
Naturalism.  As Searle puts it, ‘I believe you can consistently accept physics and chemistry, 
while also accepting that the world contains subjective, qualitative, first person, mental 
phenomena’.52  Howell also concurs with this view that not all of reality is objective, when he 
states that ‘there is something about minds that cannot be fully understood from “the 
outside”’.53  This echoes both Nagel’s point about the importance of the first-personal point of 
view and Searle’s insistence that experiences have a first-person ontology. 
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I have considered similarities between Searle’s Biological Naturalism and the real identity 
theory in the way that they approach subjective features in a supposedly wholly objective 
reality.  I will now turn to Searle’s use of differing levels of description as an additional reason 
why Searle should be seen as a real identity theorist. 
b) Howell’s different aspects, real identity theory’s different terms 
for picking out a brain state and Searle’s different levels of 
description 
One token brain state with two ways of picking it out: Real identity theory involves a particular 
token brain state occurring in a subject’s brain when they’re undergoing an experience.  That 
brain state comes under both the type “experience” and the type “neuronal activity”.  These 
two different ways of picking out the brain state do not correspond to separate properties of 
the brain state, an experiential property and a neuronal property.  If they did then real 
identity theory would of course simply be a form of property dualism.  What then are these 
two ways of picking out a brain state?   
Howell’s notion of different aspects: Howell’s theory of Subjective Physicalism similarly 
proposes a single brain state with what he refers to as two different “aspects”, which he 
clearly states, ‘are not themselves properties, but are instead part of the nature of properties 
that are not expressible by physical description’.54  This means that for Howell; 
‘Subjective physicalism does not, therefore, recognize a distinct set 
of properties that correspond to qualia...There are, to be sure, 
aspects of states and properties that are subjective, and these 
roughly correspond to qualia…But unlike qualia traditionally 
conceived, the subjective aspects of certain physical properties do 
not enjoy independent metaphysical status. They cannot be a source 
of difference between objects, and they cannot become detached 
from the property of which they are aspects.’55 
So just as real identity theory posits a token brain state occurring in a subject which falls under 
two different types, which can be picked out in two different ways, Subjective Physicalism 
holds that ‘when a subject is undergoing a conscious experience he occupies a state with two 
“aspects”, a subjective aspect and an objective aspect’.56   
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What are Howell’s different “aspects” if not different properties?  Howell seems to see them 
as conceptual features of a brain property, akin to the idea of the front half and the back half 
of a sphere being aspects of the sphere.  He states that, 
‘Real parts are parts that can be separated spatially from one 
another. Conceptual parts are parts that can be separated “in mind 
only:” the mind can attend to them and distinguish between them, 
but in fact they constitute a basic physical unity.’57 
This means that Howell sees aspects as individuated conceptually by how we think about 
them, or conceptualise them.  Because Howell holds an extensional view of properties, he 
does not therefore see the different aspects as being different properties, and hence the 
aspects are not different metaphysical phenomena in their own right, but merely “aspects” of 
the brain state in question.  As Howell puts it, ‘aspects are intensionally individuated while 
properties are not.  As merely conceptual parts of the properties, they do not have 
individuation conditions that are purely metaphysical.’58  So for Howell, any particular brain 
state which is instantiated when a subject has an experience can have different aspects, that is 
to say different ‘features of the properties that the mind can discern’59 which are not, 
however, separable from the whole of which they are a “part”’;60 ‘they cannot become 
detached from the property of which they are aspects’.61  Specifically relating to brain states 
that occur when a subject is undergoing a conscious experience, he believes that ‘the 
subjective aspect cannot exist without the physical aspect and vice versa,’62 that ‘they are 
metaphysically dependent on the properties of which they are conceptual parts’.63 
Comparing Howell to real identity theory to Biological naturalism:  I find Howell’s position very 
similar to that of real identity theory in that for any particular brain state undergone by a 
subject, that brain state has two different aspects, as Howell calls them.  He sees them as 
relating to the experiential aspect of the brain state and the physical aspect.  This directly 
parallels the two ways of picking out the brain state that real identity theory involves, one 
experiential, one neuronal.  I also think that this mirrors Searle’s notion of different levels of 
description, that is, different ways of picking out a particular token brain state.   
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Searle’s different levels of description are different ways of describing a single system: In 
chapter 3 I explored in depth Searle’s idea of different levels of description, where any 
particular phenomenon can be grasped in a number of different ways.  For example, a table, 
at a time, can be described as a collection of molecules tightly bound in a stiff lattice structure 
in particular configuration XYZ or it can be described by saying it is a piece of furniture which 
supports objects put on its top, and has multiple legs for holding up the top.  The first 
description is given at the level of molecules, the second at the level of household items.  As 
Searle puts it, 
‘Any complex system can be described in different ways.  Thus, for 
example, a car engine can be characterized in terms of its molecular 
structure, in terms of its gross physical shape, in terms of its 
component parts, etc.  It is tempting to describe this variability of 
descriptive possibilities in terms of the metaphor of “levels,” and this 
terminology has become generally accepted.  We think of the 
microlevel of molecules as a lower level of description than the level 
of gross physical structure of physical components, which are higher 
levels of descriptions.’64 
Levels of description and brain states: Regarding the relationship between experiences and 
the brain, Searle takes it to be the case that ‘because mental states are features of the brain, 
they have two levels of description – a higher level in mental terms, and a lower level in 
physiological terms’.65  An important point to be clear about is that Searle does not see the 
different descriptions, at different levels, as ‘competing or distinct, but rather different levels 
within a single unified causal system’.66  I think this exactly mirrors both Howell’s view that his 
different aspects of a brain state ‘do not enjoy independent metaphysical status’67 and real 
identity theory’s belief that the two ways of picking out the particular brain state, the two 
types it comes under, are not competing to be the most fundamental or essential, but instead 
simply accepted as both equally valid, real and relevant facets of the brain state.   
Different levels of description are not metaphysically mysterious:  Searle insists that ‘the fact 
that the brain has different levels of description is no more mysterious than that any other 
physical system has different levels of description’.68  He describes it like this, 
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‘We can describe my arm going up at the level of the conscious 
intention-in-action to raise my arm, and the corresponding bodily 
movement, or we can describe it at the level of neuron firings and 
synapses and the secretion of acetylcholene at the axon endplates of 
my motor neurons, just as we can describe the operation of the car 
engine at the level of piston cylinders and spark plugs firing, or we 
can describe it at the level of the oxidization of hydrocarbon 
molecules and the action of metal alloys. In both the case of the 
brain and the case of the car engine, these are not separate causal 
structures; it is a single causal structure described at different 
levels.’69 
What this actually amounts to is a picture where a single system can be described in a number 
of different ways, at different levels.  Searle could have painted a picture where the 
neurobiological property of a brain state was seen as a distinct entity or property from the 
experiential one.  This would have separated brain states from experiences in a metaphysically 
fundamental way.  Such a separation of mental and physical is evident in both traditional 
mind-brain identity theory, which sees the mental properties as needing to be reduced to the 
physical ones, and in property dualism where the mental properties are embraced as 
fundamentally distinct from the physical properties.  In effect, they both consider mental and 
physical to be, on the face of it, fundamentally different properties or features,70 which 
therefore need reconciling.  In contrast, Searle is clear that for him, conscious states in the 
brain are fundamentally no different from any other feature of our bodies; ‘consciousness is a 
system-level, biological feature in much the same way that digestion, or growth, or the 
secretion of bile are system level, biological features’.71  This echoes the way that real identity 
theory finds it unproblematic that any particular feature of the world will be describable in a 
multitude of different ways, and Howell’s view that a brain state can have different aspects, 
one of which is experiential, without there being different properties, or creating a 
metaphysical divide.   
c) Addressing a concern: How can Searle be an identity theorist 
when he claims experiences are ontologically irreducible? 
Aren’t identity and irreducibility mutually exclusive?  In the previous sub-sections I have been 
highlighting the parallels between Biological Naturalism and real identity theory.  I would like, 
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at this point, to answer a concern that might arise, as I think it will aid in understanding 
Searle’s position.  Someone could ask; 
How can Searle’s Biological Naturalism be a form of identity theory 
when he also claims that experiences are ontologically irreducible? 
The triviality of Searle’s irreducibility claim leaves no metaphysical gap between mental and 
physical: In responding to this concern I would first point to the conclusion of the previous 
chapter, that although Searle uses the terminology of “irreducible” he does not mean it in the 
same weighty sense that the property dualist does, to denote a metaphysical divide between 
mental and physical properties.  Searle accompanies his irreducibility claim with the 
acknowledgement that experiences are only “trivially” irreducible, which means that for 
Searle they are reducible merely because of our use of the process of reduction.  Therefore, in 
Searle’s eyes, the irreducibility of experiences does not result in a metaphysical gulf between 
mental and physical of the sort that would rule out any claim of identity. In fact, the triviality 
of the irreducibility claim could be seen as supporting the general framework in which an 
identity claim can be made; for Searle’s trivial style of irreducibility keeps experiences as 
features of the world alongside neuronal states or brain states, in that no metaphysical divide 
between mental features and physical features opens up in light of Searle’s irreducibility 
claim. 
Irreducibility is seen as incompatible with an identity claim: However, this still leaves the 
concern that admitting any irreducible features of the world rules out an identity claim.  
Indeed, Searle describes just such a situation where for many philosophers, he believes that, 
‘they think that to grant the reality of irreducibility of consciousness 
and other mental phenomena commits one to some form of 
Cartesianism, and they do not see how such a view can be made 
consistent with our overall scientific world picture’72 
The concern I have raised assumes that admitting of irreducible mental features in the world 
rules out an identity claim, because if experiences are ontologically irreducible, then they are 
metaphysically separated off from physical features.  The other side of this coin is the desire 
to reduce mental features which might appear to be ontologically irreducible, so that they 
become unproblematically “physical”.  The problem occurs because identity is usually taken to 
include a reductive, privileging element, and hence is obviously incompatible with an 
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irreducibility claim.  Searle expresses the idea when he discusses the identity theory 
approaches to the mind-body problem, stating that  
‘Either materialism of the identity variety leaves out the mind or it 
does not; if it does, it is false; if it does not, it is not materialism.’73 
Emphasising that real identity theory does not include any reduction: It is important to 
emphasise again that real identity theory is non-reductive in that it does not include any 
additional privileging claim on top of the claim of identity.  So whilst some, including Searle, 
take identity theory to be inherently reductive, I deny that it has to be this way and propose 
real-identity theory as an alternative to the identity-plus-reduction forms of identity theory.  
Given that real identity theory is a token identity claim that for any particular brain process 
going on in a subject when they undergo an experience, the token brain state can come under 
two types, “experience” and “neuronal state”, there is no tension in claiming that a particular 
token experience is irreducible to, yet also identical to a particular brain state in the subject 
undergoing the experience.  This is because of real identity theory’s non-privileging approach 
to the two ways of picking out the brain state; they are seen as equally referring to the brain 
state, yet not reducible, one to the other, in either direction.  This means that the trivial form 
of irreducibility that Searle adopts is no barrier to a claim of identity in the real identity theory 
sense.   
Irreducible, yet identical: Real identity theory can accept that an experience has an irreducibly 
phenomenal, mental description, yet is also identical to a brain state in that the mental 
description equally refers to the brain state alongside the physical description.  Searle seems 
to fully support the identity side of identity theory, but vehemently disagree with the 
reductive, privileging aspect.  As he puts it,  
‘In one way it seems to me that…the identity theory is absolutely 
right and could hardly be false.  However, historically the identity 
theorists that I know, with very few exceptions, had a reductionist 
motive.  They wanted to get rid of subjectivity.  They wanted to say 
that consciousness is nothing but neurobiological states of the brain 
neurobiologically described in third person terms.  I have argued in 
this article that we know independently that that claim is false.74 
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Given that Searle seems to feel an intuitive pull towards identity theory but is strongly 
repelled by its reductive nature, I think real identity theory is the best way to make sense of 
Searle’s claims within Biological Naturalism.   
8. Conclusion 
I have split this chapter into two main parts.  In the sections 2-5 I set out to divorce the 
identity relation from reductionism.  I started by showing how traditional mind-brain identity 
theory meshes together reduction and identity as being intertwined, even inseparable.  Taking 
identity as the metaphysical claim that something is identical with itself, real identity theory 
describes a situation where one phenomenon can be picked out in two different, equally 
illuminating ways, which are not reducible to one another.  I then argued that identity does 
not, in fact, inherently include any notion of reducing one way to another, and that any such 
privileging is an addition to identity theory on top of the actual identity.  I introduced a split 
terminology to deal with the two different forms of identity relation; privileging-identity for 
the type used by traditional mind-brain identity theorists, and real-identity meant as pure 
identity with no accompanying reductionism.  I developed this into a real identity theory, 
which is based on the identity relation but does not privilege the mental over the physical, like 
traditional mind-brain identity theory does.   
Having reclaimed identity from any additional privileging or reduction, sections 6 and 7 were 
devoted to showing how this newly reclaimed non-privileging notion of real identity theory is 
the best way to make sense of the different features of Searle’s Biological Naturalism.  First, I 
set out the differences between Searle’s position and that of the traditional, reductive identity 
theorist, to put distance between the two.  Next, I explored the ways in which Biological 
Naturalism is similar to real identity theory, by looking at Searle’s insistence that reality is not 
wholly objective and how his ideas about levels of description can be seen to echo both 
Howell’s position and that of real identity theory.  Lastly, I addressed a possible concern that 
any irreducibility claim would automatically rule out any claim of identity.  Searle claims that 
experiences are ontologically irreducible, yet he also claims that experiences are just states 
that the brain can be in.   Real identity theory can account for both of these claims together, 
which have been such a source of confusion for philosophers trying to understand Searle’s 
position.  Therefore, I strongly believe that real identity theory is the best possible way to 
make sense of Searle’s Biological Naturalism. 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
1. Summary of chapters 
I began this dissertation by highlighting the confusion that Searle’s Biological Naturalism has 
caused among philosophers trying to understand him.  Given that Searle claims to have 
created a unique approach to the mind-body problem, which lies in between physicalism and 
dualism, I agree with Nagel that ‘if this view could be clarified in a way that distinguished it 
from the alternatives, it would be a major addition to the possible answers to the mind-body 
problem’.1  This is why I consider that my endeavour to make sense of Searle’s Biological 
Naturalism is an important one. 
Chapter 2 emphasized the vast array of difficulties that philosophers have in understanding 
Searle’s position.  General critique of Searle included replacing the subjective/objective 
dichotomy with the parallel first-person/third-person dichotomy, to misconstruing both the 
property dualism and physicalism that he rejects, to redefining “physical” to simply include 
subjective, which critics saw as a merely linguistic move.  Specific criticism of facets of 
Biological Naturalism included a concern that Searle had not created a theory which could 
deal with the problem of mental causation, confusion over exactly what was “causal” about 
causal reduction and worry about the triviality of Searle’s irreducibility claim.  There is also 
criticism about how to interpret what Searle claims in Biological Naturalism, with some 
believing it to be tantamount to property dualism, others finding it akin to identity theory. 
Chapter 2 concluded by drawing out what I considered to be the main barriers to making 
sense of Biological Naturalism, of all the separate criticisms.  These became the basis for the 
following chapters.  My aim was to gradually break down the obstacles that prevented a clear 
understanding of Searle’s position, thereby diagnosing the areas of tension in his theory with a 
view to reaching a coherent interpretation of Searle’s intentions. 
I began by tackling Searle’s notion of first-person ontology in chapter 3.  The name may be 
unique but I found Searle to be expressing ideas inspired by other philosophers such as Nagel, 
Jackson and Kripke.  After analysing what first-person ontology might mean, I concluded that 
Searle was expressing the dual claim that experiences are essentially subjective, in that they 
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are tied to a specific subject’s point of view on the world, as well as essentially qualitative, in 
that it feels a certain way for any subject to undergo an experience.  I concluded my discussion 
of first-person ontology by stressing how first-person ontology creates a problematic tension 
within Biological Naturalism.  The conflict arises from first-person ontology being the kind of 
claim which dualists classically make about the special nature of experiences, whilst other 
areas of Searle’s theory, such as his claim of causal reduction, seem to be akin to the claims 
made by physicalists.  I therefore turned my attention to making sense of causal reduction and 
Searle’s talk of levels of description so that I could ascertain if there was a way to dispel this 
tension that I had identified with first-person ontology. 
I constructed an ontological wish list on Searle’s behalf which detailed all the different 
features of an ontological view which Searle appeared to want to include, which helped the 
apparent contradictions came to the fore.   It could be clearly seen that Searle wanted 
experiences to be simply a state the brain can be in, yet also based in differing levels of 
description of a single feature of the brain.  Searle proposes that experiences are causally 
efficacious, yet also denies that they have any specifically mental causal powers of their own.  
Finally, Searle claims that experiences are both caused by, and yet also realised in the brain.  
The remainder of chapter 4 was spent trying to deal with each of these issues in turn with the 
purpose of reconciling these apparent contradictions. 
Searle’s view of levels of description was discussed, and I detailed my belief that Searle is not 
referring to different metaphysical levels which have their own independent properties.  
Instead, I believe he is referring to particular token brain states falling under different types, 
all of which equally pick out the token brain state in question.  I looked at the way that Searle 
seems to individuate properties extensionally, which added weight to my view of Searle as 
positing differing ways of picking out a brain state, rather than differing properties of the brain 
state. 
I proceeded to focus on the problem of mental causation as a conduit for elucidating Searle’s 
view of the causal efficacy of experiences, and determining if that is in conflict with his claim 
that experiences have no causal powers above and beyond those of the neuronal activity in 
our brains.  I concluded that because Searle views experiences as a state the brain can be in, 
with different types under which the token brain state can be picked out, there is only a single 
set of causal powers of the token brain state in question.  These causal powers can be 
characterised either experientially or neuronally, but there remains just a single causal 
sequence for any instance of mental causation.  In this way, Searle’s claim that experiences 
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are causally efficacious does not conflict with his claim that experiences have no causal 
powers specifically of their own, over and above any of those identified to be at the neuronal 
level.  Proceeding to consider Searle’s claim that experiences are both caused by and realised 
in the brain, I found his simultaneous style of causation to be atypical, with cause not robustly 
separated from effect in the way required by standard causation.  This was in contrast to the 
typical use of realisation as a metaphysical relation where a type is instantiated by a particular 
token.  I concluded that when Searle says that experiences are both caused by and realised in 
the brain, this is tantamount to the claim that they are simply realised by the brain.  This 
dissolves the apparent tension. 
In chapters 5 and 6 I turned my attention to the criticisms made of Searle that Biological 
Naturalism was not the unique position he claims it to be, but instead a form of either 
property dualism or identity theory.  Taking property dualism first, I looked at what that 
doctrine involved, finding the claim of irreducibility, that is, experiences being something over 
and above physical brain features, to be at its core.  I then contrasted the property dualist’s 
view of irreducibility with Searle’s and found that because Searle sees the irreducibility as a 
simple consequence of the way we define and use reduction, rather than the metaphysically 
more weighty concept employed by the property dualist, an interpretation of Biological 
Naturalism as a form of property dualism was unwarranted.  I concluded chapter 5 with a 
discussion of whether Searle was entitled to hold such a view of irreducibility, given his other 
claims in Biological Naturalism.  Specifically, I wanted to deal with the tension that exists 
between claiming that experiences have a first-person ontology, which I previously showed to 
be a similar claim to the standard dualist line, whilst also downgrading his irreducibility claim 
to something clearly distinct from, and less metaphysically substantial, than that of the 
property dualist.  I employed the work of Howell and his notion that experiences need to be 
instantiated in order to be fully grasped to help explain how Searle deals with the difficult 
problem of fitting together first-personal experiences and third-personal brain states.  I 
concluded that Searle is claiming that experiences just are certain brain states, with the 
proviso that they have to be instantiated in a subject in order for the experience to be grasped 
experientially by that subject.  The idea that token experiences are just a particular way the 
brain is at a given time naturally leads onto the charge against Searle that he is some kind of 
identity theorist. 
When considering whether Searle’s Biological Naturalism is tantamount to identity theory, I 
thought it was very important to be clear exactly what identity theory does, and does not, 
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entail.  I developed a view of identity, real identity, which does not include the reductive 
privileging which I believe to be inherent in traditional identity theory.  My subsequent 
development of real identity theory was one of a neutral identity claim without any attached 
reduction.  Having established what identity amounts to, I turned to Searle’s theory and 
concluded that because of his vehement rejection of reductive approaches to experiences and 
his belief that they have a specifically first-person ontology, Biological Naturalism cannot be a 
form of traditional identity theory.  However, when I compared Searle’s position to that of real 
identity I found that substantial parallels could be drawn, such as reality not being exclusively 
objective.  Looking again at Howell’s theory of subjective physicalism, I compared Howell’s 
idea of different aspects of properties to Searle’s differing levels of description, that is, 
different ways of picking out a particular token brain state.  I concluded that Biological 
Naturalism both can, and should, be seen as a form of real identity theory. 
In order to consolidate this interpretation of Searle, I will revisit the original barriers to making 
sense of Biological Naturalism that I set out in chapter 2.  In light of all the subsequent 
chapters I will set out the reasons I believe they should no longer be seen as obstacles, 
concluding that Searle’s position is coherent.   
2. Revisiting the barriers to making sense of Searle’s Biological 
Naturalism 
In order to show how my discussions have achieved my aim of making sense of Biological 
Naturalism, I will look again at the obstacles that many of Searle’s readers find prevent them 
from fully understanding his position.  In light of the work done in previous chapters I will now 
give my response to each of the worries. 
a) Ontological irreducibility and first-person ontology, but the 
irreducibility is trivial 
Searle’s ontological irreducibility claim, although using the same language as that of the 
property dualist, is not of the same metaphysically substantive variety.  By claiming that 
experiences are ontologically irreducible the property dualist means that mental properties 
have features which fundamentally exclude them from the physical realm.  The essential 
subjectivity and qualitative feel of experiences are considered by dualists to justify a 
metaphysical divide between mental and physical features of the world, seeing mental 
properties as over and above any physical properties of the brain.  This is completely contrary 
to Searle’s view of irreducibility as being a mere inapplicability of our notion of reduction to 
experiences because of his belief that you cannot separate off the appearances of experiences 
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from any underlying reality.  As Searle puts it, the ontological irreducibility of experiences is 
simply a ‘trivial consequence of our definitional practices’.2 
However, the problem that remains is that Searle appears to be making a substantive point 
about the essential nature of experiences on one hand, with his claim that they have a first-
person ontology, whilst on the other hand trying to avoid any substantial metaphysical 
consequences of a claim of irreducibility, with his construal of irreducibility as mere 
inapplicability.  I think that understanding first-person ontology as being underpinned by a 
brute assertion that some brain states just are experiential when instantiated by a subject, 
first-person ontology becomes demystified enough to match the downgraded sense of 
inapplicable irreducibility.  It becomes just the way things are, that certain brain states require 
being undergone by a subject in order for them to be fully grasped experientially by that 
subject, so almost by definition, they will not be able to be reduced to, that is said to be 
“nothing but”, objective properties which do not require any such instantiation for their 
nature to be fully understood.  This can be seen as the origin of Searle’s claim that ‘the 
characteristic mistake in the study of consciousness is to ignore its essential subjectivity and to 
try to treat it as if it were an objective third person phenomenon’3 and why he believes that ‘a 
complete description of the third-person objective features of the brain would not be a 
description of its first-person subjective features.’4  Searle’s irreducibility claim, based on his 
notion of first-person ontology, is a claim of irreducibility without the metaphysical baggage. 
b) Causal reduction and at the same time, ontological irreducibility 
In order to make sense of Searle’s notion of causal reduction, we must again return to the idea 
that certain token brain states, ones which are occurring when a subject has an experience, 
can be brought under at least two different types; “experience X” and “neuronal activity Y”.  
Causal reduction amounts to the claim that the causal powers of that brain state are equally 
described by the experiential way of picking the state out, or the neuronal way.  There is one 
set of causal powers, which can be picked out in two different ways. 
I set out how for Searle, reduction is a process of carving off the surface features, the 
appearances of a phenomenon, and redefining that phenomenon in terms of the underlying 
causal processes.  As I showed in the previous sub-section, Searle’s notion of ontological 
irreducibility amounts to the claim that given what the process of reduction is, at least as 
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Searle sees it, it is simply inapplicable to experiences.  This is because Searle believes both that 
the appearance of an experience cannot be separated from any underlying reality, and that 
experiences require instantiation by a particular subject, and are therefore tied to a particular 
subject’s point of view on the world.   
At first glance, causal reduction and ontological irreducibility seem to be in competition with 
each other, for on the standard use of the terminology, experiences are either reducible or 
irreducible; the two terms are mutually exclusive.  However, I think Searle’s position is more 
nuanced than this, because of his non-standard understanding of ontological irreducibility.  
Searle states that, 
‘The real contrast between such features as solidity and pains is that 
the causal reduction leads to an ontological reduction for physical 
features, but not for mental features. The first person ontology of 
mental reality makes it impossible to carry out the ontological 
reduction without losing the point of having the mental concepts’5  
I take this to mean that whereas the essential features of physical phenomena can be 
captured at the lower level, the essential features of experiences, their subjectivity and 
qualitative nature, cannot be fully grasped except from the first-person point of view of a 
subject undergoing that particular experiential brain state.  This picture is clearly not one 
where causal reduction and ontological irreducibility are polar opposite positions which are 
seen as mutually exclusive.   
c) Experiences are caused by, and realised in, the brain 
This problem arises because causation, as standardly used, involves separate phenomena 
ordered sequentially such that one causes the other, but realisation is a metaphysical relation 
where a certain type is realised by a particular token.  I believe this tension is one of the easier 
ones to dispel once Searle’s non-standard form of causation has been appreciated.   
Searle proposes that where experiences are concerned, causation refers to a bottom-up, non-
event style of causation where the lower-level features “cause” the higher level system level 
features simultaneously.  Searle puts it like this, 
‘Think of the solidity of the table.  It is explained causally by the 
behaviour of the molecules of which the table is composed.  But the 
solidity of the table is not an extra event; it is just a feature of the 
table.  Such examples of non-event causation give us appropriate 
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models for understanding the relation between my present state of 
consciousness and the underlying neurobiological processes that 
cause it.  Lower-level processes in the brain cause my present state 
of consciousness, but that state is not a separate entity from my 
brain; rather it is just a feature of my brain at the present time.’6 
Searle has expanded the notion of causation beyond two separate events ordered 
sequentially.  Non-event bottom up causation, as Searle puts it, seems very similar to the 
metaphysical instantiation that occurs in a realisation claim.  Just as the type solidity can be 
realised by the rigid molecular structure of this table, so Searle claims that the rigid molecular 
structure of this table “causes” the solidity.   
I therefore think that given Searle’s non-standard use of causation, which could be seen as 
tantamount to a realisation claim, to say that experiences are both caused by and realised in 
the brain translates to the claim that experiences are realised by, and realised by the brain, 
and hence the tension is dissolved. 
d) Mental causation, but experiences have no causal powers over 
and above those of the neuronal activity in the brain 
Searle’s view that experiences are particular token brain states, picked out under experiential 
or neuronal types is the key to understanding his solution to the problem of mental causation.  
A view of token identity like this will result in a single set of causal powers belonging to the 
brain state in question, which is occurring when a subject has a certain experience.  Just as the 
brain state can be picked out in at least two ways, neuronally and experientially, so can the 
causal powers be.  This means that there are not two sets of causal powers competing for 
which one caused a mental experience, which is the premise of the problem of mental 
causation.  Overdetermination is not a problem, again for the reason that there are not 
separate mental and physical causes, just one set of causal powers differently described.  
Neither is epiphenomenalism a concern because an experience can be said to have just as 
many causal powers as the neuronal activity way of picking out the brain state, for they refer 
to the same causal powers.   
I should note here that my contention that Searle is a real identity theorist, rather than a 
traditional reductive identity theorist can be seen in the equal status of either way of 
describing the causal powers of the brain state.  Many solutions to the problem of mental 
causation collapse the mental causes to the physical causes.  However, seeing Searle as a real 
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identity theorist, who resists reduction of the mental to the physical, views the two 
characterisations of the causal powers on an equal footing.  This means that Searle manages 
to solve the problem of mental causation without the need for reduction. 
3. Making sense of Biological Naturalism 
I believe that Biological Naturalism makes sense.  Searle is presenting a view which is that of 
real identity theory, where an experience is just one way to pick out a particular token brain 
state occurring in a subject, and both the experiential and neuronal way of referring to the 
brain state are valid and informative characterisations of it.   
Experiences have a first-person ontology in that a subject undergoes a qualitative experience 
when certain token brain states are instantiated.  This is the sense in which an experience is 
just a state the brain can be in.  It is the reason why experiences are subjective; because they 
need to be grasped experientially from the first-person point of view of the subject 
undergoing them.  That is to say, experiences exist ‘only as experienced by a human or animal 
subject’7. 
Searle’s notion that experiences are ontologically irreducible is meant in a trivial way meaning 
that reduction is simply inapplicable to experiences.  The source of the inapplicability is the 
impossibility of separating the appearance from the reality where experiences are concerned, 
which is what Searle believes the process of reduction is.  The appearances of an experience 
cannot be separated from any underlying reality because, claims Searle, the appearance of an 
experience, what it feels like for the subject undergoing it, is that experience’s quiddity, so 
attempting to reduce it, that is, carve it off in favour of an underlying causal process, loses the 
very nature that was trying to be understood.   
So, Searle’s Biological Naturalism, as I have construed it, is a view that holds both token 
identity and irreducibility.  I have called this view real identity theory.  Experiences are 
irreducible to neuronal activity in the brain, but they are just a particular brain state occurring 
in a subject.  If you wanted to reject a reductionist approach to experiences, but not slide all 
the way to dualism, then Biological Naturalism offers a position between the two.  I think this 
is an important option in philosophy of mind, which is mostly overlooked in the literature, and 
deserves a lot more attention. 
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